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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship between diagnostic communication
practices and deliberative rhetoric through the lens of Actor-Network theory and feminist
theory. Specifically, I argue that Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT) provides a
generative framework for tracing diagnostic networks as it accounts for uncertainty, dispersed
agency, community stakeholders, and nonhumans. The chapters explore how a networked
approach to diagnosis opens up opportunities to reform doctor-patient relationships,
expands our conceptions of diagnostic actants, suggests ways to respond to patients living at
risk for disease, and broadens our understanding of ethos in healthcare contexts.
Furthermore, I also consider how a networked framework can help us comprehend how
public misdiagnoses happen so we can prevent them in the future. I conclude by advocating
for healthcare providers to reform diagnostic communication practices to account for the
agency and expertise of non-specialist stakeholders, particularly patients. I also explore
methods for intervening within global health networks and addressing the intersectional
problems they collaboratively solve.
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CHAPTER 1:
DIAGNOSING DIAGNOSIS: A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO NETWORKED
PRACTICE
This clash of contexts pits the doctor's impulse to reduce against the patient's impulse to multiply.
Medicine's reductionism narrows its gaze, eliminating that which proliferates around the
biological phenomena of sickness in a patient's always generative and teeming life. – Rita Charon
Popular representations of diagnosis, in television shows such as House, commonly
depict the diagnostic process as a doctor (usually male) and his trainees looking down at test
results or a lab report that reveals the problem. Cancer. Kidney failure. Multiple Sclerosis. The
doctor usually experiences relief and sometimes pride because he or she has cracked the case.
In real life, though, diagnosis is much messier. A patient waits for over an hour with
trembling, sweaty palms in a stark, white oﬃce that smells like Latex gloves and hand
sanitizer, and she listens anxiously to her doctor’s greeting for hints as to what will come next.
When she hears the news, she will either breathe a heaving sigh of relief because she is safe—
but only for now—or she will face a new reality, one to be haunted by incomprehensible
medical terminology, pokes and prods by needles, stethoscopes and laser rays, and potentially
most troubling, her own mortality.
In response to the divide between the two presentations just described, one of cool
rationality in the face of illness, and one of the confusion, pain, and chaos that illness can
engender, scholars within the medical and health humanities have posed a series of
challenging questions in recent years: how can doctors most ethically respond to patient’s
needs for emotional as well as physical support? (see Nancy Mairs and Ann Jurecic); who
should get to tell narratives of illness? (see Arthur Frank and Rita Charon); and what do
patients deserve in communication about their health, and where do doctors fall short in
delivering on these rights? (see Lisa Sanders and Kathryn Montgomery Hunter).
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This dissertation adds to such questions by considering how acknowledging the
rhetorical and intersectional dimensions of diagnoses might enable doctors to more ethically
account for (1) the complex factors that constitute illness and (2) the narrative agency of
patients. More importantly, I will examine how this shift in framework might enable patients
to find a sense of meaningfulness within an illness experience that can significantly alter one’s
sense of self. Contemporary rhetorical accounts of diagnosis tend to cast the encounter as a
static process wherein the doctor is granted ultimate narrative authority. In “Diagnosis: A
Biocultural Critique of Certainty,” Lennard Davis highlights the roots of the term diagnosis
itself: “Dia means both ‘through’ and ‘thorough [knowing]” and “Gnosis, as knowledge,
implies the certainty of religious knowledge” (85; emphasis original). He argues that
diagnosis serves two key rhetorical functions: it grants doctors the status previously held by
priests, who could make determinations about a person’s spiritual health, and it also renders
diagnoses ostensibly a-rhetorical, or incontestable. Similarly, in Every Patient Tells a Story, Lisa
Sanders argues that in diagnostic encounters, the doctor plays the role of detective and the
patient plays the role of the “passive bystander to the ongoing crime” (6). Within this
detective work, according to Rita Charon, the patient loses even her ability to control the
form that her narrative of illness will take: “Instead of listening silently while a patient makes
the countless narrative decisions that must be made in conveying anything, the doctor spoils
the patient’s narrating by forcing it into medicine’s preferred outline and sequence” (99).
Such a move on the part of the physician to control both the form and content of the
patient’s narrative means that “information of the most valuable sort” is lost (99).
Significantly, these views of diagnosis limit the patient’s agency (narrative and
otherwise), ignore sociocultural factors that cause and contribute to illness, and fail to
account for the complex network of actants involved in any illness or diagnosis. Perhaps Judy
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Segal, in Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine, most clearly establishes this static view of
diagnosis when she takes an Aristotelian approach to medical rhetorics by defining rhetoric as
persuasion (1-2). While of course many medical encounters involve persuasion, such a
definition fails to account for the dynamism of diagnosis, the uncertainty it engenders, and
the multiplicity of actants involved in molding illness narratives and their meaning.
My thesis is that shifting from an Aristotelian view of diagnosis to a Latourian
(networked, rhetorical) framework will promote a more relational practice that accounts for
various actants, narratives, social and structural factors, and objects that shape diagnosis,
specifically, and illness, in general. I’m interested in an Actor-Network Theory (ANT)
approach to diagnosis because networks enable us to trace complex situations and follow the
movements of every actant so that we might intervene and respond to what we find. As
opposed to the static model of diagnosis, which solely considers the doctor and patient (who
remains powerless), ANT suggests that diagnostic networks are vibrant, ever evolving, and
constitutive of our worlds, but most importantly, they can always be reassembled if actants
redistribute into other, better chains of associations. Thus, such a method serves well as a
framework for medical rhetorics because it reflects the dynamism of medicine, the relational
qualities that are inherently apart of caring for patients, and the reassemblage of practices and
theories that no longer serve patients’ needs. Such a framework might empower patients to
navigate the various narratives that haunt their illness experience rather than simply
accepting a diagnosis that reduces their complex identity into a singular narrative of patient
hood. I also hope that such an approach will counter the stigmatization and blame that often
accompany contemporary diagnoses by contextualizing illness within a Western framework
of racism, sexism, homophobia, poverty, and ableism. For example, such a rhetorical
framework might take into account the extent to which poor minority women living near
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waste sites are more likely to develop breast cancer, and this analysis might shape the
diagnosis so as to assign blame to the social factors that influence disease. It is not enough for
medicine to define or even treat illnesses; it must respond to the structural sources that
disproportionately cause them. To the extent that diagnoses serve to categorize the healthy
and the sick, the normal and the abnormal, the self-governing and the dependent, ignoring
such rhetorical dimensions that inform diagnosis is irresponsible and deeply unethical.
Beyond speaking to more healthy power dynamics between doctors and patients,
such a rhetorical rethinking of the practices and assumptions particular to diagnosis
represents a vital way for medicine to reclaim its significance in a time when Google, Web
MD, and other medical websites sometimes oﬀer cheaper, faster, and more empathic
interactions than doctors do (Topol 26). If doctors fail to acknowledge the rhetorical and
networked elements of medicine and diagnosis, then they will further undermine their own
relevance by limiting their role to the interpretation of test results. Ann Jurecic reminds us
that doctors oﬃces and hospitals have replaced churches as the foremost place wherein
people face questions of life, death, pain, and suﬀering, and since this is the case, healthcare
providers must account for this growing need that people have to make meaning in medical
spaces (10). Medical rhetorics is a field that must engage with the most painful type of
uncertainty, mortality, and this means that medicine as a rhetorical enterprise must recognize
patients as agentive participants in the diagnosis and treatment of illness. Charon claims that,
“Nothing will ease patients’ uncertainty in the face of illness, but perhaps their doctors can
help them to articulate the uncertainty and thereby live less painfully with it” (30). And
perhaps the field of medical rhetorics remains uniquely poised to support such eﬀorts by
advocating for patients, opening up forums for listening to their narratives, and considering
the intersectional and networked actants that cause and inform illness.

4

Actor-Network Theory
Before I shift to a more specific analysis of the diagnostic problems to which ActorNetwork Theory might respond, I want to first discuss what Actor-Network theory does, and
then provide an example of what such a framework might look like in practice. In
Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour introduces his method(ology) of Actor-Network
Theory, which he uses to trace connections between actants (he prefers this term to the more
humanist “actor”) under the umbrella of a particular social institution, sociology in his case.
ANT’s key slogan is to “follow the actors themselves,” or “to try to catch up with their often
wild innovations in order to learn from them what the collective existence has become in
their hands, which methods they have elaborated to make it fit together, which accounts
could best define the new associations that they have been forced to establish” (12). To put it
most simply, networks are action, and the researcher who adopts an ANT framework must
follow this action to see the linkages and assemblages they (re)form. Latour notes that while
definitions for ANT have proliferated, there are three “tests” that may be applied to see if a
given study can accurately be dubbed ANT. First, an ANT method will grant to nonhumans
the role of “actors and not simply the hapless bearers of symbolic projection” (10). ANT
dramatically reconceives of the agency of non-human actants, which are now seen as not only
agentive but “vibrant,” in the words of Jane Bennett. Furthermore, another test is to check
whether the assemblage being considered (such as science, diagnosis, or sociology) is treated
as static and stable. “If the social remains stable and is used to explain a state of aﬀairs,” says
Latour, “It’s not ANT” (10). Or, to translate Latour, ANT remains highly suspicious of
eﬀorts to present any assemblage as inevitable or explain away an assemblage by pointing to a
“hidden social force” responsible for a particular event (11). Finally, the most diﬃcult test is
to “check whether a study aims at reassembling the social or still insists on dispersion and
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deconstruction” (11). Latour’s ANT aims to eschew the iconoclasm or critique in favor of a
method that builds something new and reassembles actants into a more healthy chain of
associations. Rather than critique, Latour introduces the word “gather” to serve as the project
for the 21st century ANT practitioner, who must undertake “a multifarious inquiry launched
with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how
many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its
existence” (“Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 246). Thus, Latour’s version of ANT
demands a commitment to active tracing of associations, attempts to reassemble unhealthy or
malfunctioning networks, and recognition of all actants as engaged and agentive.
Within Rhetoric and Composition, Latour’s ANT has been embraced as revival of
rhetoric, a way to not only open up rhetorical inquiry to nonhumans but to recognize that
deliberation occurs in response to complex negotiations amongst human and nonhuman
actants. In their “Introduction” to Thinking with Bruno Latour in Rhetoric and Composition,
Paul Lynch and Nathaniel Rivers put it simply: “Rhetoric’s new thing is, in fact, things” (40).
Despite the misleading “new” moniker, however, ANT stresses the limitations that have
always haunted human deliberators: “Latour dramatically increases the number and kinds of
deliberators. The truth is made but not solely by humans. In Latour’s agora, everything is
nervously loquacious. There is not a ‘society’ but rather a ‘collective’” (4). The serious
question that Latour puts to rhetoric—how can a discipline that has “historically defined
itself in terms of human language and expression adequately account for the persuasive
contributions of nonhuman agents?”—has serious implications for agency, ethics, and policy
formation, to name just a few key areas of rhetorical study (Scot Barnett 81). Not only do we
co-create truth and knowledge with nonhuman actants, but we rely on them even to create
occasions for speaking.
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For example, in her dissertation, Relational Agency, Networked Technology, and the
Social Media Aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing, Megan McIntyre argues that agency
can no longer be considered a possession of a single actor but rather something co-created
through a relationship among actants, a shared power to act. She explains, “agency is not the
property of any single actant but the product of the relationship between actants. Or,
perhaps, more importantly, agency becomes a product of the work of what Latour calls
mediation and translation undertaken by actants to improve the strength of their networks,
which is, at its core [...] a rhetorical endeavor” (73). For McIntyre, we have no choice but to
embrace such a conception of agency and to negotiate with nonhumans as we come to
decisions together. She also acknowledges that the stakes are quite high: “By layering
dependent and networked visions of agency, we might come to a more complex vision of
agency, one that privileges the relational over the autonomous and the dependent over the
independent” (73). Such a conception of agency, as ushered into rhetoric by ANT, better
responds to the problems facing many disciplines—from rhetoric to science studies—as it
promotes relational and collaborative decision-making.
Of course, medicine is also one such discipline that stands to benefit from ANT’s
method of tracing assemblages and relational agency. ANT has recently been adopted as a
method for studying medical environments, interactions, and even illnesses themselves. In
The Body Multiple, for example, Annmarie Mol, an ANT practitioner, argues that disease can
never be isolated as a single object—it is instead a dynamic series of “practices” involving “the
body, the patient, the disease, the doctor, the technician, the technology” (4-5). She explains,
“The ‘disease’ that ethnographers talk about is never alone. It does not stand by itself. It
depends on everything and everyone that is active while it is being practiced. The disease is
being done” (31-2). Whereas rhetorical ANT practitioners emphasize agency’s dispersal, Mol

7

emphasizes that illness itself is dispersed, relational, and uniquely uncertain. Others have
emphasized that ANT serves as a productive method for deliberating within medical contexts
of uncertainty. In Illness as Narrative, Jurecic wonders how stakeholders might best respond
to illness narratives if we exchange the critical project, which haunts the study of illness
narratives, for Latour’s concept of gathering. She asks, “Does prioritizing concerns about risk,
pain, human vulnerability, and the uncertainty of the future alter the critical project? What
might the study of narratives about illness look like if the critic’s task were to create
intellectual arenas for the gathering of ideas, and to address matters of concern with care and
compassion?” (17). Jurecic wonders if accounts of medical events can unhinge the critical
project of debunking fact and fiction by creating a diﬀerent task for the stakeholder within
an illness event: a commitment to care. In fact, Latour himself speaks to the need to
reconceive of illness, among other complex figures including God and art, apart from
critique when he writes: “I know, for instance, that the God to whom I pray, the works of art
I cherish, the colon cancer I have been fighting, the piece of law I am studying, the desire I
feel, indeed, the very book I am writing could in no way be accounted for by fetish or fact,
nor by any combination of those two absurd positions” (“Why Has Critique Run Out of
Steam?” 243). ANT’s value within medicine, at least in part, is its ability to open up
alternative ways for responding to illness that are actively constructive and responsive to
other actants.
While further sections of this introduction, and later chapters, will perform ANT
and more fully articulate its value to medical rhetorics, generally, and this dissertation,
specifically, I want to shift to an example of what Latour’s theory might look like when used
as a method for tracing an illness experience. In Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and
Liberation, Eli Clare approaches the issues of environmentalism and disability in conjunction
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with his emotional and mental problems: “body-deep terror, grief, and confusion” (36).
Rather than treating these issues from a purely psychological standpoint, he generates an
intersectional approach to identity-generation through what he calls “multi-issue politics,” or
an attempt to invite political and personal unity regarding issues that aﬀect us all (xi).
Primarily, Clare organizes this approach by focusing on the loss of home—the body as home
and his backwoods logging community in Oregon as home. As he reflects, he is “exiled” from
both due to his borderlands identities. He writes as a queer “supercrip” from a “redneck,”
working class family (36-8). He writes of his homesickness for a place that he cannot return
to because of the physical danger associated with being queer in the backwoods of Oregon
(35-6). As he explains, “If I moved back to Port Orford, the daily realities of isolation would
compete with my concerns for safety” (35). Thus, the loss of home involves a physical
separation from his working-class, rural roots, which remain at odds with his sexual and
political identities.
Clare also writes of being exiled from his body, which has been repeatedly abused,
tortured, and raped by his father and other men in his community throughout his
childhood. “Being a queer is one piece of this loss, this exile,” he writes, “Abuse is
another” (36). Beyond the extreme trauma Clare experiences based on past violations of his
body, Clare lives in the world as a queer person who must navigate societal demands that he
identify as a male or female. He writes of a desire to maintain his “long history as a girl” in
conjunction with his current state of living “as a man, even while my internal sense of gender
is as genderqueer, neither man nor woman” (xiii). Significantly, Clare’s complex identities
lead him to think of issues within mainstream feminist and queer studies and
environmentalism from an intersectional perspective. For example, he chastises queer
theorists for maintaining classist stereotypes about working-class “rednecks,” and treating
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them as if they are not intelligent enough to engage in conversations about homophobia,
racism, sexism, and other forms of structural and interpersonal violence (37). He also argues
that environmentalists need to think carefully about the lives of those who might be aﬀected
if logging towns are shut down—as he emphasizes, caring for the environment might mean
putting entire towns of people out of work (67).
Most importantly, perhaps, Clare highlights the extent to which his personal traumas
associated with being exiled from home require structural and multi-faceted changes. He
explains, “My displacement, my exile, is twined with problems highlighted in the
intersection of queer identity, working-class and poor identity, and rural identity, problems
that demand not a personal retreat, but long-lasting, systemic changes...I want each of us to
be able to bring our queerness home” (48). As I consider my project of adopting an ANT
approach to diagnosis, I am reminded of Clare’s story and his intersectional approach to the
personal and political problems that haunt him. In Latourian terms, Clare’s narrative is a
tracing of an assemblage, a lively (re)construction of a series of identities, and an exploration
of the varying factors that have shaped them. Whereas the terror, grief, and confusion could
have been diagnosed as a particular illness that shaped his story, Clare takes another approach
—one that reiterates the many narrative threads that inform him and rejects the idea that one
simple explanation can suﬃce. In what follows, I will explicate what I mean by this method
of narrative (re)assemblage, and I will explain why I find it so meaningful in the contexts of
healthcare and diagnosis.
As Clare probes the intersectional nature of his life problems, he discovers that none
of his problems can be neatly allocated to medicine—they are rather hybridized results of
trauma, location, class, politics, and many other factors. As this example illustrates, medical
rhetorics needs a hybridized approach to diagnosis to account for all of the factors that
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intersect to cause illness and shape a person’s response to it. While some have considered the
intersections of medicine and rhetoric in relation to intake forms (see Allan Peterkin’s “Adult
Intake Form,”), public conversations about abortion (see Bernice L. Hausman’s “Public
Fetuses”), and death and dying (see Felicia Cohn “When the Doctor is Not God”), among
many other issues, few have questioned the overlapping purviews of rhetoric and medicine in
relation to diagnosis. In response to the need for a theory that can adequately account for
complex experiences of illness, this dissertation interrogates the intersections of rhetorics of
diagnosis, theories of narrativity, selfhood, and meaningfulness, and networked theories of
human and nonhuman attachments.
In what follows, I will more fully articulate these three key areas of inquiry and their
intersections. Following a Latourian method of tracing assemblages, I will begin by
discussing a few problems within the rhetorics of diagnosis, and I will then consider how
ANT responds to such problems and opens up possible solutions. While later chapters will
explore these issues in greater depth, my aim here is to highlight what is at stake in a
rhetorical, networked view of diagnosis, and to establish the connection I see between ANT
assemblages and diagnostic encounters.

Problems with Contemporary Diagnosis
I am most concerned with the extent to which diagnoses have come to dominate
conversations surrounding illness today. For example, many argue that “reckless and
misleading drug company marketing” leads to the over-diagnosis of particular illnesses
(notably childhood Bipolar Disorders) (Frances 5), and about ten new disorders are added to
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) annually (Davis 85). I
acknowledge, of course, that diagnoses are oftentimes necessary for patients to seek treatment
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and insurance coverage; most patients, after all, see a doctor because they want to know what
is wrong or aﬃrm the belief that they are healthy. The problem lies, then, not primarily in
diagnosis itself, but in a tendency to overly emphasize its importance in relation to the
assemblage of stories that comprise a person’s identity, her illness, her culture, her triggers,
and many other factors that cannot be captured in a DSM number. In “Diagnosis: A
Biocultural Critique of Certainty,” Davis defines diagnosis as “a complex process in which a
person’s behaviors and thoughts, capable of being seen in many registers, are transmuted into
the register of symptoms” (84). As Davis highlights, diagnosis involves reducing a set of
complex, oftentimes confusing experiences with illness to a set of symptoms that must be
objectively determined and matched to a diagnostic label. As I will suggest in what follows,
this overemphasis of diagnosis can limit the significance of the narratives generated by
patients, diagnosticians, and other stakeholders. While diagnoses can provide explanations
for what is causing a person’s illness, they can be less helpful when patients seek to answer
questions regarding why they are sick and how they might cope.
Furthermore, the tremendous inflation of certain illnesses in recent years suggests a
sort of faddish approach to diagnosis, in which common illnesses are overly diagnosed
because they are conveniently memorable or seem to be the illness du jour. More specifically,
Allen Frances cites research by Ronald C. Kessler et al. that illustrates this inflation: their
study found that “half of Americans will meet the DSM-IV disorder criteria sometime in
their life, with first onset usually in childhood or adolescence” (Kessler et al. 593, Frances 5).
Beyond these problems of presuming that half of the population might be disordered given
the current criteria, many physicians fail to communicate diagnoses to patients. According to
Shergill et al., in “Communication of Psychiatric Diagnosis,” in their study of 126 patients,
only 53 percent were informed of their diagnosis, although most patients revealed that they
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wanted to know (32). Furthermore, only 75 percent of patients agreed with their diagnosis
(32). This speaks to the ethical dangers of viewing diagnostic encounters as arhetorical; at
times, when the diagnosis is seen as indisputable, some physicians may feel that it doesn’t
warrant a conversation with the patient. Worse than a limited view of a diagnostic encounter
as only being rhetorical to the extent that its persuasive is the view that the diagnostic
encounter does not require any dialogue at all.
In other cases, particularly within medicine, diagnoses may be ineﬀectively
communicated to patients in ways that increase their suﬀering or confusion. In Nancy Mairs’
Waist High in the World, she recounts her experience of visiting a student health center with
complaints of a limp and weakness on her left side. After she waited for a few days while her
doctor made phone calls to neurologists, she was finally told that “I had to worry about a
brain tumor. [...] The weakness on my left side, coupled with a history of headaches, pointed
to a tumor, which a battery of tests could confirm” (25). In response to this diagnosis,
“electrodes were pasted to my scalp, my spine and groin were punctured, dyes were injected
and X rays taken, and in the event there simply was no brain tumor” (26). The doctors
eﬀectively shrugged their shoulders over this failed diagnosis, and Mairs remembers that it
was only when she recognized her symptoms in a Parade magazine article months later that
she asked her doctor if she had Multiple Sclerosis. “Probably,” he told her, “But only time
[will] tell” (27). This lack of clear communication about diagnosis, while partially
understandable given the lack of tests available for MS at the time, still contributed to added
stress and grief on the part of Mairs, who had to wait eighteen more months before her
diagnosis would finally be confirmed by the onset of more symptoms.
Beyond these problems associated with diagnosis, there remains the problem of how
patients can account for their suﬀering post-diagnosis. According to Arthur Frank, “Whether
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ill people want to tell stories or not, illness calls for stories” because they must explain their
experiences to various audiences including “medical workers, health bureaucrats, employers
and work associates, family and friends” (53-4). The demands placed on patients by the need
for insurance coverage, Social Security benefits, employer understanding, and even the
concern of friends and family places the patient in the position where she must be able to
name and speak about her illness. She must be a responsible rhetor post-diagnosis, so why is
she not considered a key informant and participant in the diagnostic process itself? After all,
it is she who must give an account for her illness—and in many cases, such as for insurance
coverage, defend the legitimacy of her condition and the extent to which she is impaired by it
(if she wants to “claim” disability).
In all of the above examples, a few major stalemates within the field of medical
rhetorics are invoked that I wish to more fully explore in the following sections. In particular,
I want to shift away from a static view of the actants involved in diagnosis, the construction
of illness, and the post-diagnosis account of illness and towards a Latourian framework that
imagines all actants—from the patient herself to her X-Ray images—as active and engaged in
the process of diagnosis and its attendant meaning. In what follows, I will consider three
major stalemates within medical rhetorics surrounding diagnosis—shifting from the patient
vs. doctor to the assemblage, from critique to reassemblage, and from listening to tracing—
and the ways in which ANT opens up new possibilities for responding to them.

Diagnosis and Actor-Network Theory
From Patient vs. Doctor to the Agentive Assemblage
The tendency to view a diagnostic encounter as solely involving two rhetors, the
doctor and patient, remains a key issue within medical rhetorics because of the way in which
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it denies patients agency. Trish Roberts-Miller, whose research focuses particularly on
political deliberation, defines rhetoric as the “art of communities coming to decisions
together in a context of diversity and uncertainty” (“Research”). This definition, and its
emphasis on communal decision making, informs this research because of its emphasis on
navigating diverse and uncertain contexts, which applies perfectly to the complex and
multifaceted diagnostic experiences my project will cover. This definition also remains
significant because a major tension within medical rhetorics is the question of how best to
balance power relations between doctors and patients in a technologically-savvy time when,
according to Eric Topol, many would rather visit Google than their local doctor’s oﬃce when
they fall ill (26). As Roberts-Miller’s definition suggests, taking a rhetorical approach to
diagnosis will involve moving past the model that pits doctors against patients to invoke a
community of actors who decide together. This question of how best to balance the authority
of patients, doctors, technologies, and other stakeholders such as family members, nurses,
and hospital administrators remains crucial to conversations surrounding ethical decisionmaking in healthcare settings.
In response to this tension, some have suggested that doctors must find better
strategies to convince their malleable patients to work with and trust them. For example,
Sanders is critical of attempts to rely on medical expertise to diagnose illness while ignoring
the patient’s agency and testimony. However, she insinuates that paying attention to the
patient’s agency is most useful for persuading her to trust the doctor and even obey him or
her. She writes:
Studies have repeatedly shown that the greater the patient’s understanding of
his illness and treatment, the more likely it is that he will be able to carry out
his part in the treatment [...] Patients who understand their illness are far
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more likely to follow a doctor’s advice about how to change their diet and
how to take their medications than those who do not. It’s understandable.
Taking medications on a regular basis isn’t easy. It requires dedication on the
part of the patient. Motivation. A desire to incorporate this inconvenient
addition into a life that is already complicated. Greater understanding by the
patient has been shown to dramatically improve adherence. This is where
getting a good history—one that provides you with some insight into the
patient and his feelings about the illness, his life, his treatment—can really
pay oﬀ. (14-15)
While Sanders encourages doctors to help their patients “understand” their diagnosis and
invite them to participate in conversations about their treatment, her emphasis remains on
the doctor’s orders that must be followed. The process of letting patients speak about their
feelings abruptly becomes “getting a good history,” and Sanders notes that it can “pay oﬀ”—
but for whom?
Similarly, Segal also defines rhetoric as persuasion in Health and the Rhetoric of
Medicine, which implies that the doctor and patient have very diﬀerent functions in the
diagnostic encounter. More specifically, she argues that doctors must not merely rest on their
ethos but must eﬀectively persuade patients to comply with their advice and/or demands
within kairotic moments of illness. Patients, she argues, are “an audience, addressed but also
interpellated and constituted by the physician” because “each time [they] are addressed,
[they] are invited, sometimes irresistibly, to take the shape of a particular audience” (39). Not
only are patients generally limited to the rhetorical role of being convinced by their doctors
and dutifully following their advice, they are called into (rhetorical) existence by their
physicians. In being addressed by a physician, patients are asked to be a particular type of
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patient, a particular type of audience. Physicians, too, are bound to the work of
interpretation rather than rhetorical invention, within Segal’s framework. “The text to be
read,” she writes, “is not the person but the disease” (27). For Segal, doctors are limited to
the role of interpreting the disease (commonly through tests and technologies that speak for
the person) and to convince patients that the diagnosis is correct and that they should
therefore pursue the recommended treatment options. While such a belief suggests that the
patient and doctor are active participants in the diagnostic encounter, it problematically
assumes that patients are called into rhetorical existence only as an audience to the doctor’s
persuasive tactics and that doctors are rhetors who may not create meaning but only interpret
facts.
Segal’s view of medical rhetorics is echoed in Kathryn Montgomery Hunter’s Doctor’s
Stories. As the title suggests, Hunter also privileges the doctor’s function within the rhetorical
exchange of medicine. She adds that “It is interpretive work that the physician is doing, not
original composition, nor even (except in rare cases) co-composition. Physicians who attend
the funeral of one of their patients have this brought home to them in a striking manner. The
discovery that neither the physician nor the disease has been the strongest force in a patient’s
life comes as a surprise and relief ” (12). I would suggest that what surprises and relieves
physicians, in this case, is the undeniable sense that their patient was a person, a rhetorical
being that existed and acted apart from their control as the authoritative rhetor. Hunter goes
further with this idea by labeling the doctor as a detective and the patient as the bystander to
the illness crime, suggesting that diagnosis is not rhetorical (in the sense of coming to a
collaborative decision in an uncertain context, a la Roberts-Miller) as much as a challenging
but surmountable interpretive act (Hunter 11, Sanders 6). Within Roberts-Miller’s
conception, the rhetorical encounter might fail. For Hunter, there is no room for error: the
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doctor’s role is reading the patient’s body and solving the case by locating the culprit behind
the problem. 1 The patient’s job is to open herself up to interpretation by a doctor and her
instruments while accepting that she will, within such a framework, inevitably be both the
victim and perpetrator of the crime.
On the other hand, feminist physicians and therapists reframe the diagnostic
encounter as more egalitarian, and they argue that patients should reclaim authority over
their bodies and illnesses. In particular, Laura S. Brown, who self-identifies as a feminist
therapist, argues that in an egalitarian model of diagnosis, “therapists are charged with the
responsibility of acting in such a manner as to earn clients’ trust, thus oﬀering to clients the
power to decide as to the therapist’s trustworthiness rather than having the therapist declared
trustworthy simply by virtue of occupying that role in the exchange” (50). Physicians must
earn a client’s trust, then, not simply to reify their authority, but to encourage patients to
engage in the rhetorical exchange with them. Brown notes that feminists tend to “avoid
[diagnosis] when possible” because it commonly “reifi[es] an objectification of the client and
pathologizes her or his pretherapy strategies for increasing personal power by whatever means
available” (51). When diagnosis is necessary, however, for medical or financial reasons, Brown
advocates for an alternative model of diagnosis wherein the patient actively contributes to the
diagnosis, and wherein the constructed qualities of the diagnosis are discussed. “Thus,”
Brown explains, “in the worst case scenario where a diagnosis is written down, it is not given
by the therapist but arrived at collaboratively and known to the client because she or he has
taken part in deciding which [diagnosis] is a best fit” (51). Whereas Sanders wants to engage
1

Such a metaphor raises obvious ethical questions when we consider the rhetoric of war that
circulates within conversations about illness, which Audre Lorde spoke out against in her
Cancer Journals. As Lorde highlighted, such a metaphor causes patients to look at their own
bodies as an alien enemy, rather than directing their warlike aggression and concomitant
anger towards the environmental, social, and political factors that contribute to their disease.
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patients in the rhetorical diagnostic exchange solely to persuade them to listen to the doctor,
Brown oﬀers a refreshing alternative that might assert the patient’s right to name and own
her illness.
Such a debate about whether the doctor’s authority or the patient’s agency should be
emphasized is troubling for two major reasons. First, the stakes are quite high when patients
are left to be read and “solved” by their detective doctor. Sanders notes that much
information about illness will be overlooked, possibly leading to an incorrect diagnosis and
medical error, when physicians fail to engage patients as co-creators of knowledge within the
medical encounter. She notes, for instance, that doctors need to listen to the patients rather
than asking the questions that are solely important to them; the patient’s own testimony
about her illness will reveal the correct diagnosis up to 70 percent of the time (57). Such an
approach might also save patients the time and money that extensive testing requires and the
distress of being viewed by their doctor as an object. Furthermore, this stalemate also casts
the doctor as either an absolute authority figure who objectively diagnoses illness or a
detective who must distrust her patient as an unreliable witness and the perpetrator of a
crime that she must solve. Perhaps such options for a doctor’s relationship to her patients and
to illness can account, in part, for the disproportionately high rates of depression and suicide
amongst physicians in training. According to Louise B. Andrew, a survey of physicians found
that “1 in 16 had experienced suicidal ideation in the past 12 months, [and] only 26% had
sought psychiatric or psychologic help” (n.p.). For medical trainees, the rates were even
higher, even accounting for less ability or willingness to share given the extremely
competitive nature of residency programs. For trainees, one study revealed, “9.4% of fourthyear medical students and interns reported having suicidal thoughts in the previous two
weeks” (Goebert et al 238, Andrew n.p.). While many factors undoubtedly contribute to
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physician and trainee depression and suicide, a better model for understanding diagnosis,
and the doctor-patient relationship, might open up alternative ways for doctors and patients
to work together rather than at cross-purposes as they confront illness. Improving doctorpatient relations might reduce stress and isolation for both parties.
A networked framework for diagnosis shifts the conversation previously explicated
away from an emphasis on the adversarial relationship between doctors and patients and
towards an assemblage model. Rather than fighting for authority and privilege within the
diagnostic process, patients and doctors might recognize their mutual expertise that they
bring to bear: for patients, their embodied experience of illness and their personal history
with it, and for doctors, their generalized knowledge of the illness and its complications. As
co-creators of knowledge about illness and its attendant meanings, doctors and patients
might come into a more healthy relationship as nodes on a diagnostic network rather than
rhetorical adversaries. For example, Rita Charon implores doctors to better attune themselves
to the health care divide that exists between themselves and patients. She, too, describes the
fraught power struggle inherent within diagnosis, albeit in diﬀerent terms:
Despite the complexity and consequences of the events that unfold in the
doctor’s oﬃce, the participants are often ill prepared for that meeting. They
speak diﬀerent languages, hold diﬀerent beliefs about the material world,
operate according to diﬀerent unspoken codes of conduct, and are ready to
blame one another should things go badly. Many patients feel abandoned by
their doctors, dismissed in their suﬀering, disbelieved when they describe
their symptoms, or objectified by impersonal care [...] Sadly, patients have
come to reconcile themselves to a forced choice between attentiveness and
competence, between sympathy and science. At the same time, many doctors

20

feel aggrieved by the extravagant hopes patients have come to hold for the
powers of medicine. They feel unable to measure up to the patient’s inflated
expectations and demands that medical treatment will reverse the results of
unhealthy behaviors, poor health choices, or random and unfair bad luck.
Realizing how ‘slow’ are their true fixes, doctors prepare to disappoint
patients or to be sued for not being as eﬀective as everyone seems to think
they are. (21)
In this passage, Charon captures the frustration of patients, who feel they must either trust a
cold, distant, but eﬀective doctor or a sympathetic, patient, incompetent one, and the
feelings of inadequacy that doctors experience when they are seen as ultimate authorities,
invincible healers. The framework that presents doctors and patients as rhetorical adversaries
ultimately fails both doctors and patients, since it leaves them both feeling (often secretly)
vulnerable and helpless.
Another key value of the networked method is that it moves us past a focus on these
two actants alone and brings in other areas of expertise—that of the tests that generate
knowledge about illness rather than just interpret facts for doctors, that of the nurses who
spend intimate moments caring for the patient and therefore have their own insights, that of
the objects in the patient’s room that shape her relationship to her illness, that of the family
members who will advocate for the patient based on their emotional connections, and that of
the larger community which shapes conversations about illness, treatment, and what it means
to be a patient. Within a networked framework, no single actant is privileged more than any
other, so the narratives of the patient and the doctor, the technology and the location, the
nurses and the family members, and the social circumstances and the history of the patient,
would all be accounted for within the rhetorical encounter of diagnosis and coming to
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decisions about treatment options. Graham Harman sums up this position nicely in “The
Road to Objects,” where he writes:
There can be no better example of a perfectly flat ontology than the early
philosophy of Bruno Latour. At that point in Latour’s career, all human and
inhuman things, all chunks of physical matter and people and cartoon
characters, are equally actors. What makes all things actors, despite the vast
diﬀerences between them, is that they have an eﬀect on other things. As
Latour puts it as recently as 1999 in Pandora’s Hope, to be real means “to
modify, transform, perturb, or create” something else. Reality is defined not
by what it is, but by what it does. Not everything is equally strong, since the
Chinese government aﬀects more things than does a stick figure drawn in the
notebook of a Chinese schoolboy, but everything is equally real, since even
that stick figure has some faint emotional resonance in the boy’s mind and is
therefore not just an empty hole of non-being, while the mighty eﬀect of the
Chinese government on its citizens is diﬀerent only in degree from the stick
figure, even if that degree of diﬀerence is huge. Reality for the early Latour
means having an eﬀect on other things. And just as for Aristotle all humans
are equally humans and all trees equally trees, for the early Latour all actors
are equally actors. (177-8)
Within healthcare contexts, interestingly, objects and nonhumans—such as tests and scans—
have come to be more credible actants than humans themselves. Some doctors find that
relying on tests is more comfortable and accurate than listening to the stories of patients,
their bodies, and the other actants within the diagnostic assemblage. However, networked
diagnosis would bring the expertise of all such actants to bear on diﬃcult cases and would
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draw on their collective authority in responding to the most challenging and painful of all
uncertainties: how to regain health or face death.

From Critique to Reassemblage
Another stalemated debate within medical rhetorics to which a networked framework
might respond is the problem of critique. Previously, I mentioned that some scholars within
medical rhetorics have tried to locate alternative ways of responding to illness experiences and
narratives that evade the distrust and iconoclasm of critique. Such techniques are
undoubtedly inappropriate for experiences of illness that can devastate a person’s identity and
life. But feminist writers and disability activists have also been particularly, and rightly, vocal
in speaking out against disparities within healthcare settings and encounters, such as
disproportionate access to compassionate care, abusive practices that harm rather than help
patients, and neglect of the elderly, in particular, in long-term care facilities. While I align
myself with such critiques, as will likely become apparent in the analysis that follows, I also
recognize the importance of moving beyond critique and towards an active reassemblage of
the very medical networks of which we’re apart. As Latour claims in “Why Has Critique Run
Out of Steam?” critique on its own can result in compassion fatigue, frustrated abandonment
of diﬃcult conversations, and stakeholders pointing fingers at each other from opposite sides
of the room (I might add, hospital). Perhaps the most common example of such an
overemphasis on critique can be seen in discussions surrounding mental healthcare, where
some attempt to shore up their field’s ostensible objectivity by citing the authority of such
tools as the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, while others rally against these
disempowering justifications for labeling (primarily) minorities as “ill.” In what follows, then,
I will focus on mental healthcare rhetorics as I consider ways in which a networked approach
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would more fruitfully address the need to hold those in power accountable while it opens up
ways to reconstitute traditional methods for diagnosing people with mental illnesses.
Perhaps the most commonly critiqued practice within mental healthcare rhetorics is
the use of the DSM to diagnose mental illness. In 2013, in fact, the National Institute of
Mental Health revoked support for the DSM-V, the most recent version of what some
aﬀectionately call the “Bible” of mental disorders, noting that they would no longer support
research projects that relied on or studied DSM criteria. Christopher Lane, in “The NIMH
Withdraws Support for DSM-5,” calls the decision a “humiliating blow” to the American
Psychiatric Association, particularly since the NIMH explained that “The weakness of the
manual is its lack of validity” (n.p.). This significant move comes in the wake of much dissent
about the manual’s validity, usefulness, and misuse. For example, in Making Us Crazy, Herb
Kutchins and Stuart Kirk argue that the groups most likely to be designated as mentally ill
are already vulnerable populations, such as women, minorities, and LBGTQ+ individuals.
For example, the “illness” of homosexuality remained a mainstay in the DSM until the
1970s, and several “illnesses” have surfaced within the DSM’s history that attempt to
pathologize women’s interest in sex. Furthermore, Frances notes that many physicians fail to
even double-check DSM criteria when making a diagnosis, and that when he quizzed them
on the basic guidelines for diagnosing common disorders, most of the physicians were
stumped. He argues that a tool is only as useful as its implementation, and that the DSM’s is
most useful at instigating overdiagnosis of illnesses like depression or anxiety because of their
popularity or because new drugs are being pushed by pharmaceutical companies. Relatedly,
others have criticized the small group of (mostly) white, male physicians who have
traditionally served as the DSM editors for allowing drug companies to influence their
categorization of illnesses. For example, the diagnosis of depression exploded in popularity
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following the invention of Prozac, which drug companies marketed directly to doctors and
consumers. As this all-too-brief analysis illustrates, critiques of the DSM from many
stakeholders—including psychiatrists and NIMH leaders—proliferate.
Other prominent criticisms of diagnosis within mental healthcare circles come from
feminists who challenge the authority of psychologists to label some “ill” and others “well”
based on a reductive criteria. For example, Joan Jacobs Brumberg challenges diagnoses with
eating disorders by demonstrating that, since the Victorian period, women’s appetites have
represented sexual appetite, drudgery (such as housework and extensive meal preparation),
and aggressiveness. She cites historical stigmatizations of female desires and appetites as the
underlying cause of eating disorders rather than a pathological state on the part of the
woman who suﬀers. She writes, “even when an illness is organic, being sick is a social act”
that responds to contemporary circumstances (8). “Among aﬄuent young Victorians,” she
adds, “food and eating were at the center of a web of associations that had a great deal to do
with gender and class identity. The same is true today, but broad social and cultural forces,
particularly the intensification of messages about the female body, have promoted the
urgency of appetite control and generated a new experience of the disease” (8). For
Brumberg, DSM criteria describe symptoms of a larger cultural disease that aﬀects particular
vulnerable populations more accurately than they describe the disease itself. Susan Bordo
echoes Brumberg’s analysis and extends it to argue that anorexia nervosa, as a common
example of a disease that cannot be reduced to a DSM diagnosis, represents not a rejection of
the “ideal” female body but a hyperbolic enactment of it. The disproportionately high
incidence of eating disorders in women during periods of gender change leads her to suggest
that these disorders tell us what is wrong with Western culture rather than what is wrong
with self-starving women. The contemporary anorectic, for Bordo, “experiences her life as
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well as her hungers as out of control,” and due to cultural messages that tell her that this is
wrong, she becomes “hooked on the intoxicating feeling of accomplishment and control”
that eating disorders can supply (149). This feminist approach levies blame at representations
of female bodies in advertising, cultural ideas that women should be thin and without
appetite, and expectations for women to focus on controlling their appearance rather than
becoming politically engaged. While I am quite sympathetic with such critiques of the DSM,
in particular, and constructions of mental illnesses that aﬀect vulnerable populations, more
specifically, I want to suggest that they might be more powerful when enacted with an eye to
reassemblage of these troubling paradigms.
A networked framework for shifting from critique to reassemblage would involve
generating alternative narratives about mental illnesses and other methods for responding to
them in addition to critiquing structural inequities and abuses within medicine. For Latour,
reassemblage is additive in the sense that, “The social that makes up society is only one part
of the associations that makes up the collective. If we want to reassemble the social, it’s
necessary, aside from the circulation and formatting of traditionally conceived social ties, to
detect other circulating entities” (Reassembling the Social 233). What other actants are
circulating that might be added to this assemblage to strengthen it? Digital support groups
oﬀer excellent examples of patients and concerned stakeholders coming together to support
each other, rally for their rights to insurance coverage and to define their illnesses on their
own terms, provide advice to those who have recently fallen ill, and respond to injustices
within healthcare settings (see Kristen Gay, “Unbearable Weight, Unbearable Witness”).
These groups oftentimes critique problems that they’ve witnessed, but they also construct an
alternative space wherein patients might tell their stories and reclaim their subjectivity from
stigmatizing mental health diagnoses. Such an active reassertion of what is missing in medical
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discourse for many—the unique identities of individuals that cannot be encapsulated by a
diagnosis—speaks to the empowerment that a network reassemblage might foster.
Furthermore, for researchers who want to engage in networked critique, they might follow
the lead of Becky W. Thompson in A Hunger So Wide and So Deep, who interviewed many
Black, working-class, and lesbian women with eating disorders and found that nearly all
named experiences with sexual abuse as the cause. While she firmly levies a critique against
assumptions that eating disorders are a superficial “white girl” illness, for example, she goes a
step further by suggesting a new way to label eating disorders without stigmatizing those who
suﬀer: eating problems. Problems, she suggests, indicate the complex narratives that
interweave to create a troubled relationship between a woman and her body in contrast to
disorder, which implies that the woman is somehow responding inappropriately to a
traumatic experience. Beyond adding this new word to the network, she also adds new
voices; she writes that, “scholarship on eating problems is not particularly behind in its lack
of attention to race, sexuality, and class. Unfortunately, it mirrors health scholarship in
general” (6). Rather than simply critiquing such an omission, which has led to misdiagnosis
and lack of treatment for women of color, she fills this gap, in part, with the voices of the
women she interviews, who reassemble what it means to be a woman with an eating problem
(12). While there is still room for critique within and against diagnosis, Thompson’s method
for also assembling something new might empower patients, enliven conversations
surrounding a particular illness, and lead to more structural changes by inviting conversation
with multiple stakeholders.
As I hope my extended example of critique and reassemblage in the literature
surrounding eating disorders has illustrated, ANT’s commitment to adding new voices and
listening to those who have been excluded oﬀers a compelling alternative to the critical
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project. The trick, for Latour, is not to reassemble our networks to account for all of the
isolated voices that must be heard but to be able to negotiate with them in concert—after all,
when we trace a chain of associations, the actants to who we are responsible only grows. In
“Where are the Missing Masses?” he writes, “Students of technology are never faced with
people on the one hand and things on the other, they are faced with programs of action,
sections of which are endowed to parts of humans, while other sections are entrusted to parts
of nonhumans. In practice they are faced with [...] the only thing they can observe: how a
negotiation to associate dissident elements requires more and more elements to be tied
together and more and more shifts to other matters” (174). The work of reassembling
networks is never done because the network is never stable or complete but ever evolving,
like a swarm of ants attacking a piece of food, carrying pieces away, eating the food, and
making new shapes as they go. Furthermore, what can initially look like a small chain of
associations will eventually reveal, in the tracing of them, a complex system of humans and
nonhumans that have never stopped moving. For diagnosis, critique falls flat because it
ultimately reinscribes the very hopelessness and frustration that simplistic diagnoses
engender. On the other hand, a reassemblage project that adds new actants to the diagnosis
being considered (and actants here might be anything from the poverty aﬀecting a young
woman with an eating disorder to the diet pills she abuses), opens up new ways to conceive
of the problem, new sources of the problem to consider, and new ways to intervene in the
assemblage.

From Listening to Tracing
As previously discussed, when doctors consider their role to be that of persuading
patients to listen to them or interpreting their bodies and symptoms, all members of the
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diagnostic network suﬀer and diminish their agentive capacities. Furthermore, when
researchers and theorists respond by critiquing such practices without creating alternatives,
they fail to open up conversations about revising them. A final debate wherein a networked
framework for diagnosis might be preferable to the current, static framework is within the
characterizations of diagnostic encounters as hinging on silencing vs. listening. Countless
debates within medical rhetoric stem from a concern about whether patients are being
silenced or listened to, and in fact, such concerns often inform alternative practices like
narrative medicine. I want to consider what a shift to tracing, in addition to listening, might
do to move this conversation into a third space of active reconstruction of networks. In this
section, I will discuss several prominent voices within this debate before I explicate why
tracing might be a helpful complement to listening practices.
In Thomas Couser’s Recovering Bodies, he argues that the professionalization
techniques that doctors have adopted function more to shore up their own authority than to
serve patients and their needs (20-1). For example, he highlights problems surrounding the
diagnostic interview, and mentions that doctors are highly likely to interrupt patients,
especially Black female patients, during this process (20). As patients tell the story of their
illness, doctors might tell them to stick to the facts or only answer their questions, or they
might abruptly cut patients oﬀ and ask a particular question that they deem important.
Couser also mentions that fears surrounding identification with a patient who might be ill or
dying leads to a depersonalization of medical care, while concerns that their authority might
be undermined can lead doctors to withhold information or even a diagnosis from patients.
Beyond not listening to patients, the fear doctors experience of identifying with patients and
their unsettling mortality has led some to adopt a language that downplays their personhood
altogether. Thus, Couser writes, a man with liver failure might be referred to as “the liver in
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201” (26). Similarly, Couser refers to Perri Klass, who highlights the language used when a
patient’s treatment isn’t going well: “You never say that a patient’s blood pressure fell or that
his cardiac enzymes rose. Instead, the patient is always the subject of the verb: ‘He dropped
his pressure.’ ‘He bumped his enzymes.’ [...] When chemotherapy fails to cure Mrs. Bacon’s
cancer, what we say is, ‘Mrs. Bacon failed her chemotherapy’” (A Not Entirely Benign
Procedure 73-4). Such issues within the diagnostic process, far from simply reiterating
doctors’ insecurity about their authority to speak for illness, also highlight the routine
silencing of patients as they try to speak about what pains them, what they fear, and what
might be wrong. Patients aren’t merely silenced; they are even grammatically blamed for their
illness, since the disease has happened in their body, and they must thus be a co-conspirator
with it. Couser sums up these problems by noting, “Thus discourse between patient and
doctor occurs in a way that may be at odds with the root meaning of communication, the
making common of information” (20-1).
As if to highlight the silencing of patients on the part of doctors—and to reinstill the
sense that it’s somehow the patient’s fault if the doctor ignores them—Barbara M. Korsch
and Caroline Harding authored the Intelligent Patient’s Guide to the Doctor-Patient
Relationship to ostensibly teach patients to “lear[n] how to talk so your doctor will listen,” as
the subtitle promises. While Korsch and Harding attempt to put patients in doctors’ shoes to
help them better appreciate the struggles and demands they face, the text comes oﬀ as
defensive. For example, they write that “Ideally, we all would like our physicians to be
completely dedicated. In the best of all worlds, our doctors would cater to all our needs and
we would no longer have any complaints. Although that sort of an arrangement does sound
alluring, it doesn’t work. When physicians consistently go beyond what should realistically be
expected of them, they become less responsive to their patients” (128). What cannot be
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realistically expected of physicians—what chafes too much against time restrictions and
compassion fatigue—is apparently the commitment to listening to patients, hearing what
concerns them, and reassuring them that they will do something about it together.
In response to such methods for interrogating, rather than engaging, patients during
the diagnostic encounter, Charon and others have created an alternative narrative medicine
practice that shifts from silencing patients to listening to them. Charon advocates for
enabling patients to not only tell their stories but to do so on their own terms; in her
experience, the ability to control the way the story is told is as important to patients as the
ability to speak. Her process involves listening carefully to patients, asking open-ended
questions that allow them to elaborate as they wish, and letting them open up about
uncomfortable topics such as their fears of death, what it might mean to be terminally ill, or
how their bodies might change through treatment. She explains that her process “begins
simply with the invitation to ‘tell me what you think I should know about your situation,’
and is followed by a commitment to listen and not—at least at the start—to write or even to
speak. When I first started doing this, I had to literally sit on my hands to prevent myself
from writing in the chart or calling up the patient’s computerized medical records” (187). As
the patient recounts her story, Charon listens intently, avoids interrupting unless its
absolutely necessary, and pays attention “as I sit there at the edge of my seat, absorbing what
is being given—to metaphors, idioms, accompanying gestures, as well as plot and characters
represented for me” (188). Once the patient has told her story, a process that tends to take
twenty or thirty minutes, she then begins the physical examination, keeping in mind the
patient’s experience of her illness, the language and idioms she used to describe it, and her
fears and concerns. She refutes the idea that such a process is too time-consuming to be
useful as she notes that the time she spends listening to her patients early on usually saves her
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time later as she more quickly comes to a diagnosis and can more easily generate treatment
plans with patients once she has earned their trust. She elaborates, “Unfortunately, sickness
does not travel in straight lines, and we who care for sick people have to be equipped for
circuitous journeys if we want to be of help. Although many health care professionals worry
that they do not have the time to listen for stories, many of us who have incorporated
listening into practice find that time invested early is recouped quickly” (67). While Charon’s
process is both more ethical and compassionate than the type of “care” previously described
by Couser, Korsch, and Harding, I want to suggest that it could be taken a step further by
incorporating a Latourian concept of tracing a network. Rather, the kind of work within
which Charon engages, while it can aptly be called listening, also serves an important
function of inviting the patient to trace her illness experience in collaboration with the
doctor.
As Charon acknowledges in her practice, for Latour, tracing is a necessarily slow
process, one that requires care and precision. He writes that when tracing one must “Instead
of cutting the Gordian knot [...] struggl[e] to follow the gestures of those who tie it together”
(Pandora’s Hope 87). Rather than trying to separate interwoven problems, then, one who
traces must look at where the problems intersect and follow the actants as they navigate their
networks. As McIntyre puts it, “Tracing is a painstaking process that requires adherents to
follow nonhuman and human participants from network to network and trial to trial” (21).
Just as Charon experiences when she listens to her patients trace their experiences with
intersecting problems, the time invested in listening often yields more fruitful ways to
approach treatment and healing since tracing emphasizes intersectionality.
For example, Charon recounts the experience of working with Mr. Ortiz, a patient
who described not only his symptoms but “the recent shift from construction work to part-
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time clerking in a clothing store because of physical inability to do strenuous work, and his
current shame at being unable to support his family without accepting welfare” (185). In
treating Mr. Ortiz, she treated the physical symptoms of his coronary artery disease, but she
also discovered that “his sadness and shame have by no means gone away. He continues to
have joint pain, fatigue, trouble with his son, bursts of intolerable but uncontrollable
anger” (185). Charon notes that she listens “as an internist—deciding to get knee films, for
example, and to start anti-inflammatory medicine for his joint pain” but also “for his story of
himself ” (185). She concludes by writing, “He finds comfort and strength in the telling and
finds himself remembering things from childhood and making connections among his
emotions, his past, and his physical symptoms” (185). Ultimately, such disclosure enables
Mr. Ortiz to seek talking therapy with Charon, who asks a colleague in medical social work
to be her mentor as she develops her skills in this area. “It feels right,” she says, “for me to
commit this work myself instead of referring Mr. Ortiz to a separate psychotherapist because
his emotional pain is intimately tied to his physical situation. It would feel disruptive of his
integrity as a self-with-a-body to pull apart those two aspects of his suﬀering, apportioning
the discouragement and depression to the social worker and keeping the chest pain and
shortness of breath for myself ” (186). While Charon does not assume full responsibility for
the care of Mr. Ortiz—and she reiterates later that “bearing witness requires community”—
she does refuse to disentangle the Gordian knot of the patient’s sources of pain to preserve his
integrity as a complex but whole person (197). For Latour, similarly, “ANT claims that it is
possible to trace more sturdy relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way
to register the links between unstable and shifting frames of references rather than by trying
to keep one frame stable” (Reassembling the Social 24). Thus, Charon’s listening can be seen as
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a kind of Latourian tracing, a practice for medicine that is preferable to a dynamic of
listening to or silencing patients.
Furthermore, tracing is also invaluable for medical rhetorics because, although
Sanders allows that while in simple cases doctors can easily tell “whodunit” due to advances
in medical technology, diﬃcult cases oﬀer a chance to revert to diagnosis as an art, since they
suspend the doctor’s automatically assumed authority to speak for disease. As the medical
advisor to the popular television show House, she estimates that up to 15 percent of patients
are given the wrong diagnosis, and that incorrect diagnoses cause many of the adverse eﬀects
associated with illness (xxii). Far from blaming the patient for failure to be “read” properly or
to comply with the doctor’s instructions, Sanders blames the diagnostic interaction, as
recommended by Segal, that values technology over touch, testing over discussing, speaking
over listening. In “Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medicine,” Eta S.
Berner and Mark L. Graber corroborate Sanders’ assertion while they argue that doctors’
pride itself is commonly to blame for inaccuracies. They assert that physicians tend to
generate an automatic hypothesis when examining patients, and once they have (often
prematurely) made this educated guess, they automatically limit the range of available causes
of illness. This creates a “general tendency on the part of physicians to disregard, or fail to
use, decision-support resources” because “physicians do not think they need diagnostic
assistance” (57). Berner and Graber attribute this tendency to overconfidence, at least in part,
to the demands placed on physicians to be absolute authorities, to eschew uncertainty, and to
present themselves as competent professionals—even in the face of fatal or complex illnesses
(Timmermans and Mauck 18, Katz 35). Lest I sound too critical of physicians, it’s important
to note that this process generally works—more often than not, such a process is adopted
because of its general eﬃcacy in limiting an enormous range of illnesses to a few likely
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“culprits.” However, the relatively high rates of inaccurate diagnosis for common illnesses
such as Bipolar Disorder (wrong diagnosis in 69 percent of patients), breast cancer (missed in
21 percent of patients), endometriosis (missed in 18 percent of cases), and pulmonary
embolism (diagnosis was incorrect in 55 percent of fatal cases) suggests that perhaps this
model doesn’t work well for all illnesses, or in all situations (Perlis, Beam et al, Buchweitz et
al, Pineda et al). Perhaps doctors and patients need other ways to trace problems particular to
pain and illness that move beyond the antagonistic or paternalistic models so common in the
medical literature. Perhaps, more to the point, they need each other.

From Certainty to Meaningfulness
The suggestions here of the implications of networked diagnosis are by no means
comprehensive, as there are both other fruitful benefits of adopting such a framework and
potential consequences to consider, such as the allotment of resources and medicine’s values
of eﬃciency and timeliness. If I at times come across as particularly critical of doctors, I want
to acknowledge too that they face very real constraints when diagnosing patients. For medical
doctors, a patient’s risk of death or other health complications (like a stroke) might urge
them to quickly and perhaps brashly move forward in pursuit of an answer rather than
considering their patient’s need to tell their story. For mental health practitioners, fears that
their patients might take their own lives or endanger others if they don’t adopt a paternalistic
role within the diagnostic encounter can foster detrimental but nonetheless understandable
psychologist-patient dynamics. I also acknowledge that my project challenges a key value
within medical or psychological diagnosis: the ability to be certain. As previously mentioned,
Davis argues in that the very roots of the term diagnosis speak to the intricate relationship
between certainty and medicine. However, as I hope this analysis highlights, coming to a
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certain knowing of a patient’s illness may not only be impossible in some cases, it may not be
enough to satisfy their need to make meaning out of a death-inflected or life-altering
diagnostic experience. Thus, I want to conclude by suggesting that a networked approach to
diagnosis might finally move us past the rigid pursuit of certainty and towards a striving for
meaningfulness.
Ann Jurecic, in Illness as Narrative, says that if folk explanations for illness and
religious justifications for suﬀering no longer hold sway in our contemporary moment, then
doctor’s oﬃces become the new space wherein people ask these questions “human fragility
and significance” (10). The failure of doctor’s oﬃces, both in general medicine and
psychology, to answer these questions or to even entertain them has been well-documented,
as the recent increase in autobiographical accounts of illness in digital and print spaces
suggest. But as long as patients will be diagnosed with terminal illnesses, as long as everyday
persons will suddenly have to open themselves up to medical authority because of a dot on
an X-ray, and as long as doctors will serve as patients’ guides in their journey towards better
mental health, it will not be enough to definitively tie down a diagnosis for a given person.
People want to be cured, but they also want to be healed. And a networked approach to
medicine, as it opens up alternatives to the diagnostic process that decenter medical
authority, enable revisionary practices, and instigate tracings of complex illness experiences,
might more eﬀectively heal people by inviting them to make meaning within their networks.

Chapter Overview
The chapters that follow develop and qualify my claim that diagnostic practices are
out of sync with the narratives diagnoses foster. As I will argue, ANT provides a generative
framework for diagnostic deliberation as it more fully accounts for uncertainty, dispersed
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agency, community stakeholders, and even nonhumans. In what follows, I will further tease
out an alternative approach that better reflects diagnostic narratives authored by doctors,
patients, and community stakeholders.
In Chapter 2, I conduct qualitative research on Dr. Lisa Sanders’ interactive New York
Times “Diagnosis” column and explore an alternative definition for medical rhetorics.
Whereas medical rhetorics has traditionally been defined as persuasion, interpretation, or
identification, I argue instead that Sanders’ diagnostic narratives point to a more complex
work for rhetoric: assembling actants together to solve a problem, enlisting new actants, and
maintaining connections. I pay particular attention to the actants responsible for solving the
diagnostic “cases”: the doctor and/or other healthcare providers, the patient and other actants
(including family and community members), and chance. As these narratives reiterate,
diagnosis is much messier than many doctors and patients would like to recognize; in fact,
many of the cases are solved through random happenings, such as doctors agreeing to work
late or a doctor deciding to run a challenging case past a greenhouse employee. This chapter
highlights the need for a rhetorical approach to medical assemblage that might better enable
us to account for and respond productively to uncertainty rather than being paralyzed by it.
Chapter 3 tells a more cautionary tale of what can happen when a network
misdiagnoses patients, which occurred in 2015 for asymptomatic Ebola nurses who were
forced into involuntary quarantine. The chapter focuses on methods for intervening in
networks when they fail and holding all actants accountable. I focus particularly on Kaci
Hickox, or the so-called “Ebola Nurse,” who was involuntarily quarantined by Chris
Christie. I oﬀer a rereading of the Hickox network through the lens of ANT, arguing that
Christie and Maine governor Paul LePage attempted to exclude Hickox from the public
health network and reinforce a myth that U.S. healthcare networks are safe from outside
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influence. I also serve as a moralist in Latour’s sense by arguing that we must reincorporate
several actants back into the collective if we are to confront future Ebola outbreaks more
eﬀectively. In particular, I reincorporate nonhumans (such as destroyed habitats and bat
populations in Africa), perspectives of African aid workers, and conservative politics as they
contributed to Hickox’s quarantine and the breakdown of the Ebola network.
In Chapter 4, I return to Chapter 2’s emphasis on uncertainty to argue that nonWestern theories of deliberation might better equip patients and doctors to navigate
uncertain diagnostic contexts. In particular, I will consider the activities of two enigmatic
communities. First, I will analyze the phenomenon of bug-chasers, or a subgroup of gay men
who intentionally try to contract HIV because — among other reasons — they’d rather
know they have it than live in constant fear. Then, I will highlight the experiences of people
at risk for genetic diseases who choose not to take predictive tests, primarily because they
would rather live with uncertainty than know for certain whether they will develop a
particular disease. Such cases point to a dangerous fixation on certainty within Western
medicine, which values outcome generation and knowledge of one’s health status even when
such eﬀorts may not help — and may actually harm — patients. I draw on Arabella Lyon’s
research in Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights and explore how a shift towards
Chinese deliberation practices (which closely resemble ANT practice) might better enable
patients to dwell with uncertainty. Such research might also contribute to Western rhetorics
an appreciation for alternatives to outcome-driven and hierarchical deliberation.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I argue that medical assemblages can contribute to rhetorical
scholarship a more complex understanding of ethos. Drawing on both examples of networked
ethoi in diagnostic practice and theories of networked ethoi from feminist ecological
rhetoricians, I will consider how such a framework might enable rhetoricians to ethically
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respond to the needs of multiple stakeholders. The view of medicine—and rhetoric—as an
assemblage means grappling with pressing questions regarding which stakeholders should be
prioritized and why. Diagnostic networks perform a kind of “calibrated” ethoi, to borrow a
term from Annmarie Mol, wherein the expertise of doctors, patients, healthcare providers
community members, insurance companies, family members and friends, and nonhumans
must be shared. I will conclude by exploring the implications of such a model of ethoi for
rhetoric and composition.
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CHAPTER 2:
DIAGNOSING MEDICAL RHETORICS
Socrates wants to replace pistis with a didacticism that is fit for professors asking students to take
exams on things known in advance and rehearsed by training and rote exercises, but that is not fit
for the trembling souls who have to decide what is right and wrong on the spot. - Bruno Latour
In April 2016, a CFP began circulating for an edited collection entitled The Rhetoric
of Health and Medicine as/is: Theories and Concepts for an Emerging Field. Editors, including
Lisa Meloncon, Scott Graham, Jenell Johnson, John Lynch, and Cynthia Ryan, called on
readers to propose chapters that “[would] explore how scholars in the rhetoric of health and
medicine use rhetoric in theoretical and practical ways to examine the discourses of health
and medicine and how those discourses create meaning within a wide variety of scientific,
technical, practical, and political sites” (Ryan “Re: CFP”). They charged those submitting
proposals with the hefty task of defining what it means to take a rhetorical approach to
studying medicine and healthcare. More specifically, they asked for submissions to address
what rhetoric as/is medicine means:
Let’s take the concept that is part of the field’s name, “rhetoric.” For many
years, scholars in rhetorical studies and rhetoric and composition have argued
that rhetoric is a way of analyzing existing discourse as well as providing a
framework for creating it. As provides us an entryway into thinking about
diﬀerent concepts as theoretical underpinnings. Is provides us an entryway
into thinking about how theories can potentially be applied in practice. We
definitely want to nudge and even push scholars in the rhetoric of health and
medicine to appraise what it is that we do and examine what sets us apart
from other related fields. This endeavor means taking a critical stance to
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determine what is at stake when we say that we are rhetoricians of health and
medicine. (Ryan “Re: CFP”)
Aside from delineating theoretical foundations for the field of healthcare rhetorics, the CFP
raised a deceptively simple question: what is medical rhetorics? Perhaps it should be no
surprise that such a question be posed by those attempting to further establish a growing
field, since it directly echoes another question that scholars since Plato have attempted to
answer: what is rhetoric?
The CFP is merely the most recent example of an attempt to explore the intersections
of rhetoric and medicine and locate what makes studying them in concert so compelling.
According to Stephen Pender in “Between Medicine and Rhetoric,” medicine and rhetoric
have been linked since at least the fourteenth century since “both rhetoric and medicine are
pragmatic and interventionist: one devoted to the body, the other to the body politic” (40).
The study of medicine’s rhetorical dimensions initially served the needs of physicians who
needed to categorize complex medical and bodily phenomena. Pender argues that rhetorical
inquiry has also informed the ways in which physicians are able to generalize medical
findings based on particular cases and data; rhetorical theories of probability and best
practices have shaped medical inquiry. “For physicians struggling with the variable,
conflicting medical theories and a frangible, uncertain practice,” he writes, “rhetoric oﬀers
methods for reducing phenomena to their common forms, for placing these forms within
emergent systems, and for practical intervention devoted to agitation, comfort, or cure” (41).
Because rhetoric has so heavily influenced the way medicine is conceived and practiced,
Pender concludes: “[M]edicine cannot be immured from the pressures and pulsions of
rhetorical inquiry” (64). Since rhetoric provides us with tools for analyzing situations,
categorizing types of situations, and acting in a decisive and informed manner, Pender

41

suggests, it is indispensible to the art of medicine. Indeed, each of the famed ancient
rhetoricians and philosophers—from Plato’s Socrates, to Aristotle, to Quintillian, to Cicero
—spoke to the relationship between the two.
Reinvigorating rhetoric’s and medicine’s ancient aﬃnities, the area of study labeled
“Rhetoric of Health and Medicine” or the “Health Humanities” more recently developed as a
subgenre of the “Rhetoric of Science” and Science and Technology Studies (Segal 12-14).
Barbara Heiﬀeron and Stuart J. Brown note that the emergence of Writing Across the
Curriculum (WAC) programs in the 1970s influenced a renewed interest in medicine on the
part of rhetoric and composition scholars, since the WAC movement “turned attention to
textual production in other disciplines” (3). Although Kenneth Burke had long before
“opened up rhetoric to science” just as Thomas Kuhn “opened up science to rhetoric,” it
wasn’t until the 1980s that the field of rhetoric and composition began to rhetorically study
scientific processes and texts (Segal 10). In part, the downplaying of “humanistic origins and
impulses” in Western biomedicine contributed to the resurgence of studies that linked
rhetorical theory and science studies / medicine (Heiﬀeron and Brown 3). In response, the
1990s “saw a return to humanities training and an understanding of the role of language in
both medical school curricula and health practices” (3). In the 1990s, the narrative therapy
movement (see Michael White and David Epston’s Maps of Narrative Practice) began to
thrive, and in 2000, Rita Charon founded Columbia’s Program in Narrative Medicine, later
theorizing her alternative philosophy and method in Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories
of Illness. The 1990s also saw the relative proliferation of scholarly texts dealing with
rhetorical approaches to medicine, including Celeste Condit’s Decoding Abortion Rhetoric,
Kathryn Montgomery Hunter’s Doctor’s Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge,
Lennard J. Davis’ Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body, Arthur W. Frank’s
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The Wounded Storyteller, and Marc Berg’s and Annemarie Mol’s Diﬀerences in Medicine:
Unraveling Practices, Techniques, and Bodies, among others. As these titles suggest, topics
ranging from medical practices, scholarship and writing to the constructions of bodies /
ability were explored through the lenses of rhetorical theory, literature, philosophy,
communication studies, and sociology.
In 2000, Technical Communication Quarterly’s special issue on medical rhetoric
seemingly sealed medicine’s place within rhetoric and composition scholarship. In their
“Guest Editor’s Column,” co-editors Heiﬀeron and Brown mention that the special issue is
the first to invite submissions pertaining to “medical rhetoric,” but they also note the historic
roots of their project: their goal for the collection is to reverse Plato’s splitting of rhetoric and
medicine by reuniting them and designating their union as an area of study (247). Heiﬀeron
and Brown define medical rhetoric loosely as “how we communicate healthcare concerns,”
and highlight its evolution from the first time an ancient cave person “turned to the person
next to him/her and tried to describe a pain” to contemporary healthcare policies and
attempts to theorize the body (247).
Jessica Masri Eberhard’s “An Annotated Bibliography of Literature on the Rhetoric
of Health and Medicine” provides an especially detailed review of key texts within this area of
study from 1973 (Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic) to 2011 (Joan Leach’s and Deborah DysartGale’s Rhetorical Questions of Health and Medicine). By the time of Eberhard’s writing in
2012, the compilation of sources for an annotated bibliography on medical rhetorics
scholarship proved a “daunting task” given “The various methodologies, objects of interest,
critical lenses, disciplinary aﬃliations, and overarching conversations [that] have spread and
now overlap to a large extent” (n.p.). Since 2012, the study of medical rhetorics has
continued to flourish in terms of technical communication, narrative theory, healthcare
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education, and public health discourse, among others (see, for example, Therese Jones’,
Delese Wear’s, and Lester D. Friedman’s Health Humanities Reader for a vibrant display of
such scholarship).
This tracing of the recent history of rhetorics of healthcare and medicine brings us
back to the CFP for scholarship that defines the boundaries and foundations of the field of
medical rhetorics. How might we define medical rhetorics now—8 years after Heiﬀeron and
Brown—and what might we change about their early definition to better reflect
contemporary circumstances? In “Recognizing Diﬀerences and Commonalities: The Rhetoric
of Health and Medicine and Critical-Interpretive Health Communication,” John A. Lynch
and Heather Zoller revert to an even older definition in response to my question:
Like rhetorical studies generally, rhetoric of science, technology, health, and
medicine identify Aristotle’s Rhetoric as its foundational text. Rhetorical
studies of health and medicine, like the rhetoric of science and technology,
usually emphasize the situatedness of discourse, consider stylistic components
(i.e., metaphor, trope) as key to persuasion, and culminate with a judgment
about the rhetorical practice(s) being considered (Condit et al., 2012, Depew
& Lyne, 2013, Prelli, 2013; Segal, 2009). (500)
This approach to defining medical rhetorics in Aristotelian terms presumes that medical
rhetoric means studying the available means of persuasion in healthcare contexts. While
Lynch and Zoller are not alone in this presumption (about which more later), I want to
suggest that continuing to define rhetoric in general, and medical rhetorics in particular,
based on Aristotle’s limited purview means failing to account for contemporary theories that
better represent the complexity (rhetorical and otherwise) of medical encounters. Of course,
some aspects of medicine are inherently persuasive—doctors must persuade their patients to
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trust them; in some cases, they must persuade patients to take their medicine, and in other
cases, they attempt to persuade them that a particular course of treatment will best suit their
needs. However, as I will argue in this chapter, persuasion alone cannot account for all that is
communicated and all that happens in rhetorical encounters surrounding medicine.
The idea that rhetoric in medical contexts always takes the form of persuasion fails to
reflect the uncertainty of day-to-day medical encounters, in particular. The proliferation of
narratives written by doctors, surgeons, medical residents, and other healthcare providers has
revealed the extent to which doctors are often not in a position to persuade patients
regarding what to do since they are unsure themselves. In Atul Gawande’s Complications: A
Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science, he emphasizes that doctors are constantly uncertain as
they make informed life-and-death decisions, despite years of training, education, and
specialization. He writes:
Medicine is, I have found, . . . a disturbing business . . . We drug people, put
needles and tubes into them, manipulate their chemistry, biology, and
physics, lay them unconscious and open up their bodies to the world. We do
so out of an abiding confidence in our know-how as a profession. What you
find when you get in close, however—close enough to see the furrowed
brows, the doubts and missteps, the failures as well as the successes—is how
messy, uncertain, and also surprising medicine turns out to be. (4)
Gawande’s book makes a compelling case for viewing medicine as a science with limitations
and doctors as humans with vulnerabilities, despite technological advances and medical
discoveries that have generated an alternative narrative of medical perfection. For Gawande,
notwithstanding the “habit, intuition, and sometimes plain old guessing” that medicine
entails, there is still the need to “act decisively,” to make decisions in the moment with
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people’s lives on the line (7-8). In contrast to the view that doctors are authorities who must
persuade patients to accept their diagnoses and comply with a treatment plan, Gawande
views the doctor-patient relationship as a dynamic and fragile one wherein the doctor must
act decisively yet with full knowledge of his/her limitations. Gawande’s response to the idea
that rhetoric within medical contexts is persuasion might echo Jake’s infamous quote in The
Sun Also Rises: “Isn’t it pretty to think so?” (251).
However, Gawande implicitly speaks to the value of studying what rhetoric means
for/within medicine when he writes, “[W]hat seems most vital and interesting is not how
much we in medicine know but how much we don’t—and how we might grapple with that
ignorance more wisely” (8). In this chapter, I will extend Gawande’s question by considering
how rhetorical theory might help healthcare providers contend with uncertainty and
ignorance more productively. I’m primarily interested in how medical practitioners might
grapple with diagnostic uncertainties more eﬀectively because, as Gawande notes, diagnosis
often looks less like “plug[ging] it all [test results and patient information] into a formula [to]
calculate the result” and more like “us[ing] . . . clinical judgment [and intuition] . . . to
decide” (42). Diagnosis, perhaps more than any other rhetorical interaction within medicine,
is haunted by uncertainty, and the stakes are high since doctors can only eﬀectively treat
patients once they’ve accurately determined what’s wrong. As Lisa Sanders points out in Every
Patient Tells a Story, “[A]s treatment becomes more standardized, the most complex and
important decision making will take place at the level of diagnosis” (xv). In contrast to the
definitions previously proposed, I define rhetoric as collective decision-making in contexts of
uncertainty and diversity (as adapted from Trish Roberts-Miller’s definition, see Chapter 1), I
wonder what such a conception of rhetoric might illuminate within diagnostic encounters.
My goal is not to oﬀer physicians a new way to conceive of their work but to trace diagnostic
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processes and their rhetorical events as they unfold within real-life scenarios. Furthermore, I
do not hope to oﬀer a “once-and-for-all” definition of medical rhetorics but to rather see
what the lens of this definition can reveal about medical decision making surrounding
diagnosis.2
In what follows, I will first trace tentative definitions for rhetoric within diagnostic
contexts before I elaborate on my own definition, as informed by Bruno Latour and
Nathaniel Rivers. I will then perform an analysis of narratives written by Dr. Lisa Sanders for
the New York Times’ “Diagnosis” column to consider what rhetorical interactions are taking
place, and what they reveal about the intersections of rhetoric, medicine, and diagnosis. In
particular, I will pay attention to the actants responsible for solving a diagnostic “case,” such
as the doctor, another healthcare provider, the patient and other actants (including her family
members), and chance.

How is Medicine Rhetorical?
As I consider how key figures in medical rhetorics define their area of study, I am
struck by the resonances of their definitions with classic definitions for rhetoric. Thus, in
what follows, I will highlight three ancient definitions for rhetoric now adopted by medical
rhetoricians to describe their practice: medical rhetorics as persuasion, interpretation, and
identification. While all of these rhetorical interactions occur within medical rhetorics, I find
it restricting to reduce the complex and multi-faceted interactions between healthcare
providers and patients to one type of rhetorical event. I will thus adopt what I find to be a
more encompassing and versatile definition for medical rhetorics via Latour and Rivers.
2

It’s also important to note that the meaning of medical rhetorics will change depending on
the type of medicine and type of medical situation being studied. A surgeon will likely
conceive of rhetoric’s role diﬀerently than a pathologist would, for example.
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These scholars bridge two major areas of study: new materialism and rhetorical theory; they
are thus well-suited to generate a multi-faceted conception of medical rhetorics that resonates
with the uncertainty of medicine that Gawande highlights.
First, as previously discussed, persuasion continues to be perhaps the most popular
definition for medical rhetorics in contemporary scholarship. Judy Z. Segal’s foundational
text, Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine, espouses this definition: rhetoric is persuasion,
especially in medical contexts. As Segal notes in the introduction, “The premise of the book
is that rhetorical study—essentially, the study of persuasion—is a good means of illuminating
and recasting problems in health and medicine” (1). By conflating rhetoric and persuasion,
Segal uncovers a myriad of provocative relationships between health and rhetoric; for
example, she writes of hypochondriacs that they “have become persuaded in the absence of
an organic precipitating cause that they are ill” (74). But more pressingly, Segal focuses on
the extent to which persuasion saturates the doctor-patient relationship. In her 1994 article
“Patient Compliance, the Rhetoric of Rhetoric, and the Rhetoric of Persuasion,” Segal
emphasizes the usefulness of persuasion for understanding the problem of patient
(non)compliance with taking medications as prescribed, which was labeled the most pressing
problem facing medicine at the time of its publication (90-1). How is it, she wonders, that
doctors can eﬀectively persuade patients to take their medicine as prescribed? And what goes
wrong when they fail to convince their patients? However, Segal’s useful insights ultimately
lead her to go too far in suggesting that rhetorical criticism is solely “the study of persuasive
elements . . . in a wide range of texts, especially in the realm of social action or public
discourse” (10). Although she expansively highlights the value of Burkean and Kuhnean
versions of persuasion within medical situations pertaining to compliance, Segal overstates
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her case by assuming that all rhetorical interactions within medicine are persuasive—thus
failing to anticipate other rhetorical relationships.
Even Segal’s previous work undermines her book’s argument, as she suggested in an
earlier essay that imbalanced power dynamics and asymmetrical relationships within
medicine may prevent doctors from persuading patients. In short, she posits that
communication breakdowns between doctors and can oftentimes be attributed to a failure to
find common ground.. She explains:
Within this rhetorical view, persuasion is predicated on the existence of at
least a shared language and shared values—both of which are absent to
varying degrees within biomedicine's physician-patient relationship. In fact,
with its focus on the discourse community as a context and necessary
condition for rhetoric, rhetorical theory so clearly predicts the failure of
physician-patient persuasion within the current medical model that the more
interesting question (though one I will not attempt to answer) is probably
not why so many do not comply with medical advice, but why so many do.
(“Patient Compliance” 97)
Because in Segal’s view eﬀective persuasion must involve both rhetors speaking the same
language and caring about the same things, doctors cannot truly persuade patients, or, at
best, they can do so only in rare circumstances. Segal’s later assertion, in Health and the
Rhetoric of Medicine, that rhetorical persuasion must involve “a contact of minds,” while
idyllic, fails to account for her own point regarding the divisions between doctors and
patients: linguistic barriers, diﬀering expertise, and, perhaps most significantly, varying levels
of health (17). Thus, the view that medical rhetorics need always hinge on persuasion fails on
Segal’s own criteria.
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Other scholars, most notably Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, define medical rhetorics
in terms of Renaissance-era hermeneutics, of which Augustine is perhaps the most famous
practitioner. For Hunter, rhetoric’s function within medicine lies in its interpretive power,
particularly in regards to diagnosis. She likens diagnosis to a process of active reading wherein
the patient is a text and the doctor is a critical reader, thus reinforcing stereotypical and
paternalistic relationships between doctors and patients. She writes:
[T]he investigative procedures of medicine resemble the act of reading far
more closely than they do the laboratory process that has customarily been
regarded as scientific. Diagnosis is interpretive; therapeutics is interpretive;
and the care of the patient includes the interpretation of what is regarded as
brute fact: the symptoms, the test results. ‘Your pain is bursitis,’ the doctor
says; or, ‘The biopsy indicates that that lump is malignant.’ Patients enter the
doctor’s oﬃce sick; they have come for interpretation of their signs and
symptoms. (9)
The diagnostic process then, for Hunter, occurs when a patient willingly presents her body as
a text to be read and interpreted by an expert. Hunter carefully distinguishes the work
doctors do from invention, since she argues that the view that patients and doctors co-create
narratives of illness “accords the physician a much too central role in the life drama of the
person who is ill” (12). She adds, “It is interpretive work that the physician is doing, not
original composition, nor even (except in rare cases) co-composition” (12). While Hunter
claims that doctors play an integral role in interpreting patients’ bodies as texts (apparently
passively inscribed with symbols and codes to be deciphered), she simultaneously denies that
doctors participate in the creation of such texts. In eﬀect, Hunter denies that diagnosis and
interpretation are rhetorical events at all in that she sees them as a process of inputting data
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to gain the correct answer (a view that Gawande explicitly rejects, as previously
demonstrated).
Beyond the issue of physician agency, Hunter’s oﬀers a disempowering theory of
patient identity in diagnostic contexts. A patient who fails to be read by a doctor, for Hunter,
hardly exists at all as a rhetorical being. She explains:
As a medical construct, the patienthood of the sick person requires a
physician-reader for its existence in a way that illness and suﬀering do not.
Indeed, the physician’s reading as it is recorded in the patient’s chart or
presented at morning report transforms the ill, unknowable person into a
knowable, narratable, and thus treatable medical entity. Interpretation is in
itself not a method that leads to good or ill. The medical reading ideally does
no violence to the person and does not intervene in or alter the illness. (12)
To reiterate: the patienthood of the sick person requires a physician-reader for its existence. A
person does not become a patient until a physician reads her—and yet it is not an agentive
role that the physician holds. Hunter’s conception of diagnosis as a static interpretation of
illness casts both the physician’s reading and the patient’s body/text as passive, a-rhetorical
objects. Within Hunter’s framework, all that matters is treatment (wherein patients attempt
to re-embed a diagnostic interruption into their ongoing life story) and attempts to
standardize the identification and categorization of each illness, regardless of the individual
who suﬀers. She posits that “[M]edicine awaits the day when the anomalous character of
each malady will disappear, and with it the need for all narration” (105). Or, put another
way, a perfect medicine would need no rhetoric.
In contrast to Hunter’s a-rhetorical approach to medicine, and in response to the
problems previously described, the narrative medicine movement proposes an alternative
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definition for medical rhetorics, particularly surrounding diagnosis: identification. In “The
Reader’s Response and Why It Matters in Biomedical Ethics,” Charles M. Anderson and
Martha Montello describe identification via Plato’s Gorgias: “Rooted in what rhetorician
Kenneth Burke describes as the natural inclination of persons to ‘identify’ with others,
Socrates’ greatest form of friendship seeks ‘consubstantiality,’ which is the recognition that,
despite significant diﬀerences, I am of the same substance as you, we share interests,
experiences, and we value each other accordingly” (88). Such an approach prefigures any
ethical rhetorical interaction, for Anderson and Montello, because Socrates’ version of
consubstantiality enables readers to “imaginatively experience [and inhabit] the narrative
realities” he proposes and to thereby “return to the present moment to consider in a more
critical, more analytical way the knowledge gleaned from the experience” (89). The process of
identification, then, becomes a way of destabilizing the self to enter the “rhetorical power of
the narrative” and experience “the relational impact of the friendship shared by participants
in the conversation” (89). Such a method serves bioethical deliberation, too, since Anderson
and Montello envision patients and doctors engaging in a similar exchange as they experience
the patient’s story.
For example, Anderson and Montello describe a woman named Mrs. Green, who
meets an “appalled” and “harried” medical student who takes her “case” when she is
hospitalized for end-stage diabetes (91). The student “accidentally opens a door onto the
narrative of the patient’s life” by inquiring into her history of growing cotton as a child; the
patient responds by opening up to the medical student about her life and the challenges she
has faced (92). This moment of narrative exchange alters the relationship—or rather creates
one—between Mrs. Green and the medical student, who “finds himself transformed by the
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narrative consubstantiality they share” and “resists and finally discards the normative medical
narrative” of her deteriorating health (92). The medical student’s response is powerful:
As he enters the world her story oﬀers him, he meets her authentic, historic
self and understands that she and he, as diﬀerent as they might seem, are
indeed of the same substance at the deepest levels of human experience and
value. He is empowered by that knowledge to deliver eﬀective, eﬃcient
medical care that brings about significant improvement . . . medical care he
simply could not deliver had he not so fully participated in the narrative
events in which her story engages him. (92)
Such an approach enables the patient to receive better treatment and the medical student to
achieve greater personal satisfaction from his work, as he identifies with the patient’s story
and sees her as a human being.
Identification seems crucial to the process of viewing a patient as a human being with
individual needs and life stories. However, I worry about the wholesale and uncritical
adoption of a practice that enables doctors to feel like they can fully understand a patient by
listening to their stories. While doctors taking the time to listen to patients and hear their
needs represents progress, the claim that they can fully understand the needs of a patient that
may—in many cases—lead a less privileged life than they do based on a single narrative is
naïve. Imbalanced power dynamics cannot simply be erased when a physician empathizes
with a patient. Furthermore, what happens to patients with whom doctors cannot identify?
Will they receive less eﬀective care, less empathy, or less attention from their physician?
While identification may occur in some cases, to the mutual benefit of doctors and patients,
it cannot be counted on to guide rhetorical relationships in medicine.
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All of the above definitions for medical rhetorics fail to fully account for the
diagnostic process—what is rhetoric’s function in this medical situation? While doctors may
need to persuade patients to receive a particular treatment, it is uncommon for patients to
actually reject a diagnosis that can be substantiated with evidence (as most diagnoses are),
which renders persuasion an improper definition for medical rhetorics in diagnostic cases.
Doctors must certainly interpret test results, their patient’s story, and their bodies in order to
diagnose, but does this cover the decisions that doctors must make to determine which tests
to order, which elements of the patient’s story to focus on, and which bodily symptoms to
pay attention to? Finally, while identification may enable doctors to provide more empathetic
care, it can actually prevent diagnoses from occurring when it obscures important
information—in the cases that follow, despite their ongoing relationships with patients,
primary care physicians often miss a diagnosis that a new doctor immediately catches. A
more fitting and encompassing way to conceive of medical rhetorics—particularly in regards
to diagnosis—can be found in bringing together the work of Latour and Rivers since it
accounts for deliberating in complex situations that encompass a range of actants.

Toward A New Definition for Medical Rhetorics
In contrast to the previous definitions oﬀered for rhetoric (persuasion, interpretation,
identification), Rivers oﬀers an alternative definition for rhetoric via Latour; rhetoric “is the
glue or the work of gluing together relationships” and “the art or science of living
together” (“Introduction” n.p.). Lest anyone imagine that “relationships” or “living together”
applies only to humans, Rivers speaks to the value of Latour’s work for rhetoric: its assertion
that we must also “account for the glue between humans and nonhumans and maybe even
between nonhumans and nonhumans” (n.p.). The shift then is away from a conception of

54

rhetoric as static and occurring between two actors (speaker and audience) and towards a
dispersed view of rhetoric occurring within a collective of actants, many of them
nonhumans. “The term ‘collective,’” Latour clarifies, “does not mean ‘one’; rather . . . it
means ‘all, but not two’” (Politics of Nature 94). Whereas Latour refrains from defining
rhetoric, as he famously prefers to watch what something does rather than posit what it is, I
suggest that, based on his framework, rhetoric assembles. For Latour, assembling occurs as
actants move and shift in and out of networks that together form such concepts as the social,
reality, rhetoric, and, I might add, medicine. An assemblage within medicine, for example,
might involve a doctor, patient, nurse, X-Ray, family member, the patient’s prescriptions, her
body, the conditions in her history or environment that caused her illness, among many
others. While the only way to trace an actant’s movements is to watch it act, Latour carefully
reminds readers that no actant ever acts alone. He explains that “Action is not done under the
full control of consciousness; action should rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a
conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly
disentangled” (Reassembling the Social 44). While networks will continue to assemble
regardless of our intervention, Latour does allow that the ANT practitioner should “trace
social connections using the unexpected trails [traces] left” behind when they shift or mutate
into new associations (Reassembling the Social 43).
Thus, rhetoric can be understood as having two key functions within ANT
assemblages. First, as Rivers points out, rhetoric operates within networks as “the glue” that
holds actants together. Assembled actants use discourse to enlist actants into the collective,
negotiate their communal actions, and bind themselves together. The work that networks do
is rhetorical in that actants (human and non-human) must be persuaded to join forces within
a network and maintain the assemblage using discourse, though this does not always take the
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form of written or spoken language. The work of network (re)composition is also rhetorical
in that ANT practitioners use rhetoric to trace associations, intervene in networks as they
shift, and determine which actants have been excluded and need to be reconsidered (about
which more later). At the level of network tracing, ANT practitioners employ rhetoric to
reshape networks to most eﬀectively meet the problems requiring our collective attention.
While Latour does not speak directly about rhetoricians, he addresses a group he calls
the “moralists” in Politics of Nature as he redefines the roles that scientists, politicians,
economists, and moralists will share in the new collective. Rather than defining the world in
terms of nature vs. society (or fact vs. value), Latour proposes a new system wherein experts
would solve the same problems using their own expertise “Like fairies . . . oﬀer[ing their]
own particular gifts” (137). While a full analysis of the new collective is beyond the scope of
this chapter, it’s important to note that Latour explicitly tasks scientists with the
responsibility to “detect scarcely visible phenomena very early” and, using their specialized
tools, skills, and ability to see (through their instruments) through multiple points of view, to
take into account the imperceptible propositions demanding to be heard” (138). Scientists,
then, are tasked with listening to a range of actants and attuning themselves to their
demands. On the other hand, Latour tasks moralists (who I read as rhetoricians and/or
ethicists) to “equip the entities that have been set aside with the right to appeal that they can
use when, in order to fulfill the requirement of closure, they are driven out of the
collective” (156). Thus, while scientists must hear the actants that are apart of the
assemblage, moralists/rhetoricians must constantly ask who has been excluded from it. These
excluded voices cannot be left out forever but will “have to be reintegrated, at some later
point” when the network needs them, at which point, “Those who have been excluded from
the collective are going to come back all the more quickly to knock on the door, to the extent
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that the moralists will . . . go looking for them outside the collective, in order to faciliate their
reentry and accelerate their insertion” (157). While moralists and scientists work in concert
with economists and politicians, I want to emphasize the complementary roles Latour assigns
to scientists and moralists—the work of listening to the imperceptible, tracing its
movements, considering the problem from multiple points of view, asking which actants
have been prematurely excluded, and bringing these actants back into the network when
necessary. Put another way, Latour sees scientists and rhetoricians as intervening in
assemblages to observe actants at work and add to the assemblages when actants previously
considered insignificant stand to reshape the collective in beneficial ways.
As the above analysis attempts to make clear, the work of assemblage serves well as a
definition for what medical rhetorics looks like in diagnostic situations. When a doctor
diagnoses a patient, she must be able to trace associations amongst actants, listen to the
actants as they speak—even and especially the scarcely perceptible ones—and she must
constantly ask herself which actants have been overlooked or excluded as insignificant that
might illuminate the problem. Only once she has traced all of the actants within the
assemblage, often in conjunction with a variety of other actants that comprise her own
professional network, can she intervene in the illness’s network and revise it to remove
dangerous actants and add healthier links. Networks are never static but ever evolving, which
results in a vibrant and always uncertain work of following them without being certain where
one of going; such a point resonates with diagnoses because, for Sanders, “Uncertainty is the
water we swim in” (“Unexplained Illness” n.p.).
In the analysis that follows, I demonstrate that in addition to generating an
alternative framework for diagnoses, the ANT assembly frame better describes what is already
happening. I hope that such a view might oﬀer physicians and patients a more livable
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framework for inhabiting diagnoses—for understanding the uncertainty that haunts them,
the randomness with which some diagnoses occur, and the networked actants that make both
illness and diagnosis possible. Thus, in what follows, I briefly describe the “Diagnosis”
column by Sanders, and I then shift to an analysis of 75 diagnosis narratives to more fully
develop my claim that Latour’s practice of assembly serves as a productive framework for
understanding rhetoric’s function within diagnostic scenarios.

Sanders’ “Diagnosis” Column
Sanders created the New York Times “Diagnosis” column back in 2002, and her
column’s focus on mysterious illnesses and elusive diagnoses inspired the popular television
show House several years later. Each column generally begins with a patient being brought to
the hospital or suﬀering from a medical emergency, getting evaluated by a physician, and,
eventually, getting treated for his or her illness. Strikingly, the diagnostic revelation generally
comes at the end of the column rather than the beginning—this is not the story of recovery
but the story of discovering what’s the matter with a patient. Most narratives, of which there
are 75 total, have three sections—Symptoms, Investigation, and Resolution—with the
diagnosis generally occurring within the Resolution section. When the column’s 47th post
was published in 2011, readers were suddenly invited to respond to the mysterious story (and
each subsequent one) and post their diagnostic hypothesis. Later, Sanders would update the
post, highlight the range of answers submitted by readers, and congratulate the readers who
guessed correctly (the first person to guess the correct diagnosis also wins a signed copy of her
book, as of 2009). The invitation for readers to participate in diagnosis creates what Sanders
calls a kind of “crowd sourced medical conversation” amongst healthcare providers, medical
students, and laypersons (“The Girl with Unexplained Hair Loss”). Her overall goal in telling
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these mysterious diagnostic stories, she explains, is to “put you, the reader, in the front line,
in the shoes of the doctor at the bedside—to know that feeling of uncertainty and intrigue
when confronted with a patient who has a problem that just might kill him” (Every Patient
Tells a Story xxv). The payoﬀ is not just for doctors, who need to be better informed about
strange diagnoses so they can catch them in their own patients, but for patients themselves,
who might better grasp their agency in diagnostic situations once they’ve studied her column.
Sanders notes, “As physicians become more open about what we do, we make it easier for
patients to understand what they can do to more fully participate in their own care” (xxvi).
Thus, Sanders turns diagnosis into a kind of networked game wherein everyone can
participate—albeit with varying levels of expertise and diﬀerent roles.
To analyze the 75 narratives, I created a list of common ways in which the diagnosis
occurred based on the primary actant responsible for the diagnosis—the doctor, another
healthcare provider, the patient/others, and chance. Within these four major categories, I
created a list of subcategories based on the more specific way in which the diagnosis occurred
and calculated how many narratives fit each subcategory. For the first category, Doctor
Solved the Case, I created the following subcategories: doctor’s observation of an episode (3),
doctor just figures it out (4), doctor runs through a list of possibilities (1), reading the
patient’s past history reveals the problem (2), linking symptoms rather than viewing them
separately (4), doctor remembers something / notices a new factor (4), problem diagnosed
during a physical exam (5), test reveals the problem (14), and creating a hierarchy of
problems / isolating one factor (2). For the second category, Another Healthcare Provider
Solves the Case, the subcategories were as follows: a medical blog provided the answer (1),
Google provided the answer (2), the doctor missed the diagnosis (4), another doctor solves
the case (9), and a resident or medical student solves the case (3). For the third category, the
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Patient/Others Solved the Case, the subcategories were as follows: the patient solves her own
case (5), a family member solves the case (4), a non-expert solves the case (1), and the
patient’s story provides the answer (3). Finally, for the Chance category, wherein the
diagnosis was discovered through a random series of events, the subcategories were as follows:
chance (3), disease had to progress (3), the problem was discovered during an operation (2),
an object in the patient’s room revealed the problem (2), and an eﬀective treatment
demonstrated the problem (1). In a few cases, because the diagnosis involved two actants
working together, I allowed for the diagnosis to fit within two subcategories, and I also
excluded two columns from my analysis because they dealt with diagnosing fictional
characters.
In what follows, I will analyze key narratives using my major categories to explore
what rhetorical interaction entails in diagnostic encounters. While these 73 narratives are by
no means comprehensive, they nonetheless highlight key tensions and connections between
rhetoric and medicine. The narratives also highlight tensions within assemblages between
doctors, patients, their families, and random occurrences / nonhuman actants, and they
emphasize the shared agency these actants demonstrate as they initiate and support
diagnostic deliberation. The three sections that follow are based on three key actants (doctors,
patients/others, and nonhumans/chance), but as my analysis will prove, such actants are
often dispersed and complexly interwoven rather than solitary and stable during diagnostic
encounters.

Doctoring the Network
The narratives in Sanders’ “Diagnosis” column commonly emphasize that doctors fail
to diagnose patients on their own; in general, they rely on a network of other physicians,
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friends, and web resources to help them come to an accurate diagnosis. In part, this might be
attributed to the fact that no doctor can remember all diagnoses, so a network of fellow
doctors is needed to expand their collective bank of possible illnesses. Furthermore, as the
forthcoming narratives highlight, doctors often rely on others to pick up on the clue that
hides in plain sight. Just as a person solving a puzzle might be stumped by a missing piece
only to have a friend come by and immediately find it, doctors often need other doctors to
help them see the problem from a new angle, thus revealing the problem (in many cases).
Such a networked approach to diagnostic decision-making is emphasized in a post
called “A Red Scare,” where a patient is mistakenly diagnosed with poison oak, even though
she disagrees with this diagnosis. Although the patient insists that her rash doesn’t itch, as it
generally does when a person has been exposed to poison oak, her admission that she’s
“visited a friend’s farm and picked Swiss chard” recently “cinch[es]” the diagnosis for the
doctor (n.p.). When she returns with darkening welts on her skin, the doctor admits that it is
“time to call in reinforcements,” in this case two younger colleagues who are invited into the
patient’s room to see her rash. “After a long moment,” Sanders writes, “one of the partners,
Dr. Michael Adler, broke the silence. He asked the patient whether she had eaten any shiitake
mushrooms recently. The question surprised her. ‘How did you know?’ she asked” (n.p.). The
younger partner immediately identifies the rash as a response to consuming undercooked or
raw shitake mushrooms, which the patient revealed she had done recently when oﬀered a
sample at a local grocery store. When asked how he was able to diagnose the patient so
quickly when two visits to the primary doctor had failed to yield the diagnosis, he attributed
it to luck: “He had read a case report of a patient who developed this crazy-looking rash after
eating shiitakes. The picture in the journal was so striking that as soon as he saw the patient,
it all came back in a flash” (n.p.). This example illustrates the importance of having a range of
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physicians involved in solving each diagnostic case, as each collects informational fragments
and memories of diseases such as this that will aid them in identifying rare illnesses or
unusual presentations of common illnesses. “That’s what is so great about working in a
group,” the younger partner explained, “When you get stumped, you just call for help, and
chances are, one of these guys will know the answer. It’s like doing the crossword puzzle with
a friend. With any luck, the other guy fills in your gaps in knowledge. This time I got to be
that guy” (n.p.). The younger partner reiterates the collaborative nature of diagnosis and the
need for doctors to share the responsibility of solving challenging cases in order to most
eﬀectively treat patients, thus undermining conceptions of doctors working in isolation to
immediately diagnose patients with no outside help. The younger partner’s successful
diagnosis also highlights the larger context within which both illnesses and diagnoses arise;
the network involved in the patient’s sudden rash included mushrooms, a truck that carried
the mushrooms to a grocery store, the store, an employee who improperly prepared the
mushrooms, and the pans and ingredients she used. The network involved in her diagnosis is
just as complex, since it involves a string of doctors with various forms of expertise, journal
subscriptions, past memories, and educational experiences. In this case, the woman’s case was
solved because the diagnostic network was able to trace her illness network in a way that
highlighted the connections between actants.
Such collaborative diagnostic decision-making seems especially important in urgent
cases where patients may not have time to wait for a doctor to sort through all possible causes
of illness. In “Losing Consciousness,” for example, a woman presents to the hospital after two
episodes of passing out in public with excessive rectal bleeding, which is caused by her
blood’s inability to clot. Because the patient is in danger of bleeding to death, her doctor,
gastroenterologist Dr. Susanne Lagarde, immediately recognizes that “this patient needed a
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diagnosis before whatever it was that already happened twice happened again” (n.p.). Lagarde
is stumped by the tests she’s conducted, so she thinks of a respected colleague who might be
able to shed some light on the case—and using a diﬀerent medical specialty. Sanders writes,
“Lagarde immediately thought of Dr. Thomas Duﬀy. Duﬀy was one of the smartest doctors
she knew, and he was a hematologist. When Lagarde reached him, she quickly outlined the
case: a middle-aged woman with two episodes of low blood pressure and a temporary loss of
the ability to form blood clots. Did that bring anything to mind?” (n.p.). Duﬀy explores
several options before concluding that the patient has systemic mastocytosis, a rare disease
stimulated by certain drugs where huge amounts of histamine are dumped into the blood,
which results in the failure of blood to clot. When the patient confirms that she had started a
new antidepressant prior to her episodes, a chemical combination that likely led to the excess
histamine, the diagnosis is accepted. Despite years of formal training and access to specialized
resources, Sanders concludes by noting: “For doctors, perhaps the most powerful diagnostic
tools available are a phone and a friend” (n.p.). In this case, too, it’s important to note the
significance of doctors with diﬀerent areas of expertise working together—a
gastroenterologist may see some of the problem through her lens, but a hematologist may see
other important information through his. Additionally, this case unexpectedly involves the
pharmaceutical industry in that prescribed antidepressants had potentially lethal eﬀects on
the patient, which only a collaboration between doctors could uncover.
In other cases, when groups of doctors are stumped by challenging cases, they might
turn to an additional actant within their diagnostic network: a computer. In “The Heat of the
Night,” Sanders recounts the story of a patient who awoke with strange fevers during the
night, experienced significant weight loss, and had a mass on his liver. His doctors found no
clear explanation for what was causing his ongoing illness, so the patient called an old college
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friend who was now a practicing internist. Because the friend was stumped himself, he
suggested a novel approach to his old friend: posting his friend’s case in an online forum and
inviting physicians from around the world to participate in solving the case (a process that
resonates, of course, with Sanders’ own project). Sanders writes, “That afternoon Schumann
put the case on a blog . . . he was writing and contacted Kevin Pho, who has a popular
medical blog . . . who then posted it, too. Within hours, a dozen comments were posted in
response. Several pointed to a series of reports similar to this very case: patients with large
hemangiomas and persistent nightly fevers. In several cases, simply removing the tumor
stopped the fevers” (n.p.). The patient’s doctor arrived at the diagnosis without seeing these
online contributions through a “more traditional route” of asking a colleague, a
gastroenterologist, to help. This colleague immediately recognized the problem. After the
removal of the tumor healed the patient and stopped his strange fevers, the diagnosis was
confirmed. Sanders concludes by noting the significance of the extended network of
healthcare providers the Internet provides: “In medicine, doctors accept that no one knows
everything. Our knowledge is shaped by experience, training and personal interest. We all
reach out to our community of doctors when we are stumped. Usually it’s to our friends and
colleagues, but the Internet oﬀers the possibility of a broader community — a sea of
strangers linked by our medical curiosity and by our keyboards” (n.p.). Given the importance
of assembling diagnoses in concert with other physicians with diﬀerent areas of expertise and
unique experiences with treating and studying illnesses, the Internet represents an especially
helpful forum for solving challenging cases with experts around the globe. Rather than
relying on their network of immediate friends and colleagues, physicians can now open up
their diagnostic queries to the entire medical field.
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When doctors do diagnose patients more independently, they often do so by linking
symptoms together rather than viewing them in isolation—thus forming a networked
version of illness. In some cases, doctors must be able to see how the symptoms relate to one
another rather than simply paying attention to the most prominent or strange symptom. For
example, in “Sleepless,” Sanders recounts the story of a patient who hadn’t gotten a decent
night’s sleep in a decade—he was unable to sleep for more than 90 minutes at any given time
and often fell asleep during the day. He was also being treated for sleep apnea, chronic
allergies, high blood pressure and cholesterol, adult onset acne, poor teeth alignment, and
weak bones. The patient visited a new specialist to see if he could find an answer where so
many other doctors had failed, and indeed, the new specialist noticed a striking symptom:
the patient was physically large. Sanders describes how the specialist was able to identify a
symptom missed by all previous doctors: “As he examined the patient, Helfrich was again
struck by how massive he seemed. Not obese but big, really big. ‘Have you always been this
large-boned?’ he asked the patient. The patient joked that he was thinner years ago — but
weren’t we all? Helfrich looked carefully at the man’s face. His lower jaw and chin seemed
broad and unusually square,” (n.p.). On a hunch, the doctor ordered blood work, which
revealed that the patient was producing excessive growth hormone—the result of a tumor in
the pituitary gland. The doctor ordered surgery to remove the tumor, which immediately
helped his hands, feet, and face to shrink back to their normal size.
But everyone was shocked when the other symptoms which he’d complained about
were also healed—the patients allergies were never allergies but the result of swelling tissues
in the face caused by the disease, the high blood pressure was reduced to normal given the
lack of excess growth hormone, and the patient’s sleep apnea was cured. Sanders asks, “How
come not one of the dozens of doctors — including an endocrinologist — that he saw over
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the nearly 15 years of interrupted sleep and other symptoms figured out that he had
acromegaly? Perhaps because the various symptoms of his tumor were, for the most part,
common problems: insomnia, high blood pressure, allergies and acne. They developed
separately, years apart, and each was addressed by a specialist. It would take an act of
imagination to link these symptoms. The patient never made that leap, and neither did any
of his doctors” (n.p.). The division of the illnesses’ symptoms and their separate treatment by
various specialists resulted in an inability to see the overarching cause of illness—and all of its
attendant symptoms. In this story, the process by which doctors determine what they do and
do not see as significant in diagnostic cases becomes an actant, as a string of seemingly minor
complaints actually comprise the network of a major medical event. The rhetorical work of
diagnosis, then, involves being able to see the way various problems relate to each other—to
unite a group of symptoms and puzzle over what could cause all of them to occur. Sanders
adds that such an ability to “[cast] a wide net to see the whole picture” is especially important
when “the complaint that brings the patient to medical attention is commonplace, like
insomnia” (n.p.). In such cases, the patient may suﬀer when his symptoms are considered as
individual problems to be treated by specialists who don’t communicate with each other
about their patient’s health.
A similar case is explored in “Perplexing Pain,” where a patient opens the narrative by
telling her new doctor, “They took out my ovaries” (n.p.). After revealing that she has had
thirteen exploratory surgeries to help doctors determine the cause of her chronic abdominal
pain and fever, she tells her doctor that she has been living a “nightmare” (n.p.). The woman
is referred to Dr. Chelimsky, a neurologist, when she begins to lose feeling in her hands and
feet, and she explains that her ever-shifting symptoms felt like “the arcade game her children
played, whack-a-mole — you get rid of one problem, but then it would pop back up, along
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with another and another” (n.p.). Dr. Chelimsky began to focus on the patient’s nervous
system, and he finally hypothesized that “Many of her other symptoms — the rapid heart
rate, being unable to urinate, abdominal pain with no visible cause, even her constipation,
which had been so severe that six months before much of her colon was removed — could be
caused by damage to the autonomic nervous system” (n.p.). Dr. Chelimsky suggests to the
patient that she might have porphyria, and recommends that she consult with her regular
doctors about this possible diagnosis. Desperate for answers, the patient and her husband (a
pediatrician) immediately take to his medical library to read up on the illness, and the
Sanders reveals, “[I]t was as if she were reading her own medical history: her entire life
seemed to be there on the page of these old medical textbooks. All the strange and terrible
symptoms she suﬀered through, had surgery for, been considered crazy for, were there on the
pages she read. Tears flowed down her face. Her husband cried, too. They had, she felt
certain, finally found the answer” (n.p.). Although it takes the patient three weeks to get
confirmation of the diagnosis, Sanders puzzles over what enabled Dr. Chelimsky to figure out
in a short time what so many doctors had not despite multiple invasive surgeries and years of
familiarity with the patient. She rationalizes, “Porphyria is a disease of the nervous system.
Thus, everything in the body is aﬀected. The patient’s hardworking doctors had been
chopping down the trees one by one, treating each ailment in isolation. Dr. Chelimsky, a
neurologist, was finally able to step back and see the entire forest” (n.p.). Because the illness
aﬀected the entire body, it was diﬃcult for the patient’s doctors to notice that each symptom
was linked to one key problem with her nervous system. Thus, rhetoric can function within
such situations to form a conglomerate of symptoms that doctors can trace to see how they
fit together—and what common thread or problem glues them together.
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Such a rhetorical goal of uniting symptoms rather than isolating one factor or
another is also at play in “Abdominal Attacks,” the first ever post in the “Diagnosis” column.
In the narrative, a patient presents with unbearable abdominal pain that recurs and then
recedes after a few days. He tells his gastroenterologist, Dr. Sachdev, “I can’t go on this
way” (n.p.). After a few tests come back normal, the doctor decides that this won’t be an easy
case and that it will require her to take an alternative approach. Sanders clarifies that there are
two distinct processes for diagnosis—one involves “pattern identification — you see a
patient, recognize the signs and symptoms of some known disease and make your
diagnosis” (n.p.). But for other patients, she explains, “the ones with symptoms that don't
match any of the patterns you know” doctors develop their “own hierarchy of possible
diagnoses based on what they consider the patient's most prominent symptom. It's a
personal hierarchy developed through individual experience, the experiences of their teachers
and what they have read” (n.p.). In this case, though, the doctor finds the answer to the
patient’s problem not by isolating one prominent symptom (the patient’s extreme abdominal
pain) but in asking herself how it relates to the patient’s other symptoms. The doctor notes
that “Whatever [the patient] had, it was going to be unusual. She thought about his strange
allergies, the swelling of the hands and feet, which she had previously assumed were
unrelated to his stomach problems. Could they be linked? Were all these symptoms caused
by hereditary angioedema, a rare genetic disease that can cause allergylike swelling? The
swelling is usually found in the hands or feet but can also occur in the GI tract, which results
in abdominal pain” (n.p.). Testing confirms that the patient did in fact have this rare disease,
which the doctor only identified because she was able to link the symptoms rather than
separate them. The doctor was ultimately able to cure the patient by asking what each of his
symptoms had in common rather than focusing on one vague symptom.
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Perhaps the best illustration of a doctor’s need for a network of other actants to
support her diagnostic process is the fact, as represented in the “Diagnosis” column cases,
that doctors often miss diagnoses. Sanders admits, in “Missed Signals,” that her failure to
notice a patient’s illness almost led to his death. She recalls that she had been treating him for
about a year and “He was doing well, so I was shocked when I got word from the E.R. that
my patient was dying. And the doctors there weren’t sure why” (n.p.). The patient’s heart was
beating very slowly, and the doctor on call in the E.R. suddenly realized why—his kidneys
weren’t functioning, and his potassium was dangerously high. When the doctor attempted to
test the patient’s urine, he realized that the patient couldn’t urinate, so he instructed a nurse
to insert a catheter into the patient’s bladder. When the nurse was unable to do so, it became
even more obvious why the patient was so ill—he had an enlarged prostate gland that was
blocking his bladder and shutting down the kidneys. Sanders chastises herself for failing to
have the patient undergo a yearly rectal exam, which is a process that would have enabled her
to prevent the patient from all of these complications: “When I heard that the prostate was
the cause of the life-threatening bradycardia, I felt as if I had been punched in the chest. This
was something I should have caught and didn’t. An internist’s job is to diagnose and treat
acute illness and screen for and prevent additional disease. I joke with the residents I teach
that it is our responsibility to keep our patients healthy and out of the hospital. If so, I had
failed” (n.p.). Sanders attributes her failure to an inability to balance the patient’s acute needs
with his long-term healthcare goals. While she had been treating and responding to his
immediate complaints, she hadn’t probed him for information about additional concerns
(such as his trouble urinating) and she hadn’t insisted on routine preventative exams.
“Practicing medicine is a balancing act,” she writes, “weighing immediate and long-term
good. His case was a vivid reminder of what can happen when that balance is lost” (n.p.).
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Although Sanders sought forgiveness from her patient, and received it, her tale cautions us to
grasp the importance of continually seeking what has been left out and excluded from a
diagnostic assemblage. If the diagnostician must constantly attune herself to what is
happening, she must also be able to ask herself what else?
Doctors can also fail to accurately diagnose patients when the need to solve a
challenging case leads them to prematurely decide on a likely cause of the patient’s problems.
In “An Elusive Agony,” Sanders tells the story of a 9-year-old girl experiencing attacks of
excruciating stomach pain. When a series of tests ruled out the most likely culprits, the girl’s
doctor referred to her as “his little mystery and continued to search for the answer” (n.p.).
Unsatisfied with the doctor’s ineﬃcacy, and determined to help her child, the mother began
to research possible causes of illness herself; she “trolled the Internet and described her
daughter’s symptoms to every doctor she knew” (n.p.). Ultimately, when “she outlined the
symptoms to her own internist . . . he said right away, ‘Sounds like familial Mediterranean
fever’” (n.p.). When she returned to her daughter’s doctor to ask if this might be the answer
they’d been searching for, he quickly dismissed the idea, and noted that based on his
experience training in Israel and his familiarity with the disease, it was unlikely that her
daughter had it. When the doctor referred the child to yet another doctor, the mother again
raised the possibility that her daughter was suﬀering from familial Mediterranean fever. This
time, the doctor took the possibility seriously and a blood test revealed that the mother was
right. Sanders writes, “I asked Levy [the child’s original doctor] why he had been so certain
that the child didn’t have F.M.F. Until recently, he explained, F.M.F. had been a clinical
diagnosis — one made based on the patient’s symptoms and the physical exam. The
identification of the gene and the subsequent development of the test — which had only just
become available at the time of this patient’s diagnosis — changed doctors’ understanding of
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the disease” (n.p.). He added, “‘What we learned from the test was that there was a whole
spectrum of disease . . . Before, we were only able to pick up what we now know were the
most extreme forms of the disease — the tip of the iceberg. Now we can find all the
rest” (n.p.). Thus, for Levy, his training to only identify the expected presentations of a
disease led him to disregard unusual presentations, such as that of the little girl. He failed to
see that the little girl’s symptoms also fit for the disease because they didn’t match the usual
criteria and severity of symptoms for FMF. Again, this situation speaks to the importance of
constantly shifting paradigms within medicine and asking what other actants within an
assemblage might be contributing to a problem.
As these cases highlight, doctors must constantly solve diagnostic problems within
networks of other actants, collaboratively share their areas of expertise to pinpoint the
problem, view illnesses as complex assemblages rather than isolated illnesses, and link
symptoms rather than isolating the most prominent one. To return to the view of diagnosis
as assembling, we can see that such a process always hinges on tracing connections between
multiple actants—or, as Rivers put it—using rhetorical tools to find the glue that holds an
illness together. Such a framework contrasts with the view of a doctor as an isolated actant
pinpointing a single factor that reveals the illness. As these cases emphasize, doctors’ work is
messy and chaotic, and they must often follow multiple possibilities before they arrive at the
right answer. The rhetorical work that doctors engage in as they locate a diagnosis is not
simply persuasion, interpretation, or identification, but a work of assembling a diagnostic
network and tracing the network of illness to account for the problem.
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Self-Diagnosis and Patient Advocacy
While the analysis of “Diagnosis” cases has thus far highlighted the doctor’s
networked rhetorical work within diagnostic situations, much remains to be said about the
role that patients play. Far from being passive texts inscribed with meaning to be interpreted
by doctors, or arhetorical beings called into existence only through the doctor’s authority, the
“Diagnosis” narratives reveal an alternative type of patient: one who is engaged, active, and
responsible for her own health. In many of the cases, in fact, the patient actually solves her
own case. In “Flower Power,” for instance, a patient (who is also a doctor) experiences high
blood pressure and acute psychosis. Her physician, a colleague, is horrified when she begins
to speak and the words are meaningless. The doctor tests his friend for abnormal thyroid
hormones, abnormal blood chemistry or an infection, and illicit drug use. But when all of
the tests come back normal, “After four days, the patient recovered, and she was discharged,
her diagnosis still unknown” (n.p.). The patient, once home, resumes her normal gardening
routine, and is surprised to find a strange but beautiful flower growing in her garden. She
wonders, “Before it had flowered, could this plant have been mistaken for lettuce and ended
up in her salad? She pulled the plants up by their roots, put them in a baggie and drove to a
nearby nursery. As she pulled the plants from the bag to show the owner, the woman
exclaimed: ‘Don’t touch those! They’re highly toxic. That’s jimson weed’” (n.p.). The patient
learns that the root has long been associated with temporary female madness, and she had
likely accidentally consumed some before she became sick. The patient’s perceptiveness—and
her ability to consider unusual factors—ultimately led her to solve her own case, a move that
echoes the rhetorical assemblage that doctors engage in themselves. Her refusal to be satisfied
with no diagnosis, and her ability to enlist new actants into her network (such as the nursery
owner), also serve as a reminder that it can be challenging to accurately diagnose a patient
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when their symptoms resolve on their own or come and go. In such cases, patients may have
to rely on their own investigations to determine what has caused their episodes.
Other cases present examples of physicians suddenly becoming patients and
diagnosing themselves collaboratively with their doctor. In “Patient is a Virtue,” an 81-yearold man (also a physician) suddenly loses feeling in his right leg. When he’s rushed to the
E.R., he immediately begins to ask the doctor if he might be having a stroke. The doctor
insists that they must be sure what’s going on before they treat him, but all of the tests are
unrevealing in terms of the nature of the man’s problem. When a surgeon explains his
confusion to the patient, he’s struck suddenly with another idea. Sanders writes, “As he [the
surgeon] moved toward the door, the doctor-patient couldn’t resist adding one more
possibility to the list: ‘Could I have dissected my aorta?’ he asked” (n.p.). The resident argues
that it’s unlikely given that most of the patients he’s seen with a dissected aorta are younger
and writing in pain. However, while it “was unlikely given the patient’s age and the absence
of chest pain” the resident finally decides that “if he had torn his aorta, anticoagulation could
cause the patient to bleed to death. She sent the patient back to get a CT scan of his chest
and abdomen” (n.p.). The CT scan reveals that the patient has a huge dissection in his aorta
and that he needs immediate surgery. Sanders concludes by mentioning that the dissected
aorta is one of the most diﬃcult diagnoses in medicine and that it’s often not even
considered as a possibility. “In the case of this elderly patient,” she muses, “it was the very
hardest kind of diagnosis — an unusual presentation of an unusual disease . . . In spite of
that, two physicians reached this diagnosis coming at it from two diﬀerent perspectives —
that of an E.R. doctor who conscientiously made sure that she first did no harm and that of a
patient who couldn’t stop himself from thinking like a doctor” (n.p.). Here, Sanders makes
an interesting point when she reminds us that not only are patients apart of a network, but
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patients themselves are networks—imbued with their own areas of expertise, their own ideas,
and their own insight into their health. In this case, the patient’s network enabled him to
come to the correct diagnosis more quickly than the doctor’s, which speaks to the need to
take seriously the rhetorical agency of patients. Even in cases where a patient lacks the
medical knowledge necessary to diagnose himself, more can be gained by invoking the
patient’s networked knowledge into diagnostic deliberation than excluding them.
An example of a series of doctors failing to pay heed to their patient’s perspective can
be found in “The Doctor Go Round,” where the case begins with a doctor accusing his
patient of not following his instructions prior to getting a medical test. He told her that the
results were crazy. She’d pulled a muscle months before, and had gone to her primary care
doctor with a swollen ankle/foot and painful muscle strain. In the ensuing weeks, she was
tested for high blood pressure, a blood clot, obstructed blood flow, stomach abnormalities,
leukemia, and a range of other diseases by multiple specialists: her internist, an
endocrinologist, a gastroenterologist, and a hematologist. Finally, the patient begins to read a
recent set of test results when she notices that she has an abnormal amount of cortisol. She
quickly calls her doctor and tells him she thinks her problems can be attributed to Cushing’s
disease. Sanders notes that, rather than the doctor having to persuade the patient of her
correct diagnosis, “The patient laid out her argument. With Cushing’s, the body produces
too much cortisol, one of the fight-or-flight hormones. This could explain her high blood
pressure. She had other symptoms of Cushing’s too” (n.p.). Still, the doctor remains
unconvinced that the patient has successfully diagnosed herself simply by doing some
research on her elevated cortisol levels and what it might mean. As a patient with no medical
background, she has little credibility with her doctor as a contributor to the diagnostic
process. The doctor decides to test her for Cushing’s anyway, due to a lack of other ideas, and
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when the test results are strange, he accuses of her of not properly following his instructions.
When she insists that she has, he suggests another test. The results are conclusive: “She was
right, the doctor conceded; she really did have Cushing’s. She didn’t have the classic features,
perhaps because she hadn’t had the disease long enough for the rest of the symptoms to
manifest themselves” (n.p.). In this case, the patient’s diagnosis is delayed because the doctor
fails to trust his patient’s analysis and consider her guess as to what’s wrong. Instead, he works
against the patient, in an almost adversarial way, to determine the cause of her illness.
While patient-networks can play an integral role in their own diagnostic processes,
when they’re unable to participate due to their failing health, their family members can step
in and take their place, and they must therefore be added to our growing assemblage of
actants involved in diagnostic rhetorical encounters. In “A Heart Loses Its Way,” a 59-yearold woman who had a heart attack a month before is rushed to the hospital because of high
blood pressure. Her legs are like Jell-O when she tries to stand, so her husband and several
nurses must wheel her into the hospital. The patient’s husband, alarmed by his wife’s recent
and sudden decline in health “felt overwhelmed and angered by his inability to help his wife
of 36 years” (n.p.). He suddenly decided that he could help by going to his wife’s doctor’s
appointment that afternoon, since his wife felt too ill to go. As he reviews recent events with
his wife’s internist, he advocates for something to be done and tells her, “We can’t go on this
way” (n.p.). The patient’s husband and his adamancy inspire the internist to revisit the
patient’s chart as she listens to his reminders that none of her recent blood pressure readings
have been in the normal range. She begins to rethink her approach:
“I think maybe we are focusing on the wrong thing,” Mayer said,
pronouncing each word slowly and carefully as she thought through the
problem. At each visit the patient had an abnormal blood pressure — usually
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too high, but not always. And at each visit Mayer had adjusted the
medications. She hadn’t really stepped back to look at the big picture. Until
now. It was clear that this wasn’t a case of blood pressure that wasn’t being
controlled; it was a case of blood pressure that couldn’t be controlled, and
that was a very diﬀerent kind of problem. (n.p.)
Mayer, the patient’s doctor, shifts her thinking and wonders if the patient has a tumor
secreting high levels of adrenaline, and after a test reveals that this is the case, the tumor is
removed. The patient automatically experiences amelioration of all of her symptoms, much
to her husband’s relief. Sanders resolves the story, writing, “In medical school, I was often
told that if you listen, the patient will tell you what she has. It turns out that sometimes the
patient’s husband will, too” (n.p.). Although the patient has no medical expertise, his
expertise about his wife’s failing health and insight into her condition leads him to
successfully advocate for the doctor to revisit her case. His reminder to the doctor of her
wildly varying blood pressure readings ultimately leads the doctor to the culprit. Thus, family
members play a significant role within the diagnostic network because they advocate for a
revisiting of the illness-assemblage, always pushing for doctors to look again and this time
find the answer that will heal their loved one.
Perhaps the most striking example of a patient’s family member intervening in the
diagnostic network can be found in “What Caused this 15-Year-Old’s Debilitating
Headaches?” In this case, a boy suddenly develops a horrible headache that leads him to stay
in his bed for days on end—not even getting up to eat dinner. After multiple visits to his
internist and other doctors, the patient’s mother gets tired of being told that he simply has
migraines. When the symptoms fail to improve after multiple visits, the mother becomes
increasingly scared because her previously healthy and active son will no longer even eat.
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Frustrated by the repeated inattention to her son’s rapidly declining health, she decides to lie
to the doctors in order to convince them to take his condition seriously—and order a CT
scan. Sanders explains, “In the E.R., the doctors asked the same questions: Any fever? Any
nausea or vomiting? [In the past, she had honestly answered, ‘No.’] But this time she had
diﬀerent answers . . . It didn’t feel right lying to the doctors, but the mother thought that
symptoms that fit their expectations would get action faster than her own motherly
observations” (n.p.). Once the doctors finally order a CT scan, the problem is revealed: the
boy has a disease that causes connections between arteries and veins to be disrupted, resulting
in infection. In this case, the patient’s mother had to lie to the doctors, and tell them an
expected narrative, to convince them to perform a scan and find out what was wrong with
her son. “Perhaps,” Sanders notes, “her son would have gotten a CT scan without her
‘fabrication’ (as she calls it), but she didn’t want to take that chance” (n.p.). This speaks to the
rhetorical interactions that can occur when doctors fail to take actants within their network
seriously. By refusing to listen to the patient’s mother, the child’s doctors failed to fully assess
the range of possibilities for what was causing his illness. Fortunately, the mother was able to
modify her rhetorical behaviors in order to save her son’s life.
As these examples illustrate, patients and their families serve an important function
within the diagnostic network. When doctors feel that they’ve done enough, patients and
their families can remind them when they haven’t. When doctors are satisfied with no
answers, the patient and their families will provoke them to keep searching. When doctors
are stumped as to the proper diagnosis, the patient/their families can make suggestions, even
locating the accurate diagnosis in some cases. More importantly, though, these cases
demonstrate the fact that patients are not isolated actants within diagnostic situations any
more than doctors are, as they bring their own expertise and collectives with them. Doctors
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must be constantly aware of the value their patients and their families bring to bear on their
diagnostic assemblage, and they must treat patients/their families as capable rhetors who
might collaborate in solving the case. Just as Latour assigns scientists and moralists diﬀerent
roles within the collective, as they work to solve the same problems using their diﬀerent
skills, doctors and patients might work together to reassemble illness assemblages by
combining their own expertise.

Nonhumans and the Role of Chance
While doctors and patients are commonly included in literature about medical
rhetorics and rhetorical diagnoses, the theorists previously mentioned fail to assign a role to
nonhumans and chance. Although Gawande and Sanders insist that uncertainty haunts all
medical interactions—from surgery, to diagnosis, to performing an autopsy—no theorists
have discussed the integral role that unexpected and nonhuman actants play in diagnostic
assemblages. However, as these surprising actants intervene in many of the “Diagnosis” cases
to help doctors and patients determine what’s wrong, they warrant analysis as to their unique
rhetorical contributions to the collective.
In “Unresponsive,” for instance, a patient is brought to the hospital in a coma after a
night of partying. Because the man who brought her to the hospital refuses to tell doctors the
full story, since he fears being prosecuted, the doctors have an especially hard time piecing
together the cause of her sudden illness. They run a series of tests, looking for proof of a drug
overdose, but the tests reveal that she has not had alcohol, marijuana, or amphetamines. The
only clue doctors find is her low sodium. Desperate to figure out what is wrong with his
sister, her brother wonders: “What about her cellphone? [He] rummaged through the bag of
his sister’s belongings and pulled out the phone. She had made a bunch of phone calls to her
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friends — no surprises there. Then Cole started clicking through the instant messages. He
saw several references to “Molly” — who was Molly? Google quickly provided the answer; it
was another name for Ecstasy” (n.p.). Her brother spends the afternoon researching the link
between ecstasy use and his sister’s condition. He ultimately finds that ecstasy can cause
extreme hyponatremia in young women. The doctors are able to treat the patient for her low
sodium, and she’s finally healed because her brother chose to invoke a pair of unlikely actants
—a phone and Google—into the diagnostic assemblage.
A similar case can be seen in “Fear of Falling,” where an elderly woman has lost use of
her legs almost entirely. She says that she now “walks like a drunk,” falls frequently, and has
come to require a wheelchair due to her loss of sensation in both legs. The doctor tests her for
cancer, a spinal cord injury, a tumor, and even West Nile Virus, but all of the tests reveal that
she has none of these problems. A blood test reveals that she has too much Zinc and too little
copper in her system, and the doctor begins to seek out the cause of this dangerous
imbalance. As the doctor examines the patient and asks her about her Zinc exposure: “On
the bedside table, Ahmed noticed a half-empty tube of denture adhesive. He picked it up.
Didn’t some of these adhesives contain zinc?” (n.p.). The doctor found that the woman was
using five or six tubes of the adhesive a week since her dentures were ill fitting, even though
when directions are followed, a tube should last for a month. Once the patient learned of the
reason for her lack of mobility, she immediately switched to a less toxic denture adhesive,
since she could not aﬀord a better fitting pair of dentures. The observational skills of the
doctor, in this case, enable him to find the nonhuman culprit behind the patient’s illness. Or,
put another way, the nonhuman demands to be heard by the physician, who has the ability
to discern the relationship between the excessive zinc, the deficient copper, and the tube of
denture adhesive. By recognizing the role the patient’s dentures/denture adhesive is playing in
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her illness, he’s able to eﬀectively treat her, although he cannot reverse the nerve damage
done to her legs.
In some cases, too, the doctor finds an unexpected issue while attempting to treat a
diﬀerent condition. In one case, in particular, it is not the patient’s or doctor’s ability to
assemble the illness’ actants but the direct assertion of a nonhuman object that ultimately
solves the case. In “The Tell-Tale Green Heart,” a surgeon notices that his patient’s heart is
green during a routine bypass surgery. Although he’s initially unconcerned by the strange
hue, he biopsies a piece of the heart’s tissue out of curiosity, because he’s never seen such a
hue in his career spanning 25 years. The strange color is ultimately determined to be a form
of amyloidosis, a disease that causes excessive protein fibers to form in areas such as the heart,
arms, and tongue. Most interestingly, the green heart—and the chance biopsy out of
curiosity—reveals the underlying cause of the patient’s other symptoms, such as his carpal
tunnel (caused by protein deposits in his wrists) and his slurred speech (caused by tightly
packed protein fibers in his tongue). Sanders writes:
Often a patient will seek medical attention for one or more unexplained
symptoms, and a diagnosis will be achieved when those symptoms are linked
to a single disease. In this case, the patient and his doctors didn’t think there
were mysterious symptoms. Almost every ailment had been explained. He
had an infectious diarrhea; he had carpal tunnel syndrome; he had coronary
artery disease. It was only an incidental finding during surgery that led to the
diagnosis that explained everything. (n.p.)
This narrative remains important because it illustrates how the interruption of a nonhuman
actant—rather than the analysis of a doctor or patient—can ultimately reveal the diagnosis.
Nonhumans are not merely useful when a doctor recognizes them; they can appear
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unintentionally but forcefully at surprising moments to assert their significance and their role
in the illness’ network. A view, then, that diagnostic networks only involve human rhetors
does so to its own detriment, as the interruptions of nonhumans can sometimes save a
patient’s life when listened to.
In some cases, the doctor and patient must extend the patient’s network to their
environment. In “Rough Patches,” a four year old boy presents with a painful rash that looks
“as angry-looking as a slap” on his mouth, nose, and penis. His eyes were also red, and he
would cry through painful episodes with the rash, although they would recede after a few
days only to return again. Two doctors who saw the patient diagnosed his rash as poison oak,
but the boy’s mother remained unconvinced—the only plants he ever had contact with were
in his grandmother’s garden, and she had no poison oak. Besides, the rash did not look like
the classic blistered presentation of poison oak, and the rash was not itchy. The doctor begins
to wonder if the boy has been exposed to a poisonous plant at his new nursery or in his
grandmother’s garden, but he’s not sure. As he drove home later that day, Sanders describes,
“He spotted a small gardening store he passed every day. Maybe he should get a consult, he
thought, as he turned into the parking lot. Maybe he was missing something. In medicine,
what you don’t know really can hurt you” (n.p.). He turned out to be right. A man working
in the greenhouse was able to immediately diagnose the patient’s condition once the doctor
listed oﬀ some of the vegetables growing in the boy’s grandmother’s garden. “That’s easy,” he
tells the doctor, before explaining that “[p]umpkin vines more typically cause this kind of
rash. It seemed as if the boy was allergic” (n.p.). Thankfully, the cure for the boy was simple:
avoiding contact with the pumpkin vines would result in the retreat of his rash. As this
narrative illustrates, sometimes doctors and patients aren’t the only actants poised to listen to
the contributions of nonhumans; in some cases, laypeople or those with diﬀering expertise
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may be better equipped to consider the roles that unrecognized actants are playing in the
illness’ network. This speaks to the need to recognize not only the expertise of those directly
involved in the illness—such as the doctor and other healthcare providers—but to consider
the ways in which experts in other areas might be better able to listen locate the actant
destroying the assemblage. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, this narrative emphasizes
the importance of environment as an actant within diagnostic assemblages. The patientnetwork brings to the doctor her entire history and her environmental circumstances, so she
and her doctor must be able to consider the ways in which these factors might intersect with
and act within the illness network.
Beyond the role that nonhumans play in diagnostic networks, several “Diagnosis”
narratives highlight the role of abstract concepts like randomness and chance. For example,
in “Full-Body Failure,” a doctor receives a last minute message on a Friday afternoon about a
patient who is “sick as hell” and in desperate need of attention. The doctor was already late
for his weekly racquetball game but was intrigued by “what promised to be a tough case,” so
he decided to see the patient (n.p.). This chance decision, made arbitrarily, would ultimately
save a young woman’s life. When the doctor went to visit the patient, she lay in her hospital
bed with highlighter yellow skin, her abdomen distended, and her body feverish. Test results
trickled in with almost every one revealing an abnormality—she was anemic despite
transfusions, her blood wasn’t clotting, and her white blood cell count was high. Sanders
explains, “These are the most diﬃcult cases — patients who have so many things going
wrong that it’s nearly impossible for a doctor to process them all at the same time” (n.p.). By
the time Dr. Walerstein was invited to join the case, the patient was near death. According to
Sanders, “Having examined the patient and her chart, Walerstein took a moment to step
back and look for some kind of pattern buried in the chaotic assemblage of numbers and

82

tests. Everyone else started with the bloody diarrhea. Maybe that was the wrong way to think
about it” (n.p.). Walerstein instead focuses on the patient’s liver failure and the destruction of
her red blood cells. Considering these two symptoms in concert caused Walerstein to
remember a “pearl of wisdom”—or a phrase used to memorize common symptom clusters
for diseases. Explains Sanders, “Liver failure and this unusual kind of anemia were caused by
an inherited condition known as Wilson’s disease” (n.p.). As a result, the patient needed a
liver transplant immediately, and she eventually made a full recovery. Sanders concludes this
column by reflecting on the occasionally random nature of medical events; “But what would
have happened,” she ponders, “if Walerstein had been out of town that day or hadn’t come
back? Would this condition have been diagnosed? Would the patient have survived? Neither
doctors nor patients like to consider how much of medicine depends on chance” (n.p.).
Neither, it would seem, do medical rhetorics scholars always like to consider the role that
chance plays in diagnostic networks and rhetorical interactions surrounding illness. Chance,
in this case, governed the doctor’s decision to take the case, his grouping of symptoms that
hadn’t been considered together, his memory of the pearl of wisdom, the availability of tests
to determine what was wrong, and a new liver for the patient. Thus, beyond informing an
actant within a network, chance inundates the assemblage and those who trace its
movements. “Contingency and coincidence,” Sanders declares, “can be as important in the
moments between life and death as knowledge and skill. No doctor knows everything.
Hippocrates’s well-known aphorism expresses this ancient truth: ‘. . . It is not enough for the
physician to do what is necessary . . . the circumstances must be favorable’” (n.p.).
In a final case, unfortunately, chance shines less favorably on a patient and his
deteriorating condition. In “The Strep Throat that Wasn’t,” a 17-year-old boy is admitted to
the ICU because he’s unable to breathe despite his oxygen mask, which provides him with
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five times more oxygen than the air we breathe. He’s also suﬀering from a 105 degree fever, a
sore throat, and horrible chills. A few days earlier, according to his chart, the boy had woken
up feeling ill. “He saw his family doctor the next day,” Sanders clarifies, “who diagnosed
a strep throat and started the boy on a five-day course of azithromycin —
an antibiotic widely used in part because it is convenient, needing to be taken only once each
day. No strep test was done — probably, Garrett figured, because the diagnosis seemed
obvious” (n.p.). Test after test yields no promising information, and a blood culture was not
yet available. Finally, after days of fighting to simply keep the patient alive, a chance
encounter reveals the problem. The blood culture results had finally come in, and the doctor
noticed a resident looking at the boy’s chart. “‘What’s that?’ he recalls asking. The blood
cultures finally grew strange bacteria, the resident responded, but it was probably just
contaminant. What was the bacteria? Garrett persisted. Something called Fusobacterium
necrophorum. The identification of the bacteria told Garrett all he needed to know. The boy
had Lemierre’s disease” (n.p.). The doctor immediately changed the patient’s antibiotics,
hoping that the proper medication could finally eradicate the patient’s illness. Unfortunately,
the patient died three weeks later in ICU with his family at his side.
Of course, this narrative underscores the randomness with which rhetoric and
medicine intersect, albeit in a much more negative light than in the previous example.
Acknowledging chance as an actant within each diagnostic network means recognizing that
each diagnosis, each illness, has rhetorical and other contingencies beyond our grasp. There
can be no ultimate control of diagnostic encounters, just as no rhetorician can fully control a
rhetorical situation, no matter how hard she may try. However, more positively, this narrative
also stresses the importance of adjusting one’s network based on tragic assemblages and their
dissolution. When the boy’s mother informed their primary care doctor, who had mistakenly
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diagnosed the boy with strep without performing a test, he openly wept for his fatal error.
But he also readjusted his diagnostic network to be more eﬀective in the future. He told
Sanders that he refuses to miss this diagnosis again and “[h]e has changed his practice: now
everyone with suspected strep will have a throat culture to check for both strep and
Lemierre’s. ‘Maybe that’s overkill, and I’ll probably end up treating too many of my patients
with antibiotics,’ he added thoughtfully. ‘But I don’t ever want to lose a patient like this
again’” (n.p.). As this doctor learned the hard way, while we may never be able to control our
rhetorical or diagnostic networks, we may respond to troubled networks and intervene to
enhance our practices, better serve the needs of others, and even save lives.

Networked Attachments
In Reassembling the Social, Latour maintains, “it is possible to trace more sturdy
relations and discover more revealing patterns by finding a way to register the links between
unstable and shiftable frames of reference rather than by trying to keep one frame
stable” (24). In this chapter, I have attempted to disrupt the seemingly stable frame of
rhetorical diagnosis to see how defining it through the lens of ANT might better account for
the uncertainty that haunts medical events and relationships. My analysis of the “Diagnosis”
column narratives complicates notions that medical rhetorics can be equated to persuasion,
interpretation, or identification. Such frameworks presume relatively stable actants who share
common language or knowledge, which is far from the case in many medical contexts.
Furthermore, such rhetorical relationships generally exclude nonhumans and chance from
analysis because of their humanist bent. The rhetorical relationships featured in the
“Diagnosis” columns are far from a one-to-one relationship of shared discourse; instead, they
are dispersed and disrupted networks, messy and chaotic, and brimming with
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miscommunications and random interruptions. Perhaps most important, though, such
rhetorical interactions hinge on acting despite limitations, or as Gawande puts it: “we are
expected to act with swiftness and consistency, even when the task requires marshaling
hundreds of people—from laboratory technicians to the nurses on each change of shift to the
engineers who keep the oxygen supply system working—for the care of a single
person” (Better 4). As Gawande emphasizes, ethical action in medicine calls for an
understanding of the networked attachments one must maintain to ensure a patient’s health.
But what happens when the network breaks down, resulting in the misdiagnosis of a patient?
I will explore this question, and the responsibilities of actants to their assemblage, more fully
in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3:
QUARANTINE AND NETWORKED MISTAKES
As for the leper who has the infection, his clothes shall be torn, and the hair of his head shall be
uncovered, and he shall cover his mustache and cry, 'Unclean! Unclean!' He shall remain unclean
all the days during which he has the infection; he is unclean. He shall live alone; his dwelling shall
be outside the camp. - Leviticus 13:46
Simply put, germs travel. - Howard Markel
On October 30, 2014, something unremarkable happened. Kaci Hickox and her
partner, Ted Wilbur, left their home in Kent, Maine for a bike ride through their favorite
three mile trail. What was remarkable about this event was that Hickox and Wilbur were
chased out of their home and down the trail by reporters, who followed them on foot. The
reporters screamed questions after Hickox while police oﬃcers looked on outside of her
home. The bike ride was broadcast by major news networks, and figures including Maine
Governor Paul LePage and Rush Limbaugh spoke out against her actions. The Washington
Post called her “defiant” (Berman and Dennis n.p.) and NBC News referred to her
relationship with government oﬃcials, who opposed the bike ride, as a “standoﬀ”(“Kaci
Hickox, Nurse in Ebola Quarantine Standoﬀ” n.p.).“It's a beautiful day for a bike ride,”
Hickox said as she embarked in the midst of this scene.
Hickox’s unremarkable actions resulted in such an uproar because she had recently
returned from treating Ebola patients in Sierra Leone, an area in Africa hit particularly hard
by the epidemic. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sierra Leone
had 8706 cases of Ebola in 2014 with 3956 deaths, with the outbreak ending in March 2016
(“2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa” n.p.). Comparatively, the CDC explains that the US
had 4 total cases of Ebola in 2014, and one of these patients died (“Cases of Ebola
Diagnosed in the United States” n.p.). Hickox returned to the United States on Friday,
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October 24, landing in Newark Liberty International Airport. When a customs oﬃcial
learned that she had returned from West Africa, she was immediately subjected to seven
hours of questioning and an unreliable forehead scanner test, which showed that she had a
mild fever—potentially attributable to her long days of travel. According to Anemona
Hartocollis and Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Hickox was “left alone for long stretches and given
only a granola bar when she said she was hungry” (n.p.) Even though she tested negative for
Ebola on Saturday, Hickox was quarantined in “[Chris] Christie’s Ebola detention center” in
an isolated tent outside of a Newark hospital until Monday, October 27 (Jacobs, Goldstein,
and Siemaszko n.p.). Hickox openly challenged the involuntary quarantine, which opposed
medical advice from the CDC and scientific research about Ebola and its transmission. She
was quarantined because of fears that she’d transmit Ebola to others even though Ebola can
only be spread through the exchange of bodily fluids. Also, as Hickox pointed out, only
symptomatic people have Ebola, which means her asymptomatic state made it safe for her to
resume her normal activities. Although ultimately Christie released her on October 27th, the
frenzied fear surrounding the potential public health threat she posed continued to haunt her
through the bike riding incident the next week and throughout the following year, as she
ultimately sued Christie for violating her civil rights.
Since the long history of quarantine shows that it has tended to scapegoat vulnerable
individuals, particularly immigrants and poor people, Hickox’s quarantine and its subsequent
media coverage is unique because she represents a Western, white, female, healthy face of
Ebola. Hickox became the face of Ebola in the United States even while 28,637 cases and
11,315 Ebola deaths occurred worldwide, the majority of which occurred in the West
African countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (“Ebola in Africa: The End of a
Tragedy?” n.p.). So obsessive was the media coverage of Hickox that it distracted from the
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single Ebola death that occurred on U.S. soil. Thomas Eric Duncan, a Liberian, visited the
U.S. for the first time in late September 2014 to visit family. He took himself to the hospital
soon after arriving in the U.S. complaining of dizziness, abdominal pain, and a high fever,
but although he told doctors he’d recently been in West Africa, they sent him home with
antibiotics for sinusitis. Four days later, he returned to the hospital, and this time he was
diagnosed with Ebola. Less than two weeks later, he died in the Dallas hospital.
Duncan’s family later sued the hospital, Texas Presbyterian, claiming that they had
acted negligently in caring for him — particularly because of his race. For example, a family
friend pointed out to The Washington Post: “If you went to the hospital right now, and your
temperature was 103 degrees, no doctor would send you home” (Justin Wm. Moyer n.p.).
Others questioned not only the mistaken choice to not treat Duncan immediately, but the
treatment measures employed once he was diagnosed. Thomas Geisbert, a professor of
microbiology and immunology at the University of Texas at Galveston, said of the choice to
use an experimental drug on Duncan, “It kind of came out of left field. I think the jury is
still out on why this would have any activity against Ebola” (Moyer n.p.). Perhaps Moyer
puts it best when he explains, “Unlike some other Ebola patients provided state-of-the-art
experimental treatments and swept to advanced medical facilities like the National Institutes
of Health (NIH), Duncan was poor. He had no insurance. And he was black” (n.p.).
Comparing Hickox’s and Duncan’s narratives as they were picked up by the
mainstream media results in some suggestive parallels. Neither Hickox nor Duncan were
believed when they made claims about their health, and in both cases they suﬀered as a
result. Lawsuits were conducted on behalf of Hickox and Duncan because of civil rights
violations. And both cases, of course, began with a misdiagnosis. Although Hickox was
publicly misdiagnosed primarily by Christie and LePage, both of whom have no background
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in medicine, and Duncan’s doctors missed what should have been a fairly obvious diagnosis,
both individuals were the victims of a breakdown in their diagnostic networks.
Although many narratives catalog successful diagnoses—both in medical literature
and popular shows like House, few texts consider what goes wrong when misdiagnoses
happen. In “Diagnosis: A Biocultural Critique of Certainty,” Lennard Davis identifies three
key obstacles to examining misdiagnoses: “the aura of faith” surrounding diagnosis, the
erasure of an uncertain process post-diagnosis, and the conflicting goals of politics and ethics
(82). First, Davis claims that diagnosis has been endowed with a level of religious certainty
since at least the nineteenth century:
Gnosis, as knowledge, implies the certainty of religious knowledge, and its
adjective, gnostic, is opposed to the doubtful—that is to say, full of doubt—
knowledge of the agnostic. The heyday of the use of gnosis and of diagnosis
in the English language was the second half of the nineteenth century,
coinciding with the rise of evangelical Christianity, as well as the
professionalization of medicine. Without making too much of this point,
could we not see the physician as displacing the divine as the source for
certain knowledge? Diagnosis in this scenario would be the medical
equivalent of the theological certainty oﬀered by a knowing—in this case a
knowing of the body if not the soul. (85)
Here, Davis argues that doctors, like priests, are unquestioningly endowed with the authority
to classify humans into categories of well and sick, determine their illness, and identify the
course of treatment. The confluence of specialized medical knowledge and seemingly
infallible medical testing options have certainly reiterated the aura of faith that Davis
identifies in the twenty first century. Such an aura of faith, for Davis, renders it diﬃcult to
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question medical authority and discuss medical failures, since to do so is to commit an
almost blasphemous oﬀense.
Furthermore, Davis argues that the erasure of the uncertainty and mistakes that
haunt the diagnostic process once the correct diagnosis has been determined prevents us
from learning from medical error and acknowledging medicine’s fallibility. He explains,
“Diagnosis is always synchronic. It always takes place in a clinical present moment of
certainty. It has to willfully suppress the diachronicity of its own coming into being, because
such history might reveal contingency, chance, convention, and so on” (90). Beyond the
inability to grapple with physician imperfection, then, the aura of faith surrounding
diagnosis results in a trained incapacity to recognize the uncertain process that leads to every
medical breakthrough. When this process is discarded, information of immense value and
alternative theories are lost. Medical narratives celebrate discovery, success, and correctness
and skillfully conceal failure, past theories, and alternative ways of seeing. “Thus, the current
diagnostic criteria are always the last step,” Davis notes, “the hopeful, utopian moment, the
final correction of a history of error. In this sense, the diagnostic process is amnesiac and is
constitutionally incapable of being uncertain about its certainty” (90). Davis’ conjecture
highlights not only medicine’s unwillingness to reexamine the uncertainty that haunts the
diagnostic process, but its inability to do so due to the way the diagnostic process is
traditionally conceived.
Finally, Davis locates the source of willful diagnostic certainty in its situatedness
between both politics and ethics. He quotes Zizek as saying, “the ethical is thus the
(back)ground of undecidability while the political is the domain of decision(s)” (Zizek 316,
Davis 93). Davis continues, “We can say then that diagnosis hesitates between the
undecidability of nomos and dike, between custom and justice . . . Hospitality requires an
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undecidability, but diagnosis in its political sense requires decision. Like all sovereign
decisions, it requires the certainty that comes from the amnesis of past” (93). The ethical and
political projects, as defined by Davis, are at odds because hospitality postpones decisions in
order to remain open to newcomers while politics requires decisiveness and action, a closure.
Thus, “Diagnosis will require a repression of that coming into being in favor of the moment
of judgment” (91-2). For Davis, then, medicine’s relationship to both politics and ethics
demands that physicians maintain an impossible tension between decisiveness—they must
act quickly to save the patient and because of financial and time constraints—and ethics—
what is the best course of action for this particular patient? The need to act, then, obscures
ethical questions about negative outcomes because the doctor must deliberate and decide in
the moment, often without all necessary information available.
Although Davis remains most interested in the way this certainty aﬀects the doctorpatient relationship, I wonder how such an aura of certainty contributes to public
misdiagnoses such as Hickox’s. While I explored the interpersonal dimensions of doctor and
patient diagnostic communication in Chapter 2, I want to turn my attention here to what
happens when networks of actants misdiagnose. How can we account for networked failure
in relation to diagnoses, and how can network theory help us to reintegrate misdiagnoses
into their own situational networks? Davis gives us a clue: “We might then say that
something in the diagnostic process might in fact provide a curative modality. If that were
the case, what would that curative modality look like? As we said, the diagnosis would have
to be attained in a condition of mutuality, one that took into account the history of not only
the patient and the practitioner but also the profession itself ” (94). The history of the
profession of medicine, while vast, also oﬀers us a clue as to the broken link in diagnostic
networks such as Hickox’s. Davis argues that “To diagnose is to attempt to emphasize
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diﬀerence,” and indeed the history of medicine involves categorizations based on diﬀerence:
sick and well, diﬀerent classifications of sickness, and the establishment of boundaries
between them (88). Perhaps the tradition of quarantine serves as the best example of this
boundary generation and maintenance as a way of separating those seen as a threat to the
healthy citizenry. Quarantine establishes a separation because a group of people is waiting for
a diagnosis that will send them into isolation, if they are sick, or back into their everyday
lives, if they are well. Quarantine, then, generates tremendous fear because it generally arises
in situations where people are fearful of contracting an infectious disease, and those in
quarantine themselves often do not yet know whether they are sick. At the heart of Hickox’s
struggle, in fact, is a fight against the stigmatization and separation quarantine demands.
Thus, in what follows, I will cover a brief history of quarantine as it has functioned to
perpetuate diagnostic diﬀerence and separation. I will then discuss the ways in which Latour’s
Actor-Network Theory opens up an alternative way to negotiate with actants within a
diagnostic network without excluding those deemed potentially dangerous. Finally, I will
reread the Hickox misdiagnosis network through this framework of excluding actants and a
Latourian concept of morality.

A Brief History of Quarantine
Upon returning to the U.S. and being forced into involuntary quarantine, Hickox
contacted a friend who worked at The Dallas Morning News. The newspaper subsequently
covered her quarantine and even invited her to pen an account about the experience. An
early piece by Naheed Rajwani quotes Hickox as saying, “I am scared about how health care
workers will be treated at airports when they declare that they have been fighting Ebola in
West Africa . . . I am scared that, like me, they will arrive and see a frenzy of disorganization,
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fear and, most frightening, quarantine” (n.p.). Indeed, as Hickox points out, quarantine has
been historically linked to disorganization and fear. Quarantine takes its name from the 40
day isolation period required by fourteenth century Venetian port oﬃcials during the plague
outbreak (Tom Koch 655). According to Eleanor Klibanoﬀ in “Awful Moments in
Quarantine History, “If a ship was suspected of harboring plague, it had to wait 40 days
before any passengers or goods could come ashore. Venice built a hospital/quarantine center
on an island oﬀ its coast, where sailors from plague-infested ships were sent either to get
better, or, more likely, to die” (n.p.). Quarantine was heavily associated with both national
and interpersonal barriers and was based on the belief that “plague was somehow transported
from place to place by travelers and their goods” (Koch 655). Thus, over time, “The idea of
quarantine expanded to include, at one scale, the isolation of communities within a region or
nation and, at a still greater scale, the isolation of infected persons and their families in their
homes or in designated sites distancing them from the general population” (Koch 655).
Quarantine, then, involved the exclusion of Others—both at the national and interpersonal
levels.
Donna Barbisch, Kristi L. Koenig, and Fuh-Yuan Shih are careful to distinguish
quarantine’s unique meaning from that of isolation or internment. They explain, “‘Isolation’
is for patients who are ill. Quarantine refers to the ‘separation of symptomatic infected
individuals from those who are not infected.’ Thus, quarantine is for those with no signs or
symptoms who have possibly been exposed to a contagious disease and have the potential to
transmit the disease to others” (547). Quarantine occupies a peculiar space, then, within public
health deliberation because it covers potential rather than proven cases of illness. The person
in quarantine may become sick, but she has not yet, and she thus occupies a liminal space on
the sick-well continuum. This liminality, of course, opens up a lot of room for individual
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interpretation and even abuse. In “Quarantine,” Kathryn Staiano-Ross argues that “[Disease]
is always an event. It is polysemic, multilayered, historically full, and dynamic, not static. It is
constructed over time and encumbered with interpretants according to the needs and
preconceptions of those who argue they search only for truth” (84). Staiano-Ross finds in
historical examples of quarantine the reinforcement of “prejudices both long standing and of
recent origin. Disease proves useful as a justification for behaviors that might in other
circumstances neither be legal nor appropriate” (84). The lack of regulation for quarantine
procedures, and the uncertainty haunting those quarantined individuals who may or may not
be infected, can therefore serve as a justification for racially and ethnically motivated
exclusions and violence.
Quarantine’s historical links to racism and scapegoating has been well documented,
but a few suggestive examples may help to elucidate quarantine’s link to separation and
exclusion. In When Germs Travel, Howard Markel describes one such example:
On December 12, 1899, health oﬃcials in Honolulu announced that a
twenty-two year old bookkeeper named You Chong had died of bubonic
plague. Within hours after the discovery of his death, U.S. military police
cordoned oﬀ the fourteen-square-block area where more than 10,000
Chinese and Japanese immigrants lived. A few weeks later, on January 20,
1900, Henry Cooper, the president of the Honolulu Board of Health,
ordered a controlled burning of some of the buildings in this district to rid it
of plague. As bad luck had it, a gust of wind quickly changed the fire’s status
to ‘uncontrolled,’ and the blaze spread throughout Honolulu’s Chinatown,
lasting a full seventeen days, laying ruin to over 4,000 homes across some 38
acres, and leaving 4,500 people homeless. Nevertheless, bubonic plague
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continued to appear episodically in Honolulu through early March 1900.
(57-8)
This example highlights the particular insecurities of turn-of-the-century Honolulu (and San
Fransisco, for that matter) that Chinese and Japanese immigrants were carrying diseases into
the United States. As cities expanded and disease spread, poor public health was blamed on
immigrants rather than their deplorable living conditions and ineﬀective waste management,
particularly in densely populated cities. Thus, immigrants were cordoned oﬀ from the rest of
the population in order to supposedly protect the rest of the city, although the immigrants
were often merely victims of disease due to their close proximity to other actants: rats, other
vermin, and their poverty, which excluded them from access to doctors.
Quarantine procedures resulted in more than cordoning oﬀ immigrant
neighborhoods—it also resulted in physical violence and loss of financial opportunity. In a
similar suspected bubonic plague outbreak in San Francisco in February and March 1900,
“Personal property [of Chinatown’s residents] was confiscated and burned, Chinese-owned
businesses were closed without suﬃcient explanation, and people were thrown out of their
homes so that tenements could be disinfected. Those Chinese residents whom policemen
deemed uncooperative were beaten on their heads and bodies with billy clubs” (66). Some
were prevented from going to work while many were told that their businesses had to be shut
down; Chinatown stores owned by white people remained open, however, resulting in a
quarantine barrier that zig-zagged through the town. Of course, such a method highlights the
lack of understanding for how disease was actually spread—it was suspected that white
Americans could not carry disease even if they lived in the same quarters as the immigrants
suspected to be contagious.
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Furthermore, such discriminatory quarantine procedures also surfaced in early
twentieth century treatment of tuberculosis. For example, based on stereotypes that poor
people posed the greatest public health threat, “privately practicing physicians who treated
the well-to-do were generally not required to report their tuberculosis patients to the public
authorities while doctors working at free clinics, dispensaries, and other institutions that
catered to the poor were” (Markel 34). This meant that “Many poor or immigrant patients
either avoided the doctor altogether or sought out quacks who at least promised
confidentiality” (34). Markel notes that despite findings that native-born Americans were
more likely to have tuberculosis than immigrants, assumptions that vulnerable populations
were to blame for tuberculosis inspired attempts to ban particular immigrant populations
from entering the U.S. (35). Immigration restrictionists argued that “Diseased
newcomers . . . not only threatened the public health in the present because of their
propensity toward acute illness and poverty; they also threatened the future of American
society as they passed on their defective genes in multiplicity” (36). As Ladelle McWhorter
might remind us, this is yet another instance of “scientific racism” in U.S. history, wherein
minorities, the poor, and other “degenerates” were thought to “pos[e] a serious threat to the
continued purity of highly evolved Nordic germ plasm” (140). Although the restrictionists
were never successful in banning supposedly diseased immigrants, their rhetoric clearly
intersects with the eugenics movement and structural racism that continues to haunt U.S.
immigrants even now.
A final example speaks to the sexist history of quarantine procedures: that of the
venereal disease outbreak in the U.S. in 1917. According to Klibanoﬀ, concerns circulated at
the time about “the number of young men ineligible for the draft because of sexually
transmitted diseases like syphilis and gonorrhea” (n.p.). When oﬃcials also noticed “an
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uptick in ‘camp girls,’ prostitutes and other women hanging around U.S. training grounds
and military recruitment centers,” they decided to quarantine women who might potentially
have STDs to prevent them from infecting men in the military (n.p.). Klibanoﬀ elaborates:
A federal order allowed for the incarceration of prostitutes and camp girls
until they were deemed STD-free via mandatory testing. Harvard University
medical historian Allan Brandt estimates at least 30,000 women were picked
up in the raids. ‘There’s no evidence that this impacted the rates of
transmission,’ he says. ‘But there was this notion that these women
constituted a serious threat to our success in the war.’ He notes that while the
women were being rounded up and held in prison, often long after they’d
tested negative, the Army was issuing condoms to soldiers shipping oﬀ to
France. (n.p.)
Quarantine in this case performs not only an exclusionary function—as prostitutes are
separated from society in the name of the public good—but a punitive one, as well. The
prostitutes were held responsible for not only the infection of men eligible for the draft but
potentially for undermining war eﬀorts. Of course, the double standard found in the
military’s message that the prostitutes were unpatriotic and dangerous while the men were
mere victims of their siren calls can be seen in the simultaneous encouragement for the
soldiers to take condoms with them to France. The men were granted treatment and access to
prevention methods while the women were held in prison.
Overall, as this brief sketch of several suggestive historic examples highlights,
quarantine serves to exclude those who might be diagnosed from those who are presumed
healthy. The uncertainty of potential diagnosis provokes such fear that those most vulnerable
are often disproportionately aﬀected, most often the working class, minorities, immigrants,
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and women. Quarantine draws lines between those who may become ill and those who are
temporarily healthy, but it also draws lines between citizen and foreigner, wealthy and poor,
male and female, and white and non-white. Thus, Staiano-Ross has gone so far as to claim,
“Who is to be isolated from the balance of society, for what period of time, and under what
conditions, may depend more on the individual’s social, economic, and political status and
categorization as ‘other’ than upon his/her actual threat to the public’s health” (83). If, to
return to Davis’ conjecture, there might be something with curative potential within
diagnosis, perhaps we might locate it by considering how exclusions, enacted in the name of
the public good, function within quarantine networks. Rather than isolated situations, these
quarantines are complex events unfolding through a multiplicity of actants, both human and
nonhuman.

Quarantine and Networks
Latour’s concept of morality in many ways echoes Davis’s concept of ethics, as
contrasted with politics. Latour redefines morality as “uncertainty about the proper relations
between means and ends”—that is, refusing to treat any entity “whale, river, climate,
earthworm, tree, calf, cow, pig, brood” as “‘simply a means’ but…‘always also an
end’” (Politics of Nature 156; emphasis original). This revision of morality emerges from
Latour’s thesis that each actant is a vital contributor to the Earth’s network, and asserting
with certainty that any actant is simply a means to an end will have negative consequences
upon the whole network. Latour suggestively notes that we must extend Kant’s declaration
that we should no longer treat human beings as means to ends to nonhumans as well (155).
For Latour, each actant is both a means and an end; for example, a tree contributes to the
network of which it is apart by supplying oxygen and other resources, but it is also an end in
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itself, as a fully grown tree has realized its evolutionary goal of development. This new
conception of morality is situated within Latour’s revision of the collective into four major
professions: scientists, politicians, economists, and moralists, that will share the common goal
of “decidi[ing] about the common world in which they live” (130). Latour tasks the scientists
with detecting new phenomena for the collective, the politicians with the generation of
“voices that stammer, that protest, that express opinions,” and the economists with “giv[ing]
a common language to the heterogeneous set of entities” within the network (145, 51).
Rather than a morality that holds unswervingly to a few key foundational values, refusing to
accept the closure that politics demands, Latour’s morality interacts with the other
professions in a more constructive way. Latour explains:
Scientists, politicians, and economists, equally obsessed, though for diﬀerent
reasons, by the closing of the collective, are thus always in error in the eyes of
the moralists who are going to equip the entities that have been set aside with
the right to appeal that they can use when, in order to fulfill the requirement
of closure, they are driven out of the collective in the name of their
(provisional) insignificance. (156)
Whereas Latour acknowledges that closure is necessary for collective action, his concept of
closure is much less fatal than is Davis’—the closure is tenuous, subject to change, and open
to reintegrating excluded actants. The moralists, then, are those who must constantly ask
who has been excluded and who must be “reintegrated, at some later point, in the form of
friends, included parties, and potential allies” (157). Rather than a passive acceptance of new
actants, they must actively seek them out and facilitate their incorporation.
Moralists are furthermore tasked with the responsibility to prevent a network from
becoming too insulated from external networks. Moralists, Latour writes, “add to the

100

collective continual access to its own exterior by obliging the others to recognize that the
collective is always a dangerous artifice” (157). Lest those within the network come to take its
construction as natural or inevitable, the moralists will be there to remind them of its
constructed and revisionist design. In addition to preventing complacency on the part of the
network, moralists must also actively pursue new attachments and encourage them to
approach the network. Moralists “go looking for [those who have been excluded] outside the
collective, in order to facilitate their reentry and accelerate their insertion” (157). In this way,
moralists serve almost as intermediaries that connect new actants to the network and bring
them into the collective project of creating a common world.
In contrast to the relative decisiveness which scientists, politicians, and economists
must employ, Latour further tasks the moralists with imbuing the network with a sense of
constant anxiety. The moralists view the closure of the collective as impossible (their motto is
“we can never call it quits”), but Latour again sees this clash with the other professions as
generative rather than contradictory (158). “Far from opposing the politicians, as the old
distribution of roles would have it, the moralist’s requirement of starting over again is going
to enter, on the contrary, into consonance with the work of the politicians, to keep on
mending the fragile envelope that allows them to say ‘us’ without being unfaithful to their
constituents. To every ‘we want’ or politics, the moralist will ad, ‘Yes, but what do they
want?’” (158). Furthermore, the moralist will “add . . . a constant anxiety over the rejected
facts, the eliminated hypotheses, the neglected research projects—in short, everything that
might make it possible to seize the opportunity to bring new entities into the
collective” (158). The moralists therefore function as a kind of revolving door within the
collective; while they do not completely prevent closure, they constantly renegotiate it by
swinging the door back open and bringing in an excluded party when needed. Thus,
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moralists are tasked with the vital work of renegotiating the constituents of collectives,
reforming networks, and incorporating new actants into the network’s larger shared project.
Perhaps Latour best sums up the way the moralists contribute to the collective when
he writes, “With them, the collective is always trembling because it has left outside all that it
needed to take into account to define itself as a common world” (158). To return to the
quarantine process, perhaps it is the exclusion of moralist actants within diagnostic collectives
that results in the exclusion of important, structural actants from consideration in public
health scenarios. For example, in the bubonic plague outbreak situations described
previously, poor living conditions in immigrant neighborhoods were excluded from the
network and therefore from consideration. Thus, rather than addressing the problem of
living conditions as it intersected with disease, the network chose to violate the rights of
Chinese and Japanese immigrants by excluding them—literally and metaphorically. Public
health concerns cannot be addressed adequately by exclusion, however, particularly now
when air travel connects people with diﬀering health care systems from around the world and
public transportation brings people of all walks of life into close contact on a daily basis. The
spread of Ebola and the frenzied quarantine of aid workers, in particular, highlights an
anxiety on the part of Western countries that they can no longer remain blissfully ignorant of
healthcare systems in underdeveloped countries, as lack of access to adequate care in Africa
can result in an epidemic in New York City in less than 24 hours. The exclusionary move of
quarantining actants rather than working alongside them to compose a healthier world, while
commonly practiced throughout history, ultimately makes it more diﬃcult to promote
health and prevent the spread of disease.
In what follows, I will oﬀer a rereading of Hickox’s network that explores the ways in
which networked exclusions occurred. I will argue that by excluding Hickox from the public

102

health network through quarantine, Christie and LePage sought to shore up a Western
healthcare network that was self-sustaining and protected from outside influence. Beyond
identifying how Hickox’s Ebola quarantine represents the most recent attempt to exclude
non-Western perspectives and bodies and nonhuman actants from Western networks, I will
serve as a moralist in Latour’s sense by arguing that we must reincorporate several actants
back into the collective if we are to confront future Ebola outbreaks more eﬀectively. In
particular, I will consider the exclusion of nonhumans (particularly deforestation and
destroyed habitats in Africa), African perspectives about and experiences of Ebola, and
conservative political projects as they contributed to Hickox’s quarantine and the breakdown
of the network. I will finally describe the ways in which a moralist project, as proposed by
Latour, might ameliorate future public health scares and oﬀer us more eﬀective ways to
combat pandemics than quarantine.

Deforestation and Animal Habitats: The Silent Actants
Studies of Ebola’s origins in humans almost always begin in West Africa, particularly
in Guinea. Whereas the area was once covered in biodiverse, rich forests, meaning that
natural boundaries were maintained between wild animals and humans, civil war in Western
Africa between rebel groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone led refugees to flee to these forests
and build settlements. Sonia Shah, author of Pandemic, explains of the deforestation: “The
refugees cut down trees to plant crops, build huts, and turn into charcoal [ibid]. Rebel
groups started logging the forest, too, selling timber to finance their battles. By the end of
1990s, the transformation of the forest could be seen from space . . . Of the region’s original
forests, only fifteen percent remained” (24-5). This mass deforestation, particularly given the
relatively short period of time within which it occurred, naturally led to adverse eﬀects on the
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environment and wildlife. The tenuous borders between human and animal suddenly became
much more permeable. While Shah mentions that many animals likely disappeared as a
result of the deforestation, many remained, but now in much closer proximity to humans.
The story might have ended here, with war and deforestation converging to create a
dire situation for people in aﬀected areas. However, this already fraught network was soon
met with another actant that transformed a humanitarian crisis network into a network of
disease. This actant was an animal uniquely capable of carrying and transmitting disease to
humans: bats. Bats survived the deforestation, and because they fly and have hollow bones
(which means they “don’t produce immune cells in their bone marrow like the rest of us
mammals do”) they were primed to spread the microbes that flourish within their bodies
(25). Shah describes the new relationships between bat and animals, writing, “As the
Guinean forest was chopped down, new kinds of collisions between bats and people likely
occurred. Bats were hunted for meat, exposing hunters to microbe-laden bat tissue when the
animals were slaughtered. Bats fed on fruit trees near human settlements, exposing local
people to their saliva and excreta” (25). Thus, the deforestation which led bats and humans
into closer contact put humans at a greater risk for contacting an infectious diseases carried
by the bats. As Shah ultimately reveals, “At some point—nobody knows just when—a
microbe of bats, the filovirus Ebola, started to spill over and infect people. In humans, Ebola
causes hemorrhagic fever and can kill 90 percent of those it infects” (25). The disease began
to further spread when the civil war ended in 2003 and refugees who had been living in
isolated quarters rejoined communities where the disease was more challenging to contain.
Just as the combined actants of civil war, people fleeing to the forests for safety, and
deforestation had contributed to cross-species contamination with Ebola, it now enabled the
virus to spread like wildfire through denser populations. Whereas the remoteness of locations
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where Ebola occurred had previously prevented the disease from reaching epidemic
proportions, its spread to larger villages and cities meant that it would now travel more
rapidly and infect more people. Furthermore, as David Quammen points out in Ebola: The
Natural and Human History of a Deadly Virus, “chimps and gorillas, like humans, are highly
susceptible to Ebola” (8). This meant that those who managed to avoid contact with bats
were nonetheless striken with Ebola if they consumed contaminated chimp or gorilla meat;
this very method of transmission led to an outbreak in the Gabon village Mayibout 2 in
1996, killing over thirty people (Quammen 11-12). These nonhumans—destroyed habitats
along with bats and gorillas—helped incite the epidemic that has now resurfaced twenty-six
times in Africa alone (“Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease” n.p.).
With the conditions being ripe for the spread of an extremely deadly disease, why
was mainstream media coverage so scarce, at first? According to Shah, the very conditions
that led to the deforestation prevented others from intervening or learning about the
budding epidemic until it was too late. She explains, “[N]obody noticed. The ongoing
conflict had severed supply routes and communication networks, leaving the refugees hiding
in the jungle bereft of outside help. Even the most stalwart aid organizations such as
Médecins Sans Frontières had been forced to withdraw. The isolation coupled with the
violence compelled the United Nations to call the West African refugees’ plight ‘the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world’” (Shah 26). Beyond the human death toll of the disease
(more than ten thousand died by 2015), the epidemic killed one-third of the world’s gorilla
population, and the “thousands of people infected with Ebola quickly overwhelmed the
fragile economies and health-care infrastructures of the three most aﬀected countries” (Shah
27). However, little of this was discussed in the mainstream media, which instead only
gained interest in Ebola and its many adverse eﬀects once it threatened to spread to the U.S.
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In fact, a Google search reveals that the earliest available reports in the Western media about
deforestation in Africa and its relationship to Ebola began to surface in 2014—at the same
time that Hickox and others were returning to the U.S. after caring for West African
patients.
I want to suggest that the nonhuman actants demand to be heard in the story of the
Ebola pandemic, and that they must be reincorporated into the network if we are to combat
Ebola outbreaks in the future. While of course the human cost of Ebola is an important
focus for prevention eﬀorts, these eﬀorts will ultimately fail if work is not also done to
address deforestation and its eﬀects. The belief that we could exclude animals and forests
from our human networks and maintain a healthy world have been proven false already by
climate change research, but further research must be done to uncover the ways in which this
exclusion leads to spillover (the technical term for when diseases in animals spread to
humans). After all, Ebola is only one of many diseases caused by spillover; others include (to
name just a few): rabies, West Nile Virus, bird flu, smallpox, and SARS.
While of course Ebola is a current and prominent example of a disease network that
requires the inclusion of nonhuman actants, discoveries about the ways in which
deforestation contributes to pandemics may have a larger eﬀect on public health, more
generally. In a 2009 report, “The Spread of New Diseases: The Climate Connection,” Shah
argues that we must not only identify the connections between non-humans, the
environment, and medicine, but we must foster interdisciplinary collaboration to confront
the eﬀects of their intermingling. She writes, “These developments [in understanding climate
change and its eﬀects on disease] have given rise to a growing consensus among many wildlife
biologists and public health experts who advocate a new approach to conservation and public
health called ‘conservation medicine,’ which promotes interdisciplinary collaborations to
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expose the links between ecosystems, the health of wildlife, and humans that lead to the
emergence of new pathogens” (n.p.). Furthermore, as JA Ginsburg puts it succinctly in her
article for The Guardian, “The bottom line is that there is no public health without
environmental health” (n.p.). While developed nations must be more willing to admit
underdeveloped nations into their healthcare networks, just as pressingly, medical networks
must acknowledge the extent to which environmental actants play a role in shaping their
projects.
Ginsburg also cautions against viewing environmental factors as solely to blame for
recent outbreaks of pandemics such as Ebola and SARS. She writes, “Deforestation didn’t
cause this Ebola epidemic, but did make it much more likely. The region’s legacy of war and
poverty, its beleaguered health care systems, and a series of bureaucratic fumbles fanned a
small and isolated outbreak into a full-blown epidemic fire, which has already killed more
people than all previous 25 known Ebola outbreaks put together” (n.p.). Ginsburg’s reminder
to consider deforestation as a key actant—not the sole actant—within Ebola’s network warns
of the dangers of considering deforestation outside of the economic, medical, and political
conditions that permitted its dire consequences.
In Chapter 2, Sanders’ “Diagnosis” column narratives highlighted the need for a
more dynamic, networked approach to diagnosis. Rather than isolating a single actant as
wholly responsible for the network’s success, the view of an interwoven string of actants
working together and drawing on their own forms of expertise oﬀers a more realistic picture
of how diagnosis actually happens. As this example illustrates, such an approach also provides
a helpful framework for thinking about misdiagnoses. Just as a single actant cannot be given
full credit for a successful diagnosis, no single actant can ever be wholly to blame for a
network’s failure. Ebola’s development in humans and transformation into an epidemic can
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be attributed to a convergence of factors—among them deforestation, civil war, and
increased contact between bats, gorillas, and humans. However, by excluding these
nonhuman actants from the public’s view by overly emphasizing Hickox’s quarantine, the
history of Ebola’s development—and the problems that intersect with its spread—were also
erased from public view. Networked problems demand networked responses on the part of
those who would intervene, and failing to acknowledge these excluded actants makes it more
diﬃcult to address the questions they raise within the Ebola assemblage.

African Aid Workers: The Abandoned Actants
Beyond the nonhuman actants that must be reincorporated into public health
networks if they are to more eﬀectively prevent Ebola outbreaks in the future, the
perspectives of Africans eﬀected by Ebola must be heard and added to the networks.
Beginning with the Ebola outbreak of 2014, The Guardian created a column on their website
called “Ebola: Life on the Frontline.” The summative statement for the series reads: “People
living in countries aﬀected by the Ebola outbreak share their experiences” (n.p.). Meant to
combat the relative dearth of Ebola news written by those actually living in Ebola-striken
Western Africa, the columns present the lived reality of African healthcare workers and
journalists who were experiencing death, sickness, fear of contracting the disease, and
economic hardship on a daily basis. In particular, a columnist named Isaac Bayoh
contributed a series of updates on the state of aﬀairs in Sierra Leone and West Africa. As a
description of his role in fighting the Ebola outbreak, The Guardian explains, “Bayoh
volunteers as an Ebola quarantine and awareness worker. He is part of a team that isolates the
houses of those who have the disease, educates the family and neighbours, and monitors the
patient’s progress. Here, in his own words sent via WhatsApp, he shares his experiences about
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how people and communities are aﬀected” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline” n.p.). Bayoh’s
direct contact with the disease and its victims left him in an ideal position to describe the
way Africans were responding to the Ebola epidemic to the best of their ability.
A prominent theme in his narratives are the lack of resources with which to combat
the Ebola outbreak in Africa. In the first post in his series, he highlights the disconnect
between awareness of the disease and the ability to eﬀectively fight it. He writes, “‘The Ebola
virus is real, the Ebola virus kills, the Ebola virus is contagious.’ These words are being said
everywhere, on the radio, on the internet, even little children know the dangers of the virus,
yet people are dying everyday, people are being infected everyday . . . Many who have
contracted the virus and died, it is not because they didn’t report it earlier or run away but
because they lacked the intensive care they needed” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘Survivors
are Left Alone’” n.p.). In addition to the lack of access to care, Bayoh stresses that vital
resources such as ambulances to carry the infected to a hospital are scarce. He recalls:
A 16-year-old girl, Adama, died of Ebola symptoms at her home at the
weekend, two weeks after the death of both of her parents. An ambulance was
called multiple times through the helpline 117 and it took days before they
finally arrived. There are so many people waiting for an ambulance, the fight
against Ebola is going from bad to worse. The burial team is said to be
overwhelmed and overworked. Dead bodies [have] been left on the street by
relatives in fear of being identified as the victim’s relatives. (“Life on the Ebola
Frontline: ‘Fear is Overpowering’” n.p.)
Without access to basic emergency medical care, the fear in West Africa remains palpable,
according to Bayoh, who acknowledges that changes are being made and the government is
now collecting dead bodies “24 hours upon call” (n.p.). In a later column, towards the end of
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the outbreak, Bayoh considers that Ebola has revealed the problems with Africa’s health care
systems, and that such problems must still be addressed if Africa is to more successfully
prevent or handle future outbreaks. He argues:
Ebola exposed our health systems for what they are. It showed the trust that
was lacking between people and services, it showed how our health facilities
were often merely buildings rather than places providing care. It showed
broken relationships. During the Ebola outbreak, many of these centres were
closed, leaving people without medical help. Most of them are now operating
again, although many still lack proper equipment or improved resources, and
the absence of trust persists. Those with options prefer private hospitals.
There have been some changes and improvements after Ebola, but the
question will always remain: how ready is our health care system to fight
another outbreak like this? Many things that need to be done are yet to be
implemented. (“Ebola in Sierra Leone” n.p.)
Bayoh insists here that measures must be taken to develop facilities and resources in Western
Africa that can serve as preventive measures for local epidemics—such work is just as
important as supporting emergency response eﬀorts. Rather than ignoring West African
health systems when Western health is no longer at risk, we might work together to equip atrisk countries to more eﬀectively prevent and combat such outbreaks in the future.
Beyond the healthcare system flaws that the Ebola outbreak brought to the surface,
Bayoh stresses the economic and financial hardships that continue to haunt West Africa. For
survivors of the disease, overcoming Ebola is only the first step towards regaining their lives
—they must also confront the possibility that they will not be able to return to work because
of the disease’s stigma. In an interview with an ambulance driver named Momodu, who
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contracted Ebola while transporting patients to the hospital, Bayoh explains, “Momodu is
lucky to have got his job back after he fully recovered, but many have been stigmatized and
left unemployed” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘I Thought of Nothing Else but My Own
Death’” n.p.). Even for those who manage to avoid contracting the disease, Bayoh explains
that “many jobs have shut down [and] prices of food commodities have doubled three times”
(n.p.). In a particularly poignant column, Bayoh reflects on the community’s sadness about
not being able to participate in regular Easter traditions of going to the beach and giving
presents to his children. Although he tells his children to be happy even though “I couldn’t
buy many things as I did last time,” he feels sorrow that Easter has been ruined for the
community’s children (“The Ebola Virus Took a Knife to Our Easter Celebrations” n.p.).
During the time that should be celebratory, he reflects on the economic turmoil still facing
West African communities. He writes, “Our lives are on hold and our livelihoods destroyed.
Jobs remain diﬃcult to find, as most organisations are still closed and we’ve had to adjust to
the available work being related to Ebola” (n.p.). As an example of the career changes many
have had to make to make ends meet, he reveals that “When Ebola came, Mr Kamara had to
switch profession from teacher to grave digger” (n.p.). Just as Bayoh emphasizes the ongoing
need to build better health care infrastructure in Africa, he also insists that economic
hardship in Africa is not going away even if the epidemic has died down. He explains, “Yet
our economy has gone from bad to worse. People say this because Ebola put our nation on
hold. Even with all the money we received from donors it seems the poor are getting poorer
and the rich, richer. Life was hard before Ebola and is still so after it” (n.p.).
Among the lingering eﬀects of the Ebola outbreak is the stigmatization that
continues to haunt survivors. In another column for The Guardian’s “Ebola: Life on the
Frontline” series, Huw Poraj-Wilczynski speaks to a nurse, Fatmata Sesay, who was among
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the first responders to the Ebola crisis. She contracted the disease when a colleague whom she
was caring for vomited on her shoulder; she subsequently infected her daughter, Tata,
although both mother and daughter survived. Poraj-Wilczynski explains of Sesay’s experience,
“[T]he problems of the Ebola outbreak are not limited to the virus itself. Working in the
Ebola treatment centre, even before she caught the disease, was a lonely experience…People
stopped coming round to see her” (“Ebola in Sierra Leone: ‘Remind People not to Forget’”
n.p.). Because of the lack of understanding about Ebola in Western Africa, Ebola health care
providers faced particular stigmatization. Sesay remembers: “It was very diﬃcult for us nurses
at the time…People in Kenema said we nurses were the ones who were killing the patients.
They thought the president had given us money to reduce the population. They said Ebola
was not real” (n.p.). Sesay and other nurses were met with suspicion despite the fact that they
were fighting a disease they did not understand with inadequate resources for doing so; she
mentions in particular that the protective garments they wore were thin and allowed liquids
to seep through (n.p.). Stigmatization continues to haunt Ebola survivors as well. In Bayoh’s
account of Momodu, the ambulance driver who contracted Ebola, he describes the
challenges of reintegrating into his community after he was pronounced Ebola-free. He
explains, “My integration back into the community was a very diﬃcult one. People were
asked not to sit by me, others refused to come close. My money was rejected in the market.
My neighbors were afraid of me, they said I still had the virus and until three months [had
passed] no one should come close…After about two months, my community finally
embraces me. But it was a terrible experience” (“Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘I Thought of
Nothing Else but My Own Death’” n.p.). For survivors who have witnessed comrades dying
beside them on a daily basis while in treatment centers for Ebola, such continued
stigmatization perpetuates psychological trauma that will take a lifetime to recover from.
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A final theme of “Life on the Ebola Frontline: ‘I Thought of Nothing Else but My
Own Death’” speaks to the continued work that must be done to foster more trust between
Western aid workers and African community members. In a column entitled “Ebola Shuts
Schools in Sierra Leone but Teachers Use Skills to Stop Disease,” social worker John
Momodu Kargo reports on the ways in which teachers repurposed themselves into public
health educators after schools were shut down during the outbreak. He recalls the plan for
teachers to educate their communities: “After the schools closed, the teachers we had trained
were calling out to be put to work in preventing the spread of the virus. I soon realized that
these teachers could be very useful in helping their communities by educating their own
people in the attitudes and behaviour they needed to adopt to remain safe from
infection” (n.p.). 145 teachers were ultimately trained to take Ebola prevention messages
(most simply put: “Don’t touch the sick. Don’t touch the dead. Wash your hands with soap
frequently”) to 200 people per teacher and track Ebola outbreaks within their communities
(n.p.). Such messages are vital in communities where Ebola is believed to be unreal, “a tool
for the government to gain influence,” or associated with “devils or evil spirits” rather than “a
disease like malaria” (n.p.). Rather than sending Western healthcare workers to educate
already suspicious and vulnerable communities, Kargo’s method involved educating West
Africans who might have more influence over their communities. He rationalizes:
As they are highly respected and influential in their communities, teachers are
ideally placed to change people’s mindsets about Ebola. When they work
among their own people, our teachers are seen as ‘children of the village’ so
the community will trust them. Rural villages can be suspicious of people
coming to talk to them. Their own son or daughter finds it easier to carry the
messages that we need to disseminate. (n.p.)
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Future eﬀorts to educate rural communities about Ebola prevention measures might make
use of this mix of Western and local to better serve communities and more eﬀectively
convince them to avoid Ebola infection.
Overall, this collection of narratives reveals many ways in which we must continue to
reincorporate African perspectives into our Ebola network. In particular, we must collaborate
with African governments and community leaders to address healthcare system needs,
economic and financial needs, psychological trauma for survivors, and education eﬀorts. The
narratives also demand that Westerners acknowledge the extent to which Ebola still eﬀects
West Africans, even if we have the privilege and distance with which to move on. While
Western aid workers can go home after an outbreak of disease, West Africans are left behind
to pick up the pieces. Ebola cannot only be a network we address in times of emergency; it
must be an ongoing fight, and our commitment to those aﬀected must last longer than a few
months. In addition to our ethical obligation to care for those in other parts of the world, the
Ebola outbreak reveals the extent to which all healthcare system nodes are intricately
connected. Ongoing disturbance in Western African nodes can have dire consequences on
the rest of the network if another outbreak occurs.
The perspectives of African aid workers provide another important lesson for those
who wish to intervene in public health crises: diagnostic networks cannot simply abandon
their eﬀorts when one set of actants (the Western, white ones) are no longer aﬀected. As these
narratives demonstrate, stigmatization against those aﬀected by Ebola in Africa remains
fierce, the economy is still broken, and picking up the pieces is a daily challenge. We need a
long view of diagnosis that never feels complacent in its approach to disease; as the Ebola
epidemic reminds us, we are all intricately interconnected through travel, and we are
therefore always at risk for developing a disease. Furthermore, just as deforestation allowed
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for increased human and animal contact, and therefore spillover, the ongoing destruction of
habitats around the world might lead to increased risk for contracting new diseases.
Diagnostic networks must do more than simply label a disease once it has surfaced. They can
do perhaps more good by learning from past outbreaks, rebuilding communities where
diseases have had especially devastating eﬀects, and working with local leaders to institute
preventive measures and training procedures. Hopefully such international systems can
prevent epidemics from occurring or at least keep them from spiraling out of control in the
future.

Conservative Politicians: The Isolationist Actants
The final actants that must be reincorporated into the network has never actually
been excluded per se—only quietly overlooked. While the Ebola crisis raged on in Africa and
fears circulated in the U.S. and other Western countries, one group benefitted from the
paranoia and their time in the limelight: politicians. In a sarcastic editorial for The Huﬃngton
Post, editor Brian Rooney claims, “The Ebola virus is the best thing to happen to American
politicians in years. Ebola has done what neither war, climate change, nor economic
meltdown have accomplished. It has united our politicians in action because Ebola is
bad” (“Ebola is Good” n.p.). Rooney oﬀers a scathing critique of politicians who use the
Ebola crisis to fear monger and take a heavy-handed approach—seemingly to demonstrate
their eﬀective leadership abilities. Rooney quips, “Alarm is good. Voters unite around
politicians who tell you to be alarmed” (n.p.). While they perpetuated paranoia about
contracting Ebola and fought media wars with Hickox and other Ebola nurses returning
from Africa, they were also simultaneously engaging in actions that actually prevented the
resolution of the Ebola crisis. In what follows, I explore several key ways in which politicians,
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particularly conservative politicians, used Ebola to further their own political agendas in ways
that were counterproductive.
First, Bobby Jindal, the Republican Governor of Louisiana, was publicly criticized
when he banned medical workers who had returned from countries aﬀected by Ebola from
attending a medical conference meant to generate response strategies. According to Jess
Bidgood and Kate Zernike, he “issued a stern warning . . . to medical experts coming to an
international conference on tropical diseases that they should stay away if they had been in
Ebola-aﬀected countries in the past 21 days, and that those who defied would be confined to
their hotel rooms” (n.p.). Rather than encouraging the collaboration of experts with the most
knowledge of Ebola’s treatment and prevention, Jindal instead prevented the very eﬀorts that
might have led to a faster resolution of the epidemic. According to Rooney, who again takes a
more humorous approach, “Jindal, who likes to think of himself as having presidential
mettle, is so tough on Ebola, he’ll quarantine even the scientists thinking about Ebola. That’s
the kind of action we’ve come to expect from our politicians” (n.p.). Jindal’s eﬀorts eﬀectively
prevented networked problem solving among experts; which, according Dr. Alan J. Magill,
the president of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, “harm[ed] crucial
sessions where scientists, doctors and administrators who had been in the region were going
to teach others” (Bidgood and Zernike n.p.). Such eﬀorts, unfortunately, are also in keeping
with conservative skepticism about the expertise of scientists, medical professionals, and
others who advocate for the health and wellbeing of vulnerable populations.
Others were critical of the ways in which both liberal and conservative governors
enforced harsh quarantine procedures in order to secure a solid foundation for future
political maneuvering. Bidgood and Zernike point out that these procedures “went beyond
what the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and many medical experts have
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said are necessary to prevent the spread of the disease” and that, conveniently, “Some of the
toughest policies have been imposed by governors in tight races—such as Connecticut, where
a Democratic incumbent was fighting a tough challenge, and Georgia and Florida, where
Republicans were” (n.p.). Amongst governors and state politicians, fears circulated about the
potential backlash that a local Ebola outbreak could foster. In Hickox’s public statement
against Christie, who detained her even though she never had Ebola or its symptoms, she
directly identifies his particular motivation for quarantining her in an unheated outdoor tent
with no access to a shower. She writes, “My liberty, my interests and consequently my civil
rights were ignored because some ambitious governors saw an opportunity to use an age-old
political tactic: fear” (Laura Wagner n.p.). Christie, who conveniently quarantined Hickox
near midterm elections and later ran for president in 2016, responded to reports of the
lawsuit by saying, “I’ve been sued lots of times before. Get in line” (n.p.). Hickox went
beyond the lawsuit, though, penning an op-ed for The Guardian called “Stop Calling Me the
Ebola Nurse.” In it, Hickox reiterates to readers that she has never had Ebola and demands,
“I never had Ebola, so please stop calling me ‘the Ebola Nurse’—now!” (n.p.). She again
highlights the ways in which she was quarantined because Christie and LePage (the governor
of Maine, where Hickox lives), hoped to advance their careers by disregarding science and
medicine and violating her civil rights. She writes:
They bet that, by multiplying the existing fear and misinformation about
Ebola—a disease most Americans know little about—they could ultimately
manipulate everyone and proclaim themselves the protectors of the people by
‘protecting’ the public from a disease that hasn’t killed a single American.
Politicians who tell lies such as ‘she is obviously ill’ [Christie’s comment about
Hickox when it was proven that she did not have Ebola] and mistreat citizens
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by telling them to ‘sit down and shut up’ [Christie’s comment to an angry
attendee at a Hurricane Sandy meeting] will hopefully never make it to the
White House. (n.p.)
While Christie’s White House bid was ultimately unsuccessful, Hickox correctly predicts
Christie’s motives for publicly lying about her health (he falsely claimed she had a fever and
that she was ill even after she’d been pronounced healthy) and keeping her quarantined
against her will.
Perhaps more painful for Hickox were the personal debates about her humanitarian
intentions, which were launched against her when she defied quarantine orders.
Unintentionally, Hickox became the center of a partisan tug-of-war over the way public
health crises should be handled and the intersections of public health and individual rights.
Hickox was particularly attacked by conservative politicians, or “loathed” by them, as a
headline from the Washington Post put it. Rush Limbaugh suggested that her problem with
the quarantine was not its lack of scientific basis, but rather the lack of attention she received
while in quarantine, hidden away from the public eye. Of course, one wonders how he
Limbaugh can see her isolation—and the subsequent media frenzy—as detracting attention.
Still, he asks: “Is this not a little bit sanctimonious? I mean, here you volunteer and you let
everybody know, by the way … ‘I am a good person. I have volunteered to go to Africa, and
I am helping Ebola patients. Look at me. See me? I am a good person.’ You come back, ‘I
have just returned from Africa helping Ebola patients, and you are not going to quarantine
me so that I can’t be noticed’” (“Kaci Hickox, Rebel Ebola Nurse” n.p.). On the other hand,
in another Washington Post piece, “Ebola Nurse Kaci Hickox: ‘Flaming’ Liberals Love Her.
‘Bully’ Conservatives Hate Her,” Justin Wm. Moyer explains that although “Kaci Hickox
may not have intended to become the center of a political debate . . . she is one now” (n.p.).
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Hickox, who became “a stand-in for the entire labor movement” for standing up to “bully
governors,” was particularly beloved by liberals for standing up to Christie. Writes Moyer,
“She . . . struck a blow for all the teachers, nurses, public employees, minimum-wagers and
workers of all kinds that Christie has bullied, belittled and silenced over the years” (n.p.).
Although Christie did not personally attack Hickox, he used her to “[take] up an unusual
rallying cry for a member of the party of Reagan: the need for big government to contain a
crisis” (n.p.). Thus, rather than drawing on Hickox’s knowledge and firsthand experience
with Ebola, political figures either turned her into the liberal advocate she never asked to be
or demonized her eﬀorts to stand up for health care workers who might be discouraged by
the new quarantine policies and to fight a deadly disease in a country without proper
resources by calling her petulant and self-serving.
The actions of Jindal and Christie, among others, had more extensive consequences
than the violation of Hickox’s civil and personal rights—they also prevented aid workers
from volunteering to serve African communities at the heart of the outbreak. In “Ebola and
Quarantine,” Drazen et. al. argue that involuntary 21-day quarantine for Ebola aid workers
returning from African countries is not scientifically based and is akin to “driving a carpet
tack with a sledgehammer: it gets the job done but overall is more destructive than
beneficial” (2029). While they understand the goal of protecting the public’s health from an
oftentimes deadly disease, they point out the contradiction of quarantining healthy Western
aid workers while failing to stop the epidemic at its source by encouraging aid workers to
volunteer in aﬀected areas and honoring them when they return. They explain:
Hundreds of years of experience show that to stop an epidemic of this type
requires controlling it at its source. Médecins Sans Frontières, the World
Health Organization, the U.S. Agency for International Development
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(USAID), and many other organizations say we need tens of thousands of
additional volunteers to control the epidemic. These responsible, skilled
health care workers who are risking their lives to help others are also helping
by stemming the epidemic at its source. If we add barriers making it harder
for volunteers to return to their communities, we are hurting ourselves.
(2029)
In particular, aid workers returning from Ebola-striken areas could fear that in addition to
their own potential quarantines, their family members and friends could be quarantined if
they chose to see them. Doctors Without Borders was especially vocal in challenging the
policies of governors who reacted with panic rather than reasoned and scientifically-based
policies. In a press release on the Doctors Without Borders website, Sophie Delaunay,
executive director of Médecins Sans Frontières in the United States explains, “There are other
ways to adequately address both public anxiety and health imperatives, and the response to
Ebola must not be guided primarily by panic in countries not overly aﬀected by the
epidemic. Any regulation not based on scientific medical grounds, which would isolate
healthy aid workers, will very likely serve as a disincentive to others to combat the epidemic
at its source, in West Africa” (“Ebola: Quarantine Can Undermine Eﬀorts” n.p.). For aid
workers already anxious about the risks to their physical and psychological health of serving
in countries where they will have to watch children and adults alike die everyday from the
disease, the further risk of quarantine might be too much to bear. The press release explains,
“International MSF staﬀ members commit to burdensome four-to-six week assignments in
the Ebola-aﬀected countries. The risk of being quarantined for 21 days upon completion of
their work has already prompted some people to reduce their length of time in the field.
Others will be less inclined to volunteer in the first place” (n.p.). Thus, the politician’s strict
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quarantine enforcement did more than prevent conversations about prevention measures,
serve their own political agendas, and violate Hickox’s rights (among many others). It also
prevented aid workers from volunteering to educate and treat patients in Africa or to reduce
the amount of time they spent there serving aﬀected communities.
The Ebola outbreak and the enforcement of heavy-handed quarantine procedures by
U.S. governors should foster a critique of the ways in which politicians use public health
scares to serve their own interests. Responses to epidemics cannot be determined by
politicians who are more concerned with their favorability ratings than with scientific
principles governing disease transmission and containment. Furthermore, politicians not
only took control of the Ebola network in the U.S. in totalitarian ways, they attempted to
exclude scientific and medical actants who countered their actions. For the ostensible cause
of defending their constituents from possible illness, they failed to heed the advice of medical
experts who deemed their quarantine procedures both unnecessary and dangerous. Gregg
Gonsalves and Peter Staley sum up the disconnect between scientific arguments against
quarantine and political action:
The argument against these [quarantine] policies is based on the lack of
scientific grounds for the quarantine criteria, the likelihood that unnecessary
restrictions on those returning from the region will dissuade health care
workers from volunteering to help fight the epidemic, the illicit and
erroneous public health message sent by these quarantines that asymptomatic
persons are a danger to their communities, and the inconsistency in applying
the policies to health care workers who’ve had contact with Ebola in Africa
but not those who’ve seen patients in U.S. facilities. (“Panic, Paranoia, and
Public Health” 2348)
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The involvement of politicians as actants within public health and diagnostic networks raises
another important question: if we must, as I’ve argued, harness the energy of diagnostic
networks to do more than address immediate threats, what role should politicians play in
legislating disease? Here, Latour might remind us of the importance of never turning a
network into a hierarchy; politicians must act while acknowledging the limitations of their
knowledge and power and defer to other expert actants, such as scientists, aid workers, and
even the patients themselves. By failing to defer to the expertise of scientists and physicians,
politicians such as Christie and LePage risked stigmatizing Ebola to the point that aid
workers would avoid volunteering to help stop the epidemic. Their actions could have also
resulted in people hiding Ebola symptoms to avoid the media spectacle. Advocating for the
common good cannot be a business of isolated decision making but rather networked and
pooled expertise, a project I’ll address more fully in Chapter 5.
Perhaps most frustrating of all is a point that Gonsalves and Staley miss but Shah
picks up—the entire pandemic could have been prevented by more eﬀective international
cooperation amongst politicians and health care systems. Writes Shah:
The Ebola virus broke out in a remote forest village in Guinea in early 2014.
It would have been easy to contain using only the simplest, cheapest measures
had it been squelched early on at its source. Instead the virus, which had
previously infected no more than a few hundred people at a time, in a single
year spread into five neighboring countries, infected more than twenty-six
thousand people, and would cost billions to contain. Well-understood
diseases that can be easily contained with drugs and vaccines escaped control
even in the wealthy countries best situated to stanch them. (8-9)
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As this example (and countless others, according to Shah), illustrate, a networked view of
disease and diagnosis must be mobilized to stress international collaboration, the enrollment
of nonhuman factors, and “reaching across the aisle” between diﬀerent political parties and
specialist and non-specialist audiences.

“Ebola is Good”
While “Ebola is Good” was obviously a sarcastic commentary on the ways in which
politicians (ab)use epidemics and public health crises for their own gain, epidemics like Ebola
oﬀer us important opportunities to recalibrate public health networks. In particular, due to
developments in air travel and human population concentrations in cities, bodies of U.S.
citizens are more interconnected than ever with the rest of the world. This increased exposure
to others must be reflected in our networked relationships; rather than excluding actants who
we fear will contaminate us, we must find ways to work with such actants to promote global
infectious disease prevention, research, and education. Rather than responding with fear
mongering, we must respond with initiatives that are both scientifically-based and beneficial
for all of the network’s actants. As Jane Bennett argues in “Thing-Power,” networked
relationships change our ethical obligations, as we can no longer care only for the humans
that we perceive as immediately aﬀecting us. Recognizing that healthcare systems are
comprised of global network of actants demands that we maintain responsibility for actants
across the globe and expand our sense of whose health matters. She writes:
The ethical aim becomes to distribute value more generously, to bodies as
such. Such a newfound attentiveness to matter and its powers will not solve
the problem of human exploitation and oppression, but it can inspire a
greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are kin in the sense of being
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inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And in a knotted
world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be to
harm oneself…A vital materialism does not reject self-interest as a motivation
for ethical behavior, though it does seek to cultivate a broader definition of
self and of interest. (48)
For Bennett, then, the so-called Ebola nurse quarantine illustrates the need for a greater sense
of responsibility, or, as Latour might claim, we need more moralists to seek out and enlist
actants into our public health networks.
Furthermore, we also cannot allow politicians to create their own networks to the
exclusion of public health specialists and experts. At the heart of the Ebola quarantine
struggle, wherein Kaci Hickox was only the first of several nurses to be quarantined after
returning from treating patients in West Africa, is a problem of expertise. While Latour
encourages us to always extend the number of actants who can participate in our networks
and to continually ask who has been prematurely excluded, the question remains of how we
might determine expertise in a network of flattened ontologies. For example, during an Ebola
outbreak that encompasses many actants—from nonhumans, to African Ebola patients, to
international aid workers, to scientists and medical experts, to politicians—how do we find
ways for expertise to be collaboratively shared rather than contested? If we cannot respond to
the demands of each actant all at once, how will we decide who to listen and respond to first?
This issue is of particular importance during an era when president-elect Donald Trump and
his administration express open disdain for academic and scientific expertise. For example,
Trump recently appointed former Texas Governor Rick Perry as the Secretary of Energy, a
post previously held by a nuclear physicist. He has also appointed a vocal climate change
denier, Myron Ebell, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency transition. Future
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collaborations within diagnostic networks will demand shared work between politicians and
expert healthcare and science specialists, and given Trump’s recent nods to non-specialist and
anti-science leaders, the future looks grim for medical and scientific research. Just as Christie
and others chose to disregard the expertise of scientists and healthcare providers, future
politicians might similarly let partisan interests cloud their judgement as they face future
health crises. Global trends that show that pandemic outbreaks have historically occurred
once every fifty years, and according to Sonia Shah, “90 percent of epidemiologists said that a
pandemic that will sicken 1 billion, kill up to 165 million, and trigger a global recession that
could cost up to $3 trillion would occur sometime in the next two generations” (Shah 8,
Brilliant n.p.). And, she argues, the cause of the next pandemic may be the very
disorganization and lack of networked care that the Ebola quarantine situation illustrates.
She writes, “Partly, this sense of an impending pandemic derives from the increasing number
of candidate pathogens with the biological capacity to cause one. But it’s also a reflection of
the shortcomings in our public-health infrastructure, modes of international cooperation,
and ability to maintain social cohesion in the face of contagion. The way modern societies
have handled outbreaks of new issues so far does not bode well” (8). Thus, the ANT frame
might reach beyond the interpersonal dimension of diagnostic networks as they function in a
hospital room and into the messy international arena of epidemic identification, treatment,
and prevention.
Although Kaci Hickox has largely resumed her normal life after relocating to Oregon,
she continues to pursue a lawsuit against Christie. Hickox, who is represented by the
American Civil Liberties Union, was told last fall that while “Christie and state health
oﬃcials are immune from federal civil rights charges,” she can “proceed with parts of her
lawsuit alleging false imprisonment and invasion of privacy” (“Judge Tosses Civil Rights
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Claims” n.p.). Despite the ongoing legal battles, Hickox’s public misdiagnosis has given her a
platform for holding other actants accountable, and she serves as an excellent example of
intervening within a network that simultaneously undermines public health policy, science,
and civil liberties. And, perhaps most impressively, her experiences of being isolated as an
actant within a complex and multi-faceted network has enabled her to generate a new
network: one that might confront partisan approaches to public health policy and lead to the
revision of the U.S. Ebola network.
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CHAPTER 4:
DIAGNOSTIC (UN)CERTAINTY AND DELIBERATIVE RHETORICS
Doctors are men who prescribe medicines of which they know little, to cure diseases of which they
know less, in human beings of whom they know nothing. - Voltaire
I carry tattooed upon my heart a list of names of women who did not survive, and there is always
a space left for one more, my own. - Audre Lorde
On August 1, 2009, artist Megan Hildebrandt discovered a lump on her throat. It
throbbed with pain when she drank beer. And it wouldn’t go away. Hildebrandt, an MFA
student attending the University of South Florida at the time, didn’t have health insurance,
which made it diﬃcult to get in to see a doctor. She explains, “Finally, by the end of August
—I could no longer ignore it. I went in to the University ER . . . There I was given a CT
scan and told I was too young to have cancer, and that I was more likely to be HIV positive.
(wtf ) I was given 7 days of antibiotics and told to get tested for HIV” (Hildebrandt).
Hildebrandt waited two weeks, giving the antibiotic time to work and the lump to go away.
But when it got worse instead, she decided to get checked again, this time pursuing a
diagnosis at the student health center at USF. She recalls that “the lump was huge by this
point—the antibiotics had not worked on CANCER” (Hildebrandt). Still perplexed, the
student health center referred Hildebrandt to Moﬃtt Cancer Center, “where I was quickly
given blood tests, another CT scan, and finally, biopsy surgery. It was late September by the
time I was actually diagnosed with Hodgkin's Lymphoma, Stage 2A” (Hildebrandt).
Hildebrandt, who had been made to wait two months for a diagnosis, “began chemo
immediately [with] ABVD infusions every two weeks until the beginning of April. Then I
was declared cancer-free” (Hildebrandt). However, her doctor advised that she should get
regular CT scans in order to ensure that the cancer hadn’t returned. Hildebrandt was worried
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Figure 4.1. Megan Hildebrandt. Counting Radiation I, ink on
paper, 96 x 54 in, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.

about the levels of radiation she was being exposed to during her regular CT scans, but she
trusted her doctors.
Approximately two years after beginning treatment, Hildebrandt’s doctor told her, “I
think we should stop giving you so many CT scans” (“Culture Vultures”). He admitted that
her continued exposure to radiation, via the CT scans, put her at an elevated risk for cancer
recurrence. New research had revealed the link between radiation exposure and cancer, which
had resulted in stricter guidelines regarding how many CT scans patients should receive.
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When she asked how much radiation she’d been exposed to for each CT scan, he told her,
“For each CT scan of your head and neck we’ve given you, you’ve been exposed to one
lifetime of radiation” (“Culture Vultures”). He then asked her, “How many have we given
you?” She replied, “You’re my doctor, don’t you know?” She finally told him she had had
sixteen CT scans over two years. He said, “Okay, that means you’re about thirteen hundred
years old in radiation years” — a
revelation that was particularly hard for
her to process, she notes, as she was still a
young college student at the time
(“Culture Vultures”). Upon returning to
her studio, Hildebrandt began to
wonder, “How am I going to deal with
this number? It’s huge” (“Culture
Vultures”). She started to break 1300
down into months, weeks, minutes, and
seconds worth of exposure in an attempt
to process the quantity of radiation she
had endured.
Overwhelmed by the giant number,
she began to represent it visually through
a landscape drawing of crosshatches,
Figure 4.2. Megan Hildebrandt. Counting Radiation II,
ink on paper, 96 x 54 in, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.

broken down in increments of five sets of
tally marks. The pieces in Hildebrandt’s

Counting Radiation series, which are about eight feet tall, loom over viewers, viscerally
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communicating the intensity and weight of the number 1300. “The bigness and scale was so
important,” Hildebrandt reflects, “[It was important] that it was bigger than my
body” (Hildebrandt). The repetitive marks became a source of comfort for Hildebrandt, who
says she achieved a state of flow while creating the pieces because she didn’t have to think
about anything but moving her body while she tallied.
Now, almost 8 years after her diagnosis, Hildebrandt feels perhaps more anxiety
about her risk for disease than she did while she was going through treatment. “The liminal
space post-treatment is harder,” she muses, adding that going through treatment allowed her
to focus her energies on getting better
rather than dwelling with daily
uncertainty. “Cancer is chronic,” she
tells me, “I think of it as ‘carrying the
diagnosis’ with me [because it’s always
with you, even when they tell you
you’re a survivor]” (Hildebrandt).
Given her 50 percent chance of cancer
recurrence, and coupled with the extra
radiation exposure she endured to
monitor her cancer treatment’s eﬃcacy,
she feels the heaviness of the tally marks
perhaps more now than she did when
she created the pieces.
Hildebrandt’s emphasis on the
challenge of living with uncertainty

Figure 4.3. Megan Hildebrandt. Counting Radiation III,
ink and graphite on paper, 96 x 54 in, 2012. Courtesy of
the artist.
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post-diagnosis, and the dread that accompanies risk for or recurrence of disease, oﬀers an
important addition to the way the illness narrative genre, broadly speaking, conceives of
diagnosis. While the diversity of the illness narrative genre renders any description of
“norms” challenging, a common approach to diagnosis in much of the illness narrative
literature involves a shocking reveal—one that the person has never known she should fear.
For example, in Marisa Acocella Marchetto's Cancer Vixen, she depicts Cancer as a villain
with skeletal hands and a Grim Reaper costume knocking on her door on a random May
day. She reveals the diagnosis via a knock knock joke, picturing herself peering through the
peep hole to meet her new guest: “Who’s there?” she asks. Cancer responds, “Cancer.” She
responds, “Cancer Who?” And Cancer tells her, “Cancer your wedding! Cancer your career!
Cancer your life!” (64). This sudden interruption presents diagnosis as an unexpected shock
—not a new chapter in an ongoing saga of disease and anxiety or a confirmation of her worst
fears. Prior to her diagnosis, we do not see Marchetto staying up all night, worrying about
cancer, pacing waiting room hallways, and furiously googling symptoms. Instead, she meets
the love of her life and gets engaged, which postures cancer as an unwelcome intrusion
within an otherwise pleasant narrative. For Marchetto, these uncertain experiences come
later, once Cancer has knocked on her door.
Marchetto’s narrative, while striking in its playful irreverence, is not unique in its
shocking reveal of a diagnosis. Other contemporary examples include Breaking Bad lead
character Walter White’s sudden lung cancer diagnosis in the pilot episode, award-winning
film Still Alice’s Alice Howland’s sudden diagnosis of familial Alzheimer’s disease, and the The
Diving Bell and the Butterfly’s author Jean-Dominique Bauby, who communicated the text of
the book by blinking after a sudden and massive stroke rendered him paralyzed save for his
left eye. However, the narrative convention of sudden diagnosis fails to account for other
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relationships to disease: What about those at risk for disease who are fearful before they ever
exhibit symptoms? What about those who are not surprised to see Cancer (or another villain)
lurking towards their door but are rather relieved that it has finally arrived? The surprise
diagnosis convention can emphasize the shock of discovery to the point of masking the
experiences of those for whom diagnosis is not a surprise.
Two shifts within medicine have generated a space for the kind of living-with-risk
narrative shared by Hildebrandt. First, enhanced treatment and vaccination for diseases like
cancer mean that more people are surviving initial bouts with disease, which means that
more people are also at risk for recurrence. This is particularly true for cancer, as treatment
and predictive testing have become more eﬀective in recent years. According to their “Annual
Report to the Nation on the Status of Cancer, 1975-2012,” A. Blythe Ryerson et. al show
that cancer death rates have decreased “by 1.5% per year from 2003 to 2012” for both sexes
and all types of cancer (1312). They also found that “Overall, cancer incidence and mortality
declined among men; and, although cancer incidence was stable among women, mortality
declined” (1312). Thus, more and more people are living with the daily uncertainty that
Hildebrandt describes and anticipating future diagnoses. Furthermore, medicine’s ability to
detect genetic mutations through predictive or presymptomatic testing has generated a
population of people who can know in advance whether they will develop a genetic disease.
In May 2013, Angelina Jolie raised awareness about precisely this issue when she published
an op-ed entitled “My Medical Choice” in The New York Times. In the piece, Jolie wrote,
“[T]he truth is I carry a ‘faulty’ gene, BRCA1, which sharply increases my risk of developing
breast cancer and ovarian cancer” (n.p.). According to Jolie, “My doctors estimated that I had
an 87 percent risk of breast cancer and a 50 percent risk of ovarian cancer, although the risk
is diﬀerent in the case of each woman” (n.p.). In response to this news, Jolie opted for
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preventive surgery: “Once I knew that this was my reality, I decided to be proactive and to
minimize the risk as much I could. I made a decision to have a preventive double
mastectomy” (n.p.). Although she admits that genetic testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes are financially challenging for most—the cost is “more than $3,000 in the United
States”—she insists that “It has got to be a priority to ensure that more women can access
gene testing and lifesaving preventive treatment, whatever their means and background,
wherever they live” (n.p.). She ends with an exhortation for women to undergo testing so
they can know whether they are at risk for disease:
I choose not to keep my story private because there are many women who do
not know that they might be living under the shadow of cancer. It is my hope
that they, too, will be able to get gene tested, and that if they have a high risk
they, too, will know that they have strong options. Life comes with many
challenges. The ones that should not scare us are the ones we can take on and
take control of. (n.p.).
For Jolie, interestingly, being informed and having options are linked to taking control of
genetic risk —as if testing itself can release a person from the anxiety potential disease brings.
Her exhortation was nonetheless eﬀective, as a study by Sunita Desai and Anupam B. Jena
found that “Daily BRCA test rates increased immediately and sharply after publication of the
editorial” (“Do Celebrity Endorsements Matter?” 2). They identify a change in “BRCA
testing rates of 52%,” although they also note that Jolie’s editorial was less eﬀective at
reaching the subgroups most at risk for the BRCA gene (3). Overall, though, Jolie helped to
popularize a relatively unknown diagnostic phenomenon, and her endorsement of it
encouraged others to explore their options and risk.
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Despite these shifts towards diagnostic risks pertaining to recurrence and genetics,
the illness narrative genre has been slow to generate alternative approaches to diagnosis.
While my goal is not to criticize the way writers choose to present their experiences of illness,
I am struck by the relative dearth of narratives that focus on someone who is at risk for a
disease and must learn to dwell with her uncertainty. Such experiences are perhaps more
challenging to represent as they are anticipatory of a potential, future diagnosis—they are
more abstract, for example, than the experience of Marchetto being visited by an unwelcome
house guest or the shock of seeing Jolie’s column in the New York Times. This is not to say
that illness narratives do not involve uncertainty—uncertainty abounds regarding such
important questions as: How will I pay for treatment? Will my friends and family continue
to support and love me? How will I change as a result of my changed body / abilities? What
kinds of treatment will I undergo? Will I live? But sustained uncertainty about whether one
will become sick and when is relatively rare in illness narratives, where the very title of the
genre tends to give away the plot to some extent. In narrative terms, we might say that such
questions anticipate a future narrative event that may never come.
Despite their relative rarity, when such narratives do exist they tend to take one of
two forms: (1) a person is at risk for a disease due to genetic factors, as in the case of Jolie, or
(2) a person is at risk for a recurrence of their disease, as in Hildebrandt’s case. For patients
who fear recurrence, the diagnosis is just a node on a network of illness that may also include
the experience of a migraine triggering fears that cancer has returned and the terror of
returning for a yearly check-up. And for those at risk for a genetic disease, the story involves
fearful symptom checking and anxiety that an ordinary experience—such as tripping while
walking down the street—signals the development of a looming inherited disease. Susan
Sontag’s immortal words, with which she opens Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its
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Metaphors, perhaps come closest to presenting the uncertainty of fluctuating within the
liminal space between health and illness:
Illness is the night side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is
born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom
of the sick. Although we all prefer to use the good passport, sooner or later
each of us is obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that
other place. (3)
Sontag, herself as breast cancer survivor by the time she wrote her most famous text,
highlights the oscillation that illness engenders, and the constant fear of shifting (back) into
the “night side of life.” She views such a shift as inevitable, a part of life, although tellingly
she also allows for a shift back into the kingdom of the well. Although this opening to her
text is a bit tongue-in-cheek, as it masterfully captures the very metaphorical treatment of
illness that she finds so unethical, Sontag was primed to narrativize such an experience, as she
had lived through three decades of uncertainty about cancer recurrence. According to Abigail
Zuger, she first survived her “breast cancer metastatic to the lymph nodes,” in 1975, which
she considered unlikely (“A Fight For Life” n.p.). Still, Zuger explains:
She survived the draconian treatment and the years spent expecting her
unlikely remission to end, only to develop unrelated uterine cancer in the late
1990s. Again she survived, and again she developed a new cancer: this time
myelodysplastic syndrome, a virtually untreatable variant of leukemia,
probably related to the treatment for the first two. She died in 2004. (n.p.)
But rather than describe “what it is really like to emigrate to the kingdom of the ill and live
there” in Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors, Sontag chooses instead to challenge
“the punitive or sentimental fantasies concocted about that situation” (4). Rather than
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discussing her own experiences with dual citizenship and anxiety about sudden deportation
to the other place, she focuses on the metaphors used to describe illness, emphasizing the way
such metaphors have disempowered or unfairly heroized patients over time. Thus, Sontag’s
classic treatise—while brilliant—perpetuates the silence about diagnostic dread and
uncertainty that haunts the illness narrative genre.
Perhaps one reason for the lack of narratives about potential, future diagnoses and
bodies at risk can be attributed to Western medicine’s concern with—some might say
obsession with—certainty. For example, shows like House generate faith that no matter how
challenging a case, doctors will eventually figure out the problem and be able to treat it. Such
expectations have led to a new genre of memoirs by physicians and residents-in-training who
refute such god-like portraits of clinicians and present instead the challenging, uncertain
circumstances they face while on the job. Chapter 2 disputed the idea that medicine is an
exact science, and physicians such as surgeon Atul Gawande and internist Lisa Sanders are
quick to point out the extent to which healthcare professionals are often making informed
guesses in high pressure situations—hardly the portrait of medical perfection and certainty
that dominates in Western culture. Siddhartha Mukherjee, a physician famous for his books
The Emperor of All Maladies (2010) and more recently The Gene: An Intimate History (2016),
agrees with Gawande’s and Sanders’ assessments, writing of his time in residency:
I had never expected medicine to be such a lawless, uncertain world. I
wondered if the compulsive naming of parts, diseases, and chemical reactions
—frenulum, otitis, glycolysis—was a mechanism invented by doctors to
defend themselves against a largely unknowable sphere of knowledge. The
profusion of facts obscured a deeper and more significant problem: the
reconciliation between knowledge (certain, fixed, perfect, concrete) and
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clinical wisdom (uncertain, fluid, imperfect, abstract). (The Laws of Medicine:
Field Notes from an Uncertain Science 6)
Despite Western perceptions of medicine as a perfect science, and eﬀorts by physicians to
make their work seem more exact (through classification methods, for example, as Mukherjee
suggests), the daily reality of practicing medicine oﬀers an alternative, messier picture.
Mukherjee furthermore claims that, far from being a medical anomaly, uncertainty is at the
heart of what physicians do every day—in fact, he bookends his TedTalk (later printed as a
book) with reminders of medicine’s fallibility. In the introductory section, he quotes a
surgeon he observed during his residency who left him with important advice for his medical
career: “It’s easy to make perfect decisions with perfect information. Medicine asks you to
make perfect decisions with imperfect information” (4). In the conclusion, Mukherjee
aﬃrms his former mentor’s words, now speaking from his prestigious position as a renowned
physician and writer:
The discipline of medicine concerns the manipulation of knowledge under
uncertainty. Abstract away the smell of rubbing alcohol and bleach; forget the
adjustable beds and ward signs and the gleaming granite of hospital lobbies;
erase, for a moment, the many corporeal indignities of a man in a blue cotton
gown in a room or the doctor trying to heal him—and you have a discipline
that is still trying to reconcile pure knowledge with real knowledge. The
‘youngest science’ is also the most human science. (70)
Mukherjee adds his voice, then, to the chorus of physicians stressing that what they do is not
an exact science and calling for recognition of the limitations of physician ability and
knowledge, despite their years of schooling and experience. As Mukherjee reiterates, doctors
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are constantly negotiating the pure knowledge they’ve gained in school with the real
knowledge of treating real human bodies.
Lennard J. Davis also reminds us that perhaps nowhere is this fixation on certainty
more prevalent than in diagnostic encounters. As described in Chapter 2, the very definition
of the word “dia-gnosis”—to know with certainty—highlights the discomfiting parallels
between medicine and religion; we expect doctors to be able to at least identify what is wrong
with us even if they cannot cure us, just as we might expect a priest to be able to identify our
sin and (we hope) pardon it. The word also refers to a process of distinguishing a disease from
a list of other possibilities and arriving at a conclusion based on evaluation. Such terminology
itself points to a scientific orientation for diagnosis, perhaps to again reify medical authority
and make the practice of medicine seem less tied to chance, randomness, or guessing.
However, such expectations for diagnosticians to always know “what’s wrong” condition us
to have perhaps unrealistic expectations for what doctors can reasonably do. Furthermore,
such expectations can lead to further frustration for individuals facing questions diagnosis
cannot answer: Will I live a long life? Will I develop cancer? MS? Will I develop a genetic
disease? What lifestyle factors put me at risk for contracting a disease in the future? Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, such assumptions about the invincibility of doctors’
diagnostic knowledge and abilities presume that knowing one’s diagnosis is always a good in
itself. The anxiety we feel before Dr. House solves the case (generally in the last five minutes
of the show) indicates an unwillingness to live without a diagnosis—a discomfort with
uncertainty that potentially has more to do with a desire to know than a desire to be
diagnosed.
Furthermore, I want to highlight an aspect of diagnosis that Davis leaves out of his
study: the extent to which diagnosis invokes a decision or judgement on the part of a doctor.
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For example, the Cambridge Dictionary defines diagnosis as “the making of a judgment about
the exact character of a disease or other problem” and Merriam-Webster defines it as “the
decision reached by diagnosis” (“Definition of ‘Diagnosis’ in the Cambridge English
Dictionary”; “Diagnosis”). These definitions suggest that diagnosis hinges on the doctor’s
decision, an idea I called into question in Chapter 2. However, they also reveal that diagnoses
rely not only on relations between networked actants but on their generation of deliberative
contexts. In Chapter 2, I argued that diagnoses are rhetorical assemblages, and I suggested
that the assemblages’ aim was to answer questions of conjecture, definition, and quality (or,
the first three levels of stasis). In this chapter, I shift my analysis to consider how diagnostic
assemblages relate to the fourth level of stasis, policy. Once an illness has been defined, or if it
cannot be defined, questions remain regarding how to proceed and which course of action to
decide upon. While previous chapters have explored the makeup of diagnostic networks, I
want to now turn our attention to how a decision is made based on their coming together.
And whereas previous chapter have emphasized more “traditional” cases where patients
experience surprise diagnoses, I want to shift my focus towards the way decision-making
happens for patients at risk for diseases. How might they engage in decision-making
processes with their healthcare providers in order to ensure their continued (physical,
emotional) health? And how might doctors shift their decision-making processes to best
account for these rapidly expanding populations?
In what follows, I will suggest an alternative approach to diagnoses in potentia that
better accounts for the reality of uncertainty not just in practice for doctors, such as
Mukherjee, Davis, and others, but in patients’ lives. First, I will draw on two key examples to
further explore the focus on certainty in Western presentations of diagnosis. My analysis will
focus on two enigmatic communities who have much to teach us about the drive to
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certainty: bug-chasers, a subgroup of gay men who pursue HIV positive partners, and those
at risk for genetic disease who choose not to be tested. In considering the way both groups
confront uncertainty and risk, I will seek to first consider the way (un)certainty influences
the decisions that both subgroups make regarding their health. I will then argue that we need
an approach to deliberative rhetorics within medical contexts that is as complex as the
patients doctors treat. I locate such an approach in Arabella Lyon’s feminist and non-Western
framework for deliberation in Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights. Although
Lyon cultivated her framework specifically for human rights deliberations, I will address the
benefits of applying such a model to medical and diagnostic contexts.

Bug Chasing and the Desire for Certainty
In “The Existence of a Bug Chasing Subculture,” David A. Moskowitz and Michael
E. Roloﬀ define bug chasers as “physiologically healthy, HIV-negative gay men [who] . . .
actively see[k] seroconversion by engaging in unprotected sex with HIV-positive
partners” (347).3 The phenomena was not well-known by the mainstream media until a 2002
article in Rolling Stone, “Bug Chasers: The Men Who Long to be HIV+,” shocked readers by
providing insight into the bug chasing subculture. Gregory A. Freeman estimated, at the
time, that about 25 percent of HIV+ of newly infected gay men “[fell] into” the bug chasing
category (about 10,000 men per year) (n.p.). He furthermore explains that the internet has
helped foster a community bent on contracting the disease, since most bug chasers turn to
anonymous communities to share their deadly interests and find potential partners (n.p.). In
an interview with a bug chaser named Carlos, Freeman learns that HIV is now viewed by

3

Thanks to Tamika Carey for bringing this phenomena to my attention as it relates to my
project.
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some bug chasers as a “minor annoyance” rather than a devastating death sentence — “It's
like living with diabetes. You take a few pills and get on with your life” (n.p.). However,
Carlos also acknowledges that “I know what the risks are, and I know that putting myself in
this situation is like putting a gun to my head” (n.p.). Nonetheless, for Carlos, contracting
HIV is a kind of dream because it constitutes the most subversive and radical thing he can do
as a gay man (one, it’s worth noting, who volunteers at a crisis center for gay men and
educates others about safe sex). Freeman oﬀers a contrasting account from a man named
Doug Hitzel, a former bug chaser who “successfully” contracted HIV. Hitzel regrets his
decision to contract HIV and becomes angry when he hears people irreverently discussing
“bug chasing” now that he has to live with the daily reality of the disease. “Whenever I have
to deal with things like medication, days when I'm really down,” he tells Freeman, “I have to
look myself in the mirror and say, ‘You did this. Are you happy now?’ That’s the one line that
goes through my head: 'Are you happy now?’” He says it with a snarl, full of anger” (n.p.). In
contrast to Carlos, who brags about his uncertain HIV status and the number of positive
partners he has each week, Hitzel takes a more reflective approach. According to Freeman,
“Looking back on it, Hitzel says he was committing suicide by chasing HIV, killing himself
slowly because he didn't have the nerve to do it quickly. Hitzel is ashamed and embarrassed
that he actually sought HIV, but he's willing to tell his story because he hopes to dissuade
others who are on the same path” (n.p.). Thus, Freeman’s account exposes two approaches to
understanding bug chasing—one informed by an infatuation with gaining entrance into a
community through subversive sexual acts and the other a form of slow suicide due to the
end of a relationship.
So unsettling was this story for readers that articles quickly proliferated attempting to
prove whether bug chasing was a real subculture or a mere “urban legend or an inductive
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fallacy” (Moskowitz and Roloﬀ 355; Grov and Parsons 493). Moskowitz and Roloﬀ proved
the existence of this subculture and distinguished it from the barebacking subculture
(specifically as it applies to gay men who practice unsafe sex), noting that while bug chasers
actively pursue serodiscordant partners or indicate ambivalence regarding the partner’s status,
none of the barebackers in their study sought a serodiscordant partner (352). They did
indicate, however, that while discourse surrounding bug chasing holds that “Bug chasers are
purportedly in search of ‘the bug,’” “only 8.7% reported a preference for a certifiably positive
partner and the majority (60.6%) of bug chasers reported the HIV status ‘doesn’t
matter’” (352). Thus, for more than half of the people Moskowitz and Roloﬀ studied, bug
chasing seemed to be less about active pursuit of HIV and more about the excitement of
risking infection and/or a resignation to the likelihood of being infected resulting in
indiﬀerence.
Because of the counterintuitive premise of bug chasing—why would someone want
to contract HIV on purpose?—many writers have attempted to explain the practice. Deann
K. Gauthier and Craig J. Forsyth suggest four major explanations for bug chasing, based on
their analysis of bug chasing literature and internet resources: “fear and relief,” “risk taking as
eroticism,” “loneliness and group solidarity,” and political actions” (93-5). Each of these
explanations is highly suggestive, particularly the idea that a gay man who has been routinely
stigmatized might chase the bug because he desperately wants to find acceptance and
compassion. The question of how Western culture treats gay men with HIV in comparison to
how we treat healthy gay men warrants much more analysis than this current research can
pursue. However, I want to focus particularly on a motivation that correlates with a drive to
diagnostic certainty: the desire to contract HIV in order to know one’s status definitively.
Freeman explains, “For some, the chase is a pragmatic move. They see HIV infection as
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inevitable because of their unsafe sex or needle sharing, so they decide to take control of the
situation and infect themselves. It's empowering. They're no longer victims waiting to be
infected; rather they are in charge of their own fates” (n.p.). Freeman highlights the
significance for a gay man, who may know or sense that he has a high probability of
contracting HIV, choosing to be in control of his fate by choosing when—and by whom—he
will be infected. Indeed, some bug chasers even speak about contracting the bug in language
that mirrors pregnancy, although being “impregnated” with HIV fosters death rather than a
new life. Furthermore, to return to Gauthier’s and Forsyth’s four explanations for bug
chasing, those who pursue HIV out of “fear and relief ” typically feel that “fear of infection
inhibited their behavior in the past to such an extent that their perceived quality of life had
diminished to unacceptably low levels” (93). In response, “These individuals wish for the
‘relief ’ of knowing that they are infected. For them, infection is often viewed as ‘the great
inevitable,’ and thus they wish to merely quicken the inevitable so that they can get on with
the business of living out their lives in a more uninhibited fashion, however short that life
may be” (93). Again, given the new sense among some gay men that HIV is a “manageable
infection,” contracting HIV may seem necessary in order to achieve “increased quality of life”
(93). For example, in a 1999 article in POZ by Michael Scarce, a 33-year-old gay man
named Pete said, “I was so afraid of becoming positive for such a long time, and once it
happened, I felt relief ” (“A Ride on the Wild Side” n.p.). Rather than feeling that HIV has
ended their life, bug chasers may instead experience a feeling of invincibility: what more can
happen to them once they have contracted HIV? What will they have to fear after infection?
While of course there are many more things to fear—including side eﬀects from treatment,
the development of AIDS, and contraction of illnesses that will further compromise the
immune system—for some, contracting HIV can oﬀer respite from the endless questions and
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“what ifs” of practicing unsafe sex. Thus, in contrast to public health eﬀorts to encourage safe
sex and diminish the spread of HIV, the bug chasing subculture seeks relief from their
uncertainty by pursuing the virus.
Bug chasing highlights two key needs on the part of chasers—first, a desperate need
for certainty in the face of risk and disease and second, a sense of agency in an otherwise
chaotic and dangerous practice. Bug chasers in the aforementioned texts almost unanimously
express a desire to catch HIV so they will no longer have to live with the terror and anxiety of
not knowing if—or more likely when—they will contract it. Instead of waiting for the virus
to strike when they least expect it, bug chasers pursue it so they will no longer be held back
by fear. As Carlos puts it to Freeman: “It’s about freedom . . . What else can happen to us
after this? You can [do whatever you want as much as you want], and nothing worse can
happen to you. Nothing bad can happen after you get HIV” (n.p.). Although Hitzel would
disagree, pointing out that several days on the HIV medication that makes him constantly
vomit would make most realize how devastating the lived reality of HIV is, Carlos highlights
the extent to which bug chasers see themselves as untouchable post-infection. In narrative
terms, bug chasers see an HIV diagnosis as an inevitable future event in their lives and
organize their actions around (and in fact cause) the ending they forsee. Once they have
achieved the life event they planned for, they feel a greater sense of narrative freedom because
they can now pursue other narratives not bound up in illness. Hitzel, it’s important to note,
labels this a false hope.
Furthermore, others posit that bug chasing gives them a sense of agency in what
would otherwise be a highly uncertain process of risking HIV infection. Even the verb
“chase” suggests an approach to disease that can be controlled rather than passively feared. To
again cast the impulse in narrative terms, for gay men who feel as if they cannot control the
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inevitable conclusion of their story, bug chasing can be a tragic assertion of agency. If they
contract HIV because of unsafe sex practices as a gay man, they might be seen as another
victim of the disease in a community already ravaged by it. They may fear that their identity
will be subsumed in their illness, and their individuality will get erased in a sea of statistics. If
they transgress against the traditional narrative of HIV positive gay men by intentionally
contracting it, then they will (potentially) be seen as martyrs rather than victims of a disease.
They will also assert their individuality (bug chasing appears to be a relatively rare
occurrence) and uniqueness. While they ultimately comply with a seemingly inevitable (to
them) conclusion of their narrative—developing HIV and then AIDS—they recast their role
within the story as an active tragic hero rather than a passive casualty. 4
The bug chasing phenomenon oﬀers a profound indictment of the way illness
narratives treat diagnosis as an anchor. Such narratives set up an expectation that illness is
inevitable, and the anxiety such an expectation engenders might be particularly unbearable
for groups already especially vulnerable to contracting contagious diseases due to their
lifestyle practices or genetic traits. The feeling that illness is inevitable but never quite realized
might lead some to prefer contracting the disease rather than living in its constantly looming
shadow. A narrative emphasis on the inevitability of disease can also create a dangerous
impulse to find agency even in committing a form of suicide—signaling a feeling of
powerlessness to control the narrative’s outcome but a measure of agency to control one’s
response to (or acceptance of ) it. Overall, bug chasing highlights the limitations of viewing
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It’s also worth noting that bug chasers may be complying with the demands of those who
would like to see LGBTQ+ individuals disappear from society. Perhaps bug chasers seek to
identify with homophobic aggressors by contracting HIV—thereby placing themselves
beyond the reach of their vilification. Some bug chasers may believe that contracting HIV
will make them more sympathetic to those who would otherwise hate them, allowing them
to elicit their pity rather than their disgust.
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diagnosis as the only narrative option for vulnerable populations; bug chasers don’t seem to
acknowledge other alternative futures as viable for themselves, and they therefore resign
themselves to their ostensible fate. Additionally, bug chasers might feel that there is more
they can do if they have been diagnosed than they can do as they wait around for a potential
diagnosis. In a way, diagnosis empowers patients to take action, whereas waiting for a
diagnosis leaves most frozen in uncertainty. Thus, one diagnostic problem that rhetoricians
might be particularly well-suited to address includes collaborating with potential patients or
those at-risk for developing diseases to forsee and plan for alternative futures that can be
pursued with as much agency as bug chasing. Such an approach, about which more later,
would need to both suggest an alternative to inevitable diagnosis and help potential patients
to find ways of envisioning a future diagnosis as not necessarily destructive of their narrative.

Genetic Testing and Choosing Not to Know
While some bug chasers pursue HIV positive partners in order to gain certainty
about their health status, another community oﬀers us an alternative portrait of the way atrisk populations grapple with diagnostic uncertainty. In Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family,
Risk, and Genetic Research, Alice Wexler combines a memoir about her mother’s diagnosis
with and death from Huntington’s disease with the story of how her father and sister, Milton
and Nancy Wexler, successfully led eﬀorts to identify the genetic mutation responsible for the
disease. Huntington’s disease (HD) is an inherited disease caused by dying brain cells and
resulting in dementia and an inability to move. A person with Huntington’s will typically
start to exhibit symptoms in her mid to late thirties, and at first she may have trouble
walking steadily and concentrating. She will develop, at some point, shaking and restless
limbs that resemble Parkinson’s disease symptoms, and she will slowly lose the ability to walk,
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speak, and even swallow. The disease is incurable and tragic, a disease that robs suﬀerers of
both their physical and mental capacities early on in life. So cruel is the disease that,
according to Samuel Frank in “Treatment of Huntington’s Disease,” “25% of patients
attempt suicide, which is a cause of death in 8–9% of patients” (154). Before the detection of
the gene that causes HD, anxiety about contracting the fatal disease was typically coupled
with guilt when a person who had not known their risk had children who were also suddenly
at risk. A person whose parent has HD has a fifty percent chance of inheriting the disease, a
terrifying statistic when the child will have to watch her parent die a slow and painful death
while wondering whether she, too, or perhaps one of her siblings, will endure a similar fate.
Such was the case for Wexler, who watched her mother slowly lose her vibrant personality,
her will to live (she attempted suicide several years before she died), her ability to move, her
ability to do her favorite things (smoke and write letters), and finally her mental capacities
that had once been so sharp. As she did so, she worried extensively that either she or her
sister would also inherit the disease, and both sisters struggled to decide whether or not they
should have children when they were not sure if they had inherited the HD gene. Her
memoir, thus, diﬀers from other illness narratives because “it is really less about an illness
than about the possibility of illness, less about the medical dilemma of living with disease
than about the existential dilemma of living at risk” (xxii). Thus, in contrast to Jolie’s
assumption that women should want to know their genetic risk, Wexler presents an
alternative picture—one that is ultimately more comfortable with uncertainty.5

5

Of course, there are important diﬀerences between bug chasing subculture and at-risk
populations who choose not to undergo genetic testing. Significantly, one can voluntarily
expose oneself to HIV, whereas HD is an inherited disease for which there is no treatment or
cure. In considering these two sets of potential patients alongside each other, I hope to
highlight productive tensions and parallels within their experiences that might help us
envision an alternative approach to communication in uncertain medical contexts.
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The Wexler family’s involvement in the identification of the HD gene began in 1968
when Milton Wexler started the Hereditary Disease Foundation (HDF), which is dedicated
to conducting research and raising awareness for hereditary diseases, especially HD.
According to Douglas Martin, Wexler “formed the [HDF] to gather young scientists from
diﬀerent disciplines and institutions for freewheeling talks about Huntington’s as well as to
sponsor research” (n.p.). The creativity his foundation inspired, and Wexler’s ability to draw
on his background in psychoanalysis, was both inspiring and controversial to the scientists he
enlisted: “His strategy was one he developed for group therapy among creative people: noholds-barred discussion toward a common purpose in a nonthreatening climate” (n.p.).
Wexler always maintained that his activism was the result of his wife’s diagnosis with HD,
her brothers’ and fathers’ deaths from the disease, and the risk that one of his daughters
would develop the disease. Calling his activism “terribly selfish,” he admits that he was
“scared to death one of my daughters would get it, too” (n.p.). One of the daughters, in fact,
developed her father’s passion for studying the disease. Although Nancy Wexler “was
pursuing a PhD in clinical psychology at the time of her mother’s diagnosis,” according to
Kristin Darwin, she soon shifted her focus to genetics and “devoted her life to the study of
HD” (1). Darwin summarizes Wexler’s own contributions thusly: “In 1979, Wexler and her
colleagues began a research project in Venezuela to search for the HD gene. They surmised
that finding the gene was the most direct route to the development of treatments, even cures!
They developed a pedigree of over 18,000 individuals and collected more than 4,000 blood
samples from the largest extended family with HD ever to have been discovered. Their data
led to the identification of the gene responsible for HD” (1). Nancy’s team published their
findings in a paper, “A Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked to Huntington’s
Disease,” which was published in the November 1983 issue of Nature. Subsequent news
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coverage in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, and other major
presses praised Nancy as a heroine, and “[e]veryone lauded the astonishingly rapid
localization of the Huntington’s gene to the short arm of chromosome 4 as the first
significant breakthrough in the entire history of Huntington's disease” (Wexler 219). Nancy,
then, extended the research eﬀorts her father had initiated and ultimately solved the HD
mystery that had haunted their family—and thousands more— for decades. However, her
team’s discovery, while exhilarating, instigated a painful dilemma for her family to consider.
The discovery of the genetic mutation responsible for HD meant that Nancy and her
sister would now be able to receive reliable test results regarding their risk for contracting the
disease. Although Nancy had once been thrilled at the idea of predictive testing for HD,
particularly as it might enable would-be parents to decide whether or not to have children,
the newfound ability to determine whether she possessed the genetic mutation responsible for
HD gave her pause. Alice Wexler quotes “a widow and mother of several individuals who had
died of Huntington’s” who she spoke with at the time as wondering, “Do you really want to
know that in 10 to 15 years, you too will be stricken by the disease, or would you rather live
in uncertainty?” (221). Such was the dilemma now facing the Wexlers, who had pioneered
research for the predictive testing they now resisted. Milton Wexler was particularly opposed
to his daughters undergoing the test, which led to a nasty blowup in a conversation with his
daughters as they held a family meeting to consider whether or not to move forward with it.
For a time, the father and daughters did not communicate as a result of their conflicting
feelings about the test. As he explained in a 1986 interview with Diane Sawyer, which was
later transcribed in Alice Wexler’s memoir: “What I have now is joyousness. If I knew they
[Nancy and I] were free of the disease, I’d feel ecstasy. It’s not that great a gain. But there’s an
immense diﬀerence between joy and discovering one of them carried the gene. It’s not worth
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the gamble” (233). Nancy, for her part, also acknowledged her sudden shift in perspective—
from a scientific to a more disconcerting personal uncertainty. “I’ve always believed in
knowledge for its own sake. And it is ironic that after working for precisely that, I’m now
finding it much more complex than I ever thought it would be” (233). Diane followed up by
asking, “Did you think you’d take the test when the linkage was discovered?” And Nancy
replied, “Absolutely. Yes. I never doubted it. And now I’m not sure” (234). Alice and Nancy
finally resolved not to undergo testing, choosing instead to live with uncertainty. “The
decision not to take the test—at least for the moment,” writes Alice, “meant learning once
again to live at risk, with no thoughts now of a final release, no fantasies of freedom from the
possibility of HD” (234). Thus, in exchange for an ending to their uncertain narrative of
living at risk for HD, the Wexler sisters chose instead to live without closure.
The Wexler sisters were not alone in their decision. After the discovery of the HD
gene in 1983, testing programs were opened in the U.S., Canada, England, and in other
European countries. However, “relatively few people actually completed the test, despite the
enthusiasm for a predictive test in the days before the marker was discovered and the
euphoria of the discovery in 1983” (235). By 1990, only 1,400 people worldwide had been
tested for the gene, in spite of mounting pressure from the media and medical experts, who
advised that those at risk should get tested (235). Wexler mentions that doctors and
counselors often “portray[ed] those who took the test as somehow stronger, braver, more
optimistic, more ‘normal’ than those of us who chose not to know. But isn’t it also possible
that those who opt not to know are more able to live with uncertainty and
ambiguity?” (235). When Alice Wexler questioned those who did take the test about their
decision, many said they needed to “escape the oppressive uncertainty” of living at risk so
they could resume their lives—even if a positive test result indicated that their lifespan would
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be shortened (236). As one man who chose to be tested explained to her, “You think about it
constantly . . . I wanted to set my mind at rest one way or another” (236). Wexler sums up
her discussions with those she interviewed: “The issue of control loomed large. Knowledge
one way or the other appeared to give a measure of control, or at least of choice, over how
one lived one’s life: at the very least, knowledge of one’s future in relation to Huntington’s
seemed to increase the terrain on which one could knowledgeably make decisions” (236).
However, many found that their uncertainty was only amplified post-testing, as they now
lived in constant fear of the onset of symptoms or learned that they were not at risk but their
siblings were. Acting because of their uncertainty, the Wexler sisters decided not to have
children in order to avoid putting any future oﬀspring at risk for HD.
Wexler’s 1995 “Afterword” to her memoir and scientific-historical treatise revisits the
imperative to undergo genetic testing because of some elusive benefits dangled in front of
potential patients by doctors or the media. “[T]he number of people actually going through
with testing has remained relatively low,” she writes, “under 20% of adult people at risk,”
with more women electing to undergo testing than men (268). Speaking out against the
“potential benefits” of testing, Wexler cites research that proves that those who undergo
testing actually have a harder time planning for the future—particularly when they have
considerable economic constraints that diminish their ability to secure financial decisions
(271). She furthermore highlights that “these assertions of ‘psychological benefits’ enter a
social and political world in which pressures for presymptomatic testing are growing while
insurance coverage shrinks” (272). Such contradictions within the research surrounding
predictive testing and its dubious benefits seem particularly significant given reports that “as
many as a third of all medical geneticists (who are primarily physicians) believe, in general,
that people should be informed of their genetic status even if they do not want to
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know” (272-3). In response to the potential for physician coercion and a lack of cure for
HD, Wexler ends her text by calling for “new metaphors to talk about a deeply existential
choice” (275). Choosing not to be tested must be recognized as a viable and even courageous
act, an assertion of how one wants to live, just as choosing to know one’s genetic risk for HD
must be understood as a complex choice that can never fully satisfy one’s desire to know.
Wexler’s account of the pain certainty engenders, its elusive qualities, and its
contested benefits oﬀers an important critique of Western medicine’s assumption that we
should want to know what our futures hold. The Wexler sisters—and the other 80 percent of
people who chose not to undergo testing at the time of Alice’s writing—assert the
importance of living without a diagnosis and accepting a state of being that embraces
uncertainty. It’s important to note that this perspective seems particularly popular in terms of
HD because it is incurable, so predictive testing could not result in a changed outcome or
preventive measures. Unlike the bug chasers, who choose to contract HIV to open up their
life story’s possibilities once they have eliminated diagnostic uncertainty, people like the
Wexlers, who choose not to know what their diagnostic futures hold, feel that their life
stories might be more bearable if they don’t know the ending. Similarly, while bug chasers
seek agency by intentionally contracting the disease, those who choose not to undergo
predictive testing assert their agency by resisting a medical model of disease that values
certainty over quality of life, knowledge over happiness. In some ways, bug chasers’ assertion
of agency—the will to know regardless of the consequences—is more in keeping with such a
model than the decision to not learn one’s genetic disposition for disease. However, Wexler’s
account raises a significant question that rhetoricians are perhaps uniquely qualified to
answer: instead of insisting that people undergo genetic testing, and vilifying those who
choose not to, why can’t we instead generate an alternative framework for dwelling with
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uncertainty—not until more information is discovered, but because we want to live without
knowledge that might do more harm than good?

An Alternative Approach to Deliberative Practice
In describing the importance of HD as an instigator of renewed debate surrounding
what it means to live at risk, Wexler writes, “Huntington’s disease may serve as a space where
many discourses collide and therefore help make visible the hidden stakes in this contest for
human survival and identity in which all of us are at risk” (xxv). Indeed, both bug chasing
and choosing not to undergo predictive testing remind us of some such hidden stakes:
namely, the human costs of technological advancements that claim to oﬀer greater insight
into our bodies and medical futures than ever before. With the possibility of learning more
about our risk for disease comes new questions about whether we would actually like to
know. Furthermore, physicians’ ability to detect diseases but not necessarily cure them can
leave many at-risk populations feeling hopeless, as they know they are at risk for diseases that
cannot be fully managed by the doctors who diagnose them. While predictive tests and
treatment methods are of course crucial medical developments, they cannot assuage the
anxieties that surround the possibility of illness and a future life story tinged with pain,
disability, or disease. Even when doctors can generally answer questions of probability and
causation, they cannot as simply answer questions about when we will be aﬀected or how we
can live with the knowledge of future disease. The accounts by bug chasers and the Wexler
family highlight the importance of alternative frameworks for engaging with patients at risk
for diseases so that they can learn to live with uncertainty and so that uncertainty can be
recognized as an integral part of deliberation.
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The purposes of my analysis thus far have been twofold: first, I want to highlight that
diagnosis is only part of the story. While previous chapters have emphasized the diagnostic
encounter as a networked exchange, I want to contextualize this analysis by considering how
potential or future diagnoses get framed within narratives. Some bug chasers pursue a
particular narrative ending—and diagnosis—because they would rather know their status
than live with uncertainty. On the other hand, the Wexlers remind us that some would rather
live their lives without a diagnosis—even if one is available. As these two groups challenge
assumptions that diagnostic certainty is always a good thing and call on us to reexamine
diagnostic practices surrounding certainty, I want to consider what rhetoric might oﬀer to
those who seek to better equip patients to dwell with the uncertainty that diagnosis entails.
How might physicians work with patients to reframe living at risk in ways that both parties
can better navigate? Additionally, how might their collaboration shift patients away from a
view of doctors as gods and towards a model that values deliberative assemblages wherein
doctors merely play a role and contribute one type of expertise?
In Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights, Lyon oﬀers a framework for
reimagining deliberative rhetorics in ways that account for diﬀerence and uncertainty. She
begins by distinguishing her framework from the Aristotelian model of persuasion and the
Burkean model of identification. For Lyon, there are three key problems with Aristotle’s
persuasion-focused deliberation model, in particular. First, as she writes, “persuasion [via
Aristotle] presumes a powerful speaker (even a demigod) and a docile audience, not a
relationship between equal interlocutors” (33). Aristotle’s failure to account for a diverse
public and disparate set of citizens means that they are a collective not intended to actually
challenge or engage with a speaker’s ideas. As Lyon puts it, “Aristotle’s audience may make
judgments, but they do not make counterarguments”—thus, their decisions are always
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already constrained by the one in power (33). Second, Aristotle’s model of persuasion is
“driven to hopeful, future outcomes, which may not be the true purpose of the
persuasion” (33). Lyon conceives of Aristotle’s rhetoric as “a calculation of the means to an
end” that has endowed us with a deliberative rhetorics tradition that “is outcome-based”
rather than relationship and process based (36-7). Such an approach overly emphasizes the
success or failure of the persuasive act to the neglect of other moments in the deliberative
process. Finally, Aristotle’s deliberative rhetorics “presumes a common core of interests,
knowledges, and spaces” (33). By failing to account for the reality of diverse perspectives,
Aristotle again doubts that his audience will engage in challenging agonistic inquiry, a duty
he reserves for the speaker.
Beyond her rejection of Aristotle’s outcome-driven model, Lyon also levies critiques
at Burke’s identification model, which she calls a sort of “magical thinking” that emphasizes
“my [the speaker’s] feeling about your similarity” (59). As she explains, “Our identification is
all my pretense, cloaking co-optation and narcissism as it ignores diﬀerences” (59). One key
issue with Burke’s model, for Lyon, is that it emphasizes the individual over the collective in
deliberative contexts. Identification also “distorts the diﬃculty of diﬀerence” while it
emphasizes the speaker’s ability to find and mobilize perceived similarities to move an
audience towards their preferred outcome (59). While Lyon acknowledges the usefulness of
identification in some contexts, “it is a deeply troubled term in deliberative situations”
because “in privileging sameness and bonding, identification is imbued with power’s innate
normativity, and too often, as a[n] abstraction, it depoliticizes the most political and
contingent acts of deliberation—the many becoming action” (60). Although it does add an
emphasis on human relationship to its model, by failing to adequately account for the
challenges of deliberative engagement, identification, too, falls short of the mark. Ultimately,
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for Lyon, both Aristotle’s and Burke’s models fail to account for deliberation across
specialization, culture, and diﬀerence.
Her generation of an alternative framework for deliberative rhetorics has two key
components: an emphasis on non-Western (and particularly Chinese) approaches to
deliberation and an adoption of Hannah Arendt’s concept of “inter-est" as a new mobilizing
principle. First, Lyon looks to classical Chinese deliberators and finds that they “eschew
persuasion and argumentation as dangerous and inappropriate to human relationships” (38).
Rather than persuasion or argumentation, classical Chinese texts reveal that remonstration is
the preferred means of deliberating about future action. As she explains, “The communicative
act is an opening of the undecided and uncontrolled future to consideration by interlocutors”
rather than an act of co-optation by an agentive speaker (39). Lyon pays particular attention
to the root meaning of persuade and remonstrate, highlighting the conceptual diﬀerences
between the two words. In contrast to persuade, “Monstrare . . . emphasizes the act of
showing or demonstrating,” which involves an audience who must be engaged in the
demonstration and interpretation of such an act (39-41). Lyon’s breakdown of the diﬀerences
between persuasion and remonstration are worth quoting at length as they distinguish a
teleological from a relational model for deliberation:
‘Remonstrate’ is a process verb, lacking a telos. ‘Persuade’ is a terminus verb. If
I say, ‘I persuaded him that . . .,’ there has been an end. The act of persuasion
rarely occurs in the present tense, as an ongoing process . . . Almost always,
when one speaks of persuading, there has been a change in him, and the act
of persuading is ended. In fact, if we think of this in temporal terms, the
future and the past are the realms of persuasion: ‘I will persuade you’ or ‘I
persuaded you.’ This is all less true of ‘remonstrate,’ which even lacks the
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grammatical object, a person to be moved. If I say, ‘I will remonstrate
that . . . ,’ it is less clear that there has been an end, or what would constitute
an end, or who would judge an end. The remonstration simply stops . . . In
remonstrating, one can run out of time, energy, or materials, but otherwise
one can continue the performance, always in the present. In persuading, one
has a temporal progression, a narrative from a strategic beginning to an end
marked by a change in the audience . . . The persuader may do most of the
action, but the end is in changing an audience. With remonstration, the
eﬀect is less clear and unnecessary for judging the speech act: the
remonstrator will do all the identified action. The end is when the
demonstration finishes, rather than when an audience changes, jointly
decides, or enacts an event. Although an audience is implied in
remonstration, there is no defined manipulation. The remonstrator simply
shows something. Those who observe the performance are free to interpret it,
heed it, repeat it, ignore it, or refute it. (40)
Remonstration shifts us away from a Western value of action and certainty and towards a
messier project of ongoing conversation about a particular issue. By calling on a classical
Chinese framework, Lyon shifts deliberation away from an outcome-based process and
towards rhetorical moves that “keep a community engaged in ongoing communication” (42).
If Western deliberative rhetorics fears a lack of outcome, Chinese remonstration might be
said to fear silence—an end to the perpetual conversation. In sum, Lyon writes: “In
privileging the continuance of relationship over an outcome-based model of persuasion and
the movement of interlocutors to consensus, a remonstrative model of deliberation considers
the possibility of proceeding without end, proceeding to exhaustion or engagement, without
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emphasizing the closure of a singular, future position” (43). Thus, remonstration remains
bound in the present struggle rather than looking ahead to future decisions, and it
emphasizes ongoing communication rather than decisive closure.
To supplement the concept of remonstration and build on its relational qualities,
Lyon incorporates Arendt’s framework of inter-est. For Arendt, inter-est refers to: “the
overlapping concerns that initiate citizens’ unique relations and separations” and the process
of binding diverse people together within a common struggle (56). “From its start,” Lyon
writes, “the question of inter-est considers ‘what we should do together’” (56; emphasis
original). Rather than emphasizing an end to deliberation as the ultimate aim of discourse,
Arendt instead focuses on the moment of recognition, the coming together of deliberators to
work towards a common goal. Lyon reads Arendt as arguing that:
inter-est designates the shared actions and words that make collaboration
possible, the finding of what is common or cosmopolitan, and the matters
that make remonstration eﬀective or that allow deliberation to begin . . .
inter-est arises and asks, ‘What binds you to others?’ More than something of
interest or concern, inter-est implies the multiple ties among people which
prompt recognition and the complex openness of shared action. (56-7)
Arendt’s alternative rhetorical frame for deliberation acknowledges the impossibility of
humans determining the ends of their discourse and moves deliberative rhetorics away from
an outcome driven approach out of necessity. Lyon explains that for Arendt, “Agents cannot
know the end of their actions, a scary predicament for human aﬀairs . . . deliberation cannot
be imagined in ends, for there are not ends to human acts” (58-9). What Arendt and Lyon
are after is prior to identification or deliberation as it involves the discovery of “what binds us
together,” since deliberation must hinge on “the significance of other people to fashioning
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who I am and who you are: that is, who we are in apposition, for who we are in apposition
forms what we can do together” (57). Far from success hinging on “individual views
negotiated,” successful deliberation would be “an enactment of inter-est in an in-between, a
shared agency arising in the present moment of engagement” (57). Thus a communal
positioning, rather than pushing an agenda in pursuit of a future action, would govern the
process of deliberation.
Taken together, remonstration and inter-est shift deliberation away from an
individualistic, outcome-driven model of persuasion or identification and towards a
communal, relationship-focused process of ongoing dialogue. While Lyon does not deny the
eventual outcome of such deliberative work, the outcome is not inevitable within her model,
as other possibilities can emerge and outcomes can shift and change over time.
Remonstration is always subject to revision, and the decisions made through its process are
constantly in flux. She also resists making the outcome the sole moment of importance
within the exchange, focusing instead on the fusing of perspectives and interchange of ideas
that makes deliberation possible at all. In what follows, I will briefly trace some ways in
which Lyon’s model might enhance diagnostic deliberation practices for patients at risk.

Deliberative Rhetoric and Diagnosis
What, one might wonder, does all of this talk of remonstration and inter-est mean
for diagnostic deliberation practices? Lyon’s approach to deliberation fits nicely with
problems of power and diﬀerence that haunt interactions between patients and their
assemblages (doctors, nurses, insurance companies, family members and friends,
medications, etc.). Approaches to diagnostic deliberation that attempt to mask issues of
power cannot adequately account for the way doctors (to recall Chapter 2) or politicians (to
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recall Chapter 3) might co-opt networks for their own purposes rather than negotiating with
the rest of the network for the good of the patient. Lyon’s framework also gels nicely with
diagnostic deliberations such as the ones described by bug chasers and the Wexlers because
there isn’t yet a problem to respond to; therefore, the network can focus on reshaping
relationships and building trust amongst actants in order to prepare for a potential future
crisis. Lyon’s approach to deliberation may be less useful in climate change networks, for
example, where perpetual action and decision-making can be enriched—but not altogether
replaced—by the kind of ethical work she wants to encourage. However, her shifted
emphasis to relationship building provokes some ideas for how pre-diagnostic deliberation
might happen diﬀerently for patients at risk.
What bug chasers and the Wexlers are implicitly calling for is an alternative way of
approaching uncertainty in diagnostic contexts—the same thing, in fact, that doctors are
calling for in many cases. While previous chapters focused on ANT have stressed the
importance of networked responses to the problems both doctors and (potential) patients
identify, I want to make a few suggestions myself given Lyon’s alternative approach. First,
Lyon’s model reminds us that Western medical deliberation must shift away from its
overemphasis on outcome-based measures, which are not always the best way to respond to
individual health crises. Particularly when the crises are hypothetical or potential, diagnostic
actants might learn to take a step back and engage in dialogue about the patient’s risk. As
Gawande and Sanders might remind us, while doctors are trained to act quickly and
decisively in highly uncertain situations, they are generally less adept at listening and advising
patients on how they might cope with their risk for disease. Such patients may not always
require a decision as much as compassionate care or conversation about their health. For
example, Rita Charon’s narrative therapy practice provides an important model of holistic
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care that does not distinguish between emotional, physical, and diagnostic support. She even
maintains that patient care is enhanced over the long term because of her ability to
acknowledge a patient’s uncertainty and ongoing health concerns as important aspects of
providing care (67). What Charon’s practice values is not the outcome of a particular visit,
per se, but the ongoing wellbeing of the patient; this approach necessarily involves taking a
long view of a person’s diachronic narrative of health. The physician, rather than intervening
in a momentary emergency or solving an aberrant mystery, engages with the patient’s
network on a regular basis, thereby focusing less on an immediate outcome and more on
long-term care.
Lyon also shifts towards a deliberative practice that emphasizes relationship over
expertise. Lyon’s conception of relationship diﬀers from Burkean identification by fusing an
acceptance of diﬀerence with an openness to change. It also, significantly, reserves the power
to decide with the audience or listener (in contrast to Western theories of persuasion where
the rhetor persuades others to act as she wishes). Rhetorical engagements within medicine
hinge on expertise—while the doctor may possess specialized knowledge unavailable to the
patient, the patient knows her body’s history. But as I have argued in previous chapters,
pitting expertise against expertise results in adversarial relationships between stakeholders
who should be working together and combining their areas of expertise to confront the
problem at hand. Doctors might enhance expertise negotiations by learning when to make
recommendations based on their expertise and when to defer to patients’ wishes. Such an
approach seems particularly apt in cases of genetic testing, where doctors may possess
knowledge about a patient’s risk that the patient does not want to know. If patients are aware
of the doctor’s recommendation and choose not to learn test results that indicate their risk
for an incurable disease, can an acceptance of the patient’s decision be considered an act of
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care? And what of patients who know that an undesirable result would be more than they can
reasonably handle? Relationships within diagnostic networks built on trust become crucial in
such conversations, as patients will be more likely to take the advice of a doctor who has
taken the time to listen to their feelings about their risk, make their emotional and
psychological care a priority, and provide them with the answers they need. On the other
hand, doctors who know that patients have important reasons for not taking their advice—
and that such advice has been thoughtfully considered—might be less likely to pressure them
to pursue unwanted procedures or testing.
Lyon suggests, though, that relationships are not enough—we must also ask
challenging questions about what we have in common. She shifts deliberative practice away
from an emphasis on the outcome and towards a closer examination of pre-deliberative
negotiation. Rather than focusing on the moment of decisive action, she postulates that a
more important event occurs when the many calibrate their needs and perspectives, thereby
deciding to engage in deliberation together. Such a delicate practice involves finding
common ground, which Lyon would again be careful to distinguish from the sort of
identification project Burke pursues. Finding common ground cannot simply be about
encouraging another person to share our point of view; it must involves asking challenging
questions about what we have in common that might best enable us to work together. What
mutual needs or concerns do we share, and how might these commonalities help us to act
together? How might our diﬀerences enrich our deliberation and sharpen our problemsolving abilities? To apply such questions to diagnostic deliberation would necessarily involve
dialogue between doctors and patients about their common ground: uncertainty. Both
doctors and patients must learn to act in the face of uncertainty, and this can serve as an
important starting point for conversations about mutual concerns and shared values.
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Furthermore, because both doctors and patients live with the knowledge that they are
temporarily able-bodied, vulnerability might also function as common ground where doctors
and patients can negotiate what it means to live at risk or in diagnostic limbo. In both cases,
rather than viewing uncertainty as a necessary evil of medicine, an embarrassment to be
concealed through classification systems and emblems like white coats, doctors might harness
uncertainty as a way of relating to patients for whom they do not always have answers.
Perhaps the most important shift that must occur if diagnostic deliberation is to
become more encompassing of those who live at risk will be a relinquishing of the idea that
diagnosis is medicine’s telos. While successful diagnosis is a crucial aspect of healthcare, we
would do well to reexamine what a fixation on the identification of disease can mean to
patients for whom diagnoses are unavailable or unbearable. When diagnosis is medicine’s
telos, those without a diagnosis may feel hopeless and outside of medicine’s reach. The
Wexlers and bug chasers described previously demand that we focus on other values within
medicine that will broaden the scope of what it means to provide care. Diagnosis is a means
to an end—providing eﬀective and ethical care—rather than a good in itself. Rather than
celebrating diagnosis for certainty’s sake, diagnostic stakeholders should strive to understand
the particularities of patients who choose or are forced to live without an understanding of
their body’s status. This will likely entail medical training that emphasizes flexibility in
responding to potential or future diagnoses. When doctors presume that patients will want to
know if they carry a mutated gene, for instance, they falsely assume that this situation
requires the same response as an instance where a patient has just presented with symptoms
for a serious disease. However, diagnosis cannot always be the rhetorical response within
medicine, and we need new ways to articulate other aspects of care that can occur instead,
such as counseling and instruction. Doctors must also do more than test patients for HIV
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and other STDs; when they fail to engage at-risk gay men, for example, in conversations
about prevention measures and alternative futures free from disease, they may unknowingly
be reiterating expectations that living at-risk means that contracting disease is inevitable. In
both cases, diagnoses should open up dialogue and serve as starting points in a person’s
ongoing narrative of care rather than the penultimate moment in medicine.

An Exemplary Lesson
Before I conclude this chapter, I want to briefly return to Sanders’ Diagnosis column
to discuss a case that illustrates the dangers of viewing diagnosis as medicine’s telos. As the
narrative demonstrates, when the identification of disease becomes medicine’s focus, rather
than providing long-term care based on the patient’s wishes, the stakes are quite high:
patients’ lives may even be at risk. This is certainly the case in “Why Was This 3-Year-Old So
Irritable, and What Was Wrong With Her Eye?,” wherein a mother notices that her child has
suddenly started to misbehave and develop red lesions around her eyes. She asks her
husband’s sister Amber Bard, a third-year medical student who is in town to visit her niece,
to look into the source of the problem. Her sister-in-law, though nervous due to her lack of
experience, uses VisualDx to check the symptoms. The program is “one of a dozen or so
programs known as decision-support software, designed to help doctors make a diagnosis,”
and Bard chooses this particular program because of its focus on skin-related problems (n.p.).
She sorts through several possibilities, including sties and pink eye, paying special attention
to the images as she tries to discover her niece’s condition. Finally, though the images of
herpes keratitis do not resemble her niece’s red lesions, the potential for the disease to result
in blindness leads her to gently suggest to her sister-in-law that her daughter might have
herpes (n.p.). The mother admits that she had had a cold sore weeks earlier, and that a
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bedtime kiss near her daughter’s eye might have resulted in an infection. Bard consults with
her colleagues at work, asking them about the potential for herpes to be transmitted during a
kiss—they all find it highly unlikely (n.p.). Further, when her sister-in-law takes the child to
the doctor, “[She] listened carefully as the mother described the girl’s eye and her recent
behavior. She asked if they could be linked. Unlikely, the doctor told her. Then she examined
the child. The eye itself looked fine, the doctor said, and her vision wasn’t aﬀected . . . There
was no need for any testing or treatment at this point, she said” (n.p.). This should have been
good news: her daughter’s eye would be fine, and they wouldn’t even need to test her to see
what was wrong. The symptoms would resolve on their own. But the mother refused to be
reassured by the doctor’s lack of concern, reluctantly asking about the possibility of herpes.
Sanders explains, “That also seemed unlikely, the doctor replied. The mother asked if she
could test the girl anyway. Bard had been so insistent that the child be tested that the mother
was determined to push for it if she had to. But the doctor readily agreed to the test and
quickly swabbed the center of each sore to send for a culture” (n.p.). Thus, with Bard
resisting the advice of her colleagues and the mother rejecting the doctor’s consolation, both
women waited to hear the results of the test.
Despite the doctor’s reassurances, the little girl tested positive for herpes infection
around her eye, meaning that early intervention would likely save her vision. Although future
recurrences that would require treatment were likely, her eyes were saved because of the
persistence of her aunt and mother. While the doctor and colleagues in the story are wrong,
they are by no means villains, as part of doing their job eﬀectively entails using probability to
determine the most likely causes of diseases. They have been indoctrinated within a
healthcare system that values finding an answer—and moving on quickly when a patient’s
symptoms seem negligible. After all, there are always more patients in line who may be facing

165

much more life-threatening conditions. However, the narrative highlights the limitations of
this probabilistic and outcome-based method of deliberation. In this case, as in many others,
Bard is actually better able to anticipate an unlikely cause of her niece’s condition because of
her lack of immersion in the deliberative process of medicine; her lack of expertise makes her
better able to see other possibilities beyond the few diagnoses (such as sties and pink eye) that
might be more likely. In addition to her unique perspective as someone with access to
diagnostic aids, but without enough experience to dismiss her niece’s condition, her aﬀection
for her niece leads her to feel that even an unlikely disease should be treated as a serious
threat given its potential to cause blindness. The mother’s persistence in this story, also
motivated by her aﬀection for the child, similarly demonstrates the significance of not only
looking beyond the purview of traditional deliberative criteria—diagnostic stakeholders must
also advocate for patients when the network fails to do so. Thus, in this case, non-experts
oﬀered vital contributions to the deliberation, and in doing so, they not only solved the case,
they saved the patient.
Such an approach exemplifies Lyon’s approach to deliberation because it highlights
the need for a process that can escape the confines of the outcome-driven, probabilistic
approach to diagnosis. In this case, as in many others, the diagnosis is only possible when an
outsider’s perspective identifies an unlikely, but serious, potential problem that must be
considered. Sanders’ narratives commonly focus on the role an inexperienced healthcare
provider, such as a medical student or intern, plays in identifying a diagnosis or crucial detail
that a more seasoned doctor misses. They have not yet been fully trained in how to see, and
they are therefore better able to consider uncommon diagnoses, pay attention to gut feelings,
and notice unusual details. This oﬀers a powerful validation of Lyon’s claim that
identification erases the importance of conflict as a vital component of problem-solving;
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when everyone learns to see the same things in the same way, alternative solutions and
approaches will be overlooked. The liminal space Bard occupies as a novice medical student
also exemplifies the importance of this diﬀerence within diagnostic contexts—rather than
identifying with her colleagues and ignoring her own hunches to fit her perspective to theirs,
she insists that the potential risks of an untreated herpes infection are too serious to ignore.
As Lyon indicates, this productive tension actually enhances the network’s eﬃcacy and
benefits the patient.
One unresolved problem with the narrative involves the proper use of technology as
an actant within diagnostic deliberation. Interestingly, even the software Bard uses seems to
disprove her theory that herpes is to blame, as the images don’t resemble her niece’s
condition. Her shame at even broaching the subject with her sister-in-law almost prevents
her from bringing it up at all. On the other hand, she might never have learned about the
potential diagnosis—and its significant risks—if not for the diagnostic program. Research
indicates that other problems, such as an unwillingness to use such programs, have presented
additional challenges in terms of inviting technologies and non-human actants into
deliberative processes. An unwillingness to adopt such programs cannot be attributed to any
inadequacy on the technology’s part: in addition to its helpfulness in this case, “a study
published in 2011, and conducted at U.C.L.A-Harbor Medical Center and University of
Rochester Strong Memorial Hospital, showed that physicians using VisualDx were four times
more likely to suggest the correct diagnosis for patients admitted to the hospital for serious
infections that those who didn’t use it. Without VisualDx, admitting physicians made
diagnostic errors 28 percent of the time” (n.p.). According to Sanders, “Despite such
evidence of the eﬀectiveness of diagnostic-support software, studies show that doctors rarely
use” (n.p.). Such data makes one wonder whether the little girl would have been properly
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diagnosed at all if Bard had been a more seasoned physician, one who doubted the usefulness
of such a program in comparison to her hands-on experience. In this case, an
acknowledgment of uncertainty, and a willingness to look beyond oneself to multiple actants
with their own forms of expertise, ultimately resulted in the best possible care for the patient.
No actant oﬀered the correct answer, and yet the deliberative process yielded a favorable
result because Bard insisted that the child be tested anyway. In this case, Bard decided to test
the technological actant’s contribution, but the situation could have easily turned out quite
diﬀerently had she relied on her own expertise—or that of her medical network. While
Lyon’s model oﬀers an important alternative to outcome-based, identification models of
diagnostic deliberation, future research should seek to articulate better methods for
diagnostic networks to respond to technological contributions. I will further explore such a
problem in Chapter 5, where I consider the problem of expertise in diagnostic contexts.

On the Threshold
House episodes almost always end with a diagnosis. Within the last few minutes of
each episode, Dr. House victoriously identifies the disease, and the patient goes home still
puzzling over the strange man who cured them. But diagnosis can only be the end of the
story for the doctor who solves the case. If the cameras continued to roll once the patient left
Dr. House’s care, a new story would emerge, one in with the diagnosis was merely the
beginning of a series of treatments, a life lived in illness’ shadow, a slow decline towards
death, or of a future haunted by uncertainty. Diagnosis irrevocably alters a person’s life story,
but it never ends there. What doctors and patients and other actants must learn to do is
reconcile their alternative feelings about diagnosis’ role in their ongoing narratives. Doctors
must learn to see diagnosis not just as a medical victory but as a new beginning for patients
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—and generally not a positive one. They must guide patients through the new chapter in
their stories, connecting them with resources and support systems that can supplement their
care. They must demonstrate an openness to hearing how the diagnosis they revealed will
aﬀect the patient’s life, and they must answer questions about how the patient can cope. And,
perhaps most of all, they must empathize with the patient whose life has been changed by the
news they delivered.
Furthermore, doctors must adopt strategies for advising and empathizing with
patients who choose not to learn their risk for disease or for whom diagnoses are not
available. Doctors must understand that diagnoses cannot be taken back once they have been
revealed, and they must respect the wishes of people like the Wexler sisters, who make
informed decisions not to learn their status. Such a choice represents not only a decision to
preserve one’s emotional wellbeing, it can also encompass an insistence on protecting one’s
narrative and regulating the way it unfolds over time. While we cannot always control what
happens to our bodies, patients should have some say in whether they actually want to learn
of their risk for disease in situations where the news may cause more pain than good.6 Such
negotiations must govern conversations for those whose lifestyle choices may put them at risk
for diseases, too. Although patients may conceal bug chasing activities from doctors, doctors
might respond to the phenomenon by warning patients of the dangers of bug chasing,
educating them about prevention measures (such as medications like PrEP), and monitoring
patients who may be at risk for engaging in such intentional acts. While more research must
be done so that healthcare providers might more successfully intervene and perhaps stop
6

I want to be careful here to distinguish my advocacy for patients to be able to choose
whether or not they want to learn about their genetic risk—and have their decision honored
by healthcare providers—from advocating for doctors to withhold information from
patients. Patients should be primed for such decisions by doctors, who can discuss risks and
benefits with them based on their unique circumstances.
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would-be bug chasers from pursuing a deadly disease, demystifying diagnosis and making it
more concrete might aid prevention eﬀorts. And finally, to more adequately care for patients
like Hildebrandt, doctors must emphasize their ongoing relationship with patients postdiagnosis and foster dialogue to support those in remission as they negotiate fears about
recurrence and cope with ongoing eﬀects of disease. This will involve an attunement to what
matters to patients, anticipation of their needs, and an openness to extend care beyond the
crucial diagnostic moment and into the more crucial questions regarding what to do next.
In the end, diagnosis looks less like the neatly packaged House endings and more like
the popular Choose Your Own Adventure stories. While of course doctors and patients cannot
always control what happens in their narratives (much as they’d like to), they must deliberate
together to respond or act decisively in response to plot twists. And, in other cases, they must
develop relationships that will prepare them to act in the face of challenging, potential future
decisions. What this chapter has hopefully illuminated is that response need not always hinge
on decisive action, and that deliberation is comprised not just of such moments but of
moments of collective thought and engagement. I would like to close this chapter, then, with
one such pensive moment.
Sam Taylor Johnson’s Self Portrait in a Single Breasted Suit with Hare 7 shows Johnson
soon after her recovery from cancer. Because it was her second incidence of cancer, Johnson
decided to have a mastectomy (hence the “single breasted” word play). In the photo, Johnson
stands before a door, indicating her position on the threshold of illness. She holds a hare in
her hand which represents a return to lust and humor now that she is in remission. Her black
and white suit indicates her readiness to return to her regular life, but her tennis shoes

7

I am indebted to Diane Price-Herndl for sharing this photo and her insights about it with
me.
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indicate her lingering sense that she will always be running from something—perhaps from
her illness. She stands on a checkered floor that resembles a chess board, poised uncertainly
with one foot on the ground and one hovering in the air. And yet, despite all of the liminal,
uncertain elements in the room, Johnson’s face is determined as she presses down on the
button that will snap the photo. She asserts her existence in the face of uncertainty about her
illness, choosing to act anyway.
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CHAPTER 5:
NETWORKED ETHOI:
DIAGNOSTIC ASSEMBLAGES AND PROBLEMS OF EXPERTISE
Beware of diagnoses that would reduce your generative powers . . . Break out of the circles; don’t
remain within psychoanalytic closure. Take a look around, then cut through! - Hélène Cixous
Trauma bleeds. Out of wounds and across boundaries. - Leslie Jamison
While previous chapters have argued that a networked approach to diagnosis is not
only generative but necessary, questions of how best to respond to multiple ethoi remain
unanswered. While I will trace a more complex definition of ethos later in the chapter, I will
begin by focusing on traditional conceptions of ethos as an appeal to authority and/or
expertise. In “The Presumptions of Expertise: The Role of Ethos in Risk Analysis,” Carolyn
R. Miller argues that this approach to ethos represents “a narrowing” of its original
(Aristotelian) meaning, which emphasizes expertise (“the first of Aristotle’s three
constituents”), while neglecting “moral qualities (arete) and goodwill (eunoia)” (194).
Furthermore, for Miller, such a definition actually distorts the first constituent by shifting it
from “Aristotelian phronesis, a knowledge focused on prudent action in the social world, to
episteme, a knowledge that is close to what we call expertise” (194). While Miller’s critiques of
the easy conflation of ethos with expertise productively complicate contemporary definitions
of the ancient term, I focus on this traditional definition/distortion in the first part of this
chapter because it saturates healthcare contexts. The extent to which ethos as expertise
dominates in medical networks can be perhaps most easily identified via the “Trust me, I’m a
doctor” cliché. As my subsequent analysis will demonstrate, feminist ecological approaches to
ethos reincorporate a focus on deliberation, ethics, and care, thereby recalibrating Aristotle’s
three constituents for ethos and mobilizing them for advocacy and social justice projects.
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Negotiations of ethos in healthcare settings remain a pressing problem both within
my project and the broader field of medical rhetorics. Many writers—from concerned
healthcare providers such as Lisa Sanders, to narrative medicine scholars like Rita Charon, to
feminist therapists such as Laura S. Brown, to sociology scholars like Becky W. Thompson—
have highlighted the inequitable power dynamics that emerge between doctors and patients
in diagnostic interactions. Within a networked framework, though, wherein patients and
doctors are parts of complex diagnostic networks and no single actant’s ethos can be
privileged within diagnostic interactions, a related but slightly diﬀerent question arises: how
can doctors, patients, and other actants negotiate the competing ethoi that emerge? Within
diagnostic settings, ethoi proliferate; doctors possess specialized knowledge about
administering and interpreting tests, nurses have specialized knowledge about patient care,
patients have specialized knowledge about their bodies, and family members have specialized
knowledge about the patient’s history. Even objects reveal information about the patient’s
habits, secrets, and experiences—we might recall, for example, the cell phone from Chapter 2
that uncovered an unconscious patient’s drug use. At the community or national level,
politicians purportedly possess specialized knowledge about confronting crises and protecting
citizens, while health experts and national organizations possess specialized knowledge about
public health matters. However, as the networked approach to diagnosis in Chapter 2, public
misdiagnosis in Chapter 3, and inadequate networked deliberation practices of Chapter 4
indicate, more analysis regarding the management of these multiple forms of expertise is
warranted. Thus, in what follows, I will address methods for negotiating the multiple forms
of ethoi that networked actants generate.
In The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Annmarie Mol wonders what
happens when a patient and doctor rely on diﬀerent forms of expertise that prevent them
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from understanding the patient’s condition. Mol’s central thesis is that if bodies are multiple,
then so are diseases, and she argues that their enactments within diﬀerent settings result in
not various presentations of the same disease but multiple presentations of multiple diseases.
Her study of atherosclerosis in Hospital Z leads her to consider the atheroscleroses that
emerge in various spaces: patient rooms, surgeries, and autopsies. An emphasis on
multiplicity, though, ultimately leads Mol to the same impasse that networked diagnosis
reaches: if ethoi can be collaborative, then they can also be competitive. She explains:
A week later I spend another day with the same technician. A patient, let’s
call him Mr. Somers, lies on the examination table. Again cuﬀs are inflated
and allowed to slowly deflate. Again the stethoscope is used to listen to the
sound of turbulence in the arm arteries and the Doppler apparatus is used to
listen to the velocity of the ankle flow. The technician writes down her
numbers. She makes her calculations. There’s the ankle/arm index. It’s within
the normal range. ‘I can find nothing wrong. Nothing at all,’ the technician
says to the patient in a tone that’s meant to reassure him. But it doesn’t.
‘That’s very strange,’ Mr. Somers replies, ‘for I feel something. It hurts a lot
when I walk.’ The technician shrugs: ‘Well, there’s nothing wrong.’ Mr.
Somers insists: ‘Oh, but that’s strange. Are you sure? I admit, they’re only my
feelings, but then they are my feelings.’ His tone is one of disbelief.
Disappointment. The technician, in what is clearly meant to be her closing
remark, sounds impatient. ‘Well, you’d better discuss that with your doctor,
then, what all you feel.’” (62)
In this case, the actant Mr. Somers possesses knowledge of his embodied experience and the
pain he’s experiencing, while the Doppler apparatus and stethoscope possess their own forms
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of ethos—they are tools wielded to determine ankle and arm blood flow, respectively. The
technician finds herself within the role of negotiator, as she must determine whether Mr.
Somers’ or the Doppler/stethoscope actants are to be granted greater authority to determine
the patient’s condition.
Mol responds to this problem by suggesting three possible ways in which competing
ethoi can be made to cohere: through creating a hierarchy, “adding up,” and calibrating ethoi.
First, perhaps most obviously, actants tend to generate hierarchies amongst disparate forms of
expertise, labeling some more objective or credible than others. She clarifies, “In order to
achieve . . . coherence, a hierarchy between diverting measurements may be established. This
is often done. In cases where two facts contradict each other, one may be accorded more
weight than the other” (63). In Mr. Somers’ case, for example, “a hierarchy with the lab on
top” would enable the vascular surgeon to say, “No, Mr. Somers. I’m really sorry, there’s
nothing I can do for you. I don’t doubt that you have a lot of pain, but I’m only good at
unplugging vessels, and your vessels are in no need of unplugging” (63). Thus, by siding with
the lab results and indicating the limits of his expertise, the doctor will shift the patient back
to his general care practitioner (63). Without discounting the patient’s embodied ethos, the
doctor nonetheless grants the test results greater epistemic weight. Although Mr. Somers will
likely receive other tests to try to locate the cause of his pain, the Doppler and stethoscope
actants are granted the ultimate authority to reject a particular diagnosis.
While creating a hierarchy is a common method for resolving disputes amongst
networked actants, other scenarios might find similar sets of actants in conflict—even
seemingly infallible lab results. How, Mol wonders, might the expertise of competing actants
at the same level of the hierarchy be negotiated? As a second approach to the addition
method, Mol writes, “When diﬀerent tests give diﬀerent outcomes, it is not obligatory to
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abandon one. It is also possible to understand the objects of two diﬀerent techniques as
indeed being diﬀerent objects” (66). Rather than discarding test results that fail to align, Mol
suggests the addition method, which can occur when “surgeons do not ask ‘what is the
matter?’ but rather ‘what to do?’ Because when the vascular surgeons of hospital Z try to
decide ‘what to do,’ they are not only interested in complaints and the results of pressure
management. They draw in a lot more elements” (69). Shifting away from a diagnostic
question—what is wrong?—to deliberative practice—what to do?—encompasses a shift in
thinking away from classification and towards assemblage. When responding to the patient’s
atheroscleroses as a composite, “the patient can now be diagnosed as having two
‘atheroscleroses,’” each requiring their own interventions (68). Rather than cancelling each
other out, competing lab results can be added together to enable doctors to oﬀer more
complex and eﬀective care based on the patient’s unique presentations of disease. When tests
are not assumed to have a “common object,” “it takes tests as suggestions for action: one bad
test outcome may be a reason to treat; two or three bad test outcomes give more reason to
treat” (84). Thus, rather than discarding test results that fail to align, diagnostic networks
may draw on the contributions of each actant and his/her/its expertise as they deliberate.
Finally, perhaps Mol’s most rhetorical method for resolving diagnostic ethoi disputes
is the calibration of test outcomes. She explains, “If test outcomes were listened to as if they
were each speaking for themselves alone, they might get confined within diﬀerent paradigms.
The question whether diﬀerent tests say the same thing or rather something diﬀerent would
not be answerable—indeed it could hardly be asked” (84). Tests that measure diﬀerent
objects, then, can be calibrated to see what they mutually indicate about a patient’s health.
For example, doctors and researchers might “tinker” with PSV ratios (which measure
stenosis, or the narrowing of arteries) and lumen loss (which measures changes in the artery
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width following a stent procedure) to find correlations: “It turned out that a PSV ratio of 2.5
proved a good cutoﬀ point for diﬀerentiating between lesions of more and less than 50
percent lumen loss” (77). Thus,“the objects of angiography and duplex are coordinated into a
single common one: the severity of some patients’ stenosis” (77). By translating test results
and correlating findings to determine what they might indicate together, ethoi might be
calibrated by finding a relationship between actant contributions. Significantly, such a
process must involve the presentation of a third actant who can mediate between the two or
more disputants; for Mol, these often take the form of correlation studies. She discusses the
role correlation studies play at length, since they serve as the means for translating test results
into common measures:
The possibility to negotiate between clinical notes, pressure measurement
numbers, duplex graphs, and angiographic images only arises thanks to the
correlation studies that actively make the comparable with one another. The
threat of incommensurability is countered in practice by establishing
common measures. Correlation studies allow for the possibility (never
friction free) of translations. (84-5)
Mol’s concept of calibration nicely aligns with Latour’s ANT method of tracing actants,
although she more fully explicates how actants within medical or diagnostic networks might
negotiate their findings. Her emphasis on intermediaries who might correlate and translate
test findings, seeking relationships between measures and mutual reinforcements, is
particularly apt for an ANT approach to understanding diagnostic network negotiation.
Despite the usefulness of Mol’s model of adding up and calibrating varying forms of
expertise within diagnostic contexts, S. Scott Graham levies two major critiques at Mol in his
book, The Politics of Pain Medicine. First, Graham cites Mol’s failure to look at networked
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interactions beyond the purview of the hospital to see how ethos gets negotiated as a major
oversight. He writes, “Despite Mol’s compelling analysis, the practices that stage disease
ontologies do not exist in a vacuum. They are controlled, influenced, and regulated by
broader calibrating practices that exceed the local site of clinical doings” (110). He argues
that by neglecting the institutional actants that shape and restrict networked negotiations,
Mol misses several major players in her analysis—such as the insurance industry, third-party
payers, and the DEA. After all, he reiterates,“clinical practice is accommodated to the
economic structures of the health-insurance industry,” thus highlighting the ways in which
such institutions plays in shaping networked interactions on the micro-level. In addition to
his emphasis on actants Mol misses, he stresses the importance of considering context as an
active contributor to hospital negotiations. For example, in discussing methods for treating
patients with opioid addiction, he explains that “the climate of opiophobia is so pervasive
that addressing the practical-translative stasis cannot happen within the clinic” (112). Thus,
not only does Mol’s analysis oﬀer an incomplete picture of how diagnostic negotiations
happen surrounding ethos (as they are both verified and controlled by institutions such as the
FDA, the pharmaceutical industry, and medical boards), but her selection of a site within a
hospital limits the interactions and presentations of atheroscleroses networks that she can
witness.
Relatedly, Graham’s second major critique of Mol is that she fails to consider the
meta-level of networked calibration. In some ways, Mol doesn’t go far enough in considering
how not only diagnostic practices but ontologies get calibrated:
Here we see calibration is a sort of meta-activity. In fact, it’s so meta that in
Mol’s study it only gets a quick mention as something that happens in
correlation studies. The details of these studies are beyond the scope of Mol’s
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analysis. As a rhetorician, it is precisely spaces like these studies that interest
me. The work of calibration is predicated on the metapractical discourse of
correlation. How do diﬀerent diagnostic ontologies get calibrated? How are
the diﬀerent forms of diagnostic practice realigned, reinterpreted,
rearticulated so that they may ‘speak’ to each other, so that translation may
occur? (87-8)
Graham finds, then, Mol’s theory of calibration to be crucial, although her treatment of the
actual work of calibration is lacking. The shift, he explains, is from an emphasis on
“Ontological calibration” or “the ‘what’” to a question of “how?” networks calibrate their
forms of expertise (88). As he notes, rhetoricians are particularly qualified to take up such
questions as they pertain to medical and diagnostic networks.
In response to Graham’s suggestions that Mol better contend with the meta-level of
calibration, and that she attune herself to the contexts within which networked negotiation
occur, this chapter will apply Mol’s approach to networked calibration while shifting towards
an emphasis on context and institutional levels of analysis. While Mol does not explicitly
refer to ethos, her analysis of the various ways in which expertise gets negotiated within
medical networks oﬀer some generative starting points for reframing ethos. Thus, drawing on
Mol, this chapter will argue that a more dynamic approach to diagnosis must entail a more
complex conception of ethos. I will first review several challenges regarding ethos within
diagnostic networks which were raised, but not fully addressed, in previous chapters. I will
pay particular attention to doctor, patient, and other stakeholder perspectives. In addition to
considering how multiple ethoi might be juggled within diagnostic contexts, I want to
highlight the ways in which actants must also navigate their own multiple ethoi within such
interactions. Finally, in an attempt to fuse Mol’s theories of networked ethos “adding up” and
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calibration with Graham’s cautions against dismissing global level concerns, I will suggest an
alternative framework that ties together an ANT and feminist framework for networked
ethoi. Drawing on feminist ecological approaches to ethoi, I will suggest that diagnostic
networks adopt a model of ethoi that is multiple, dispersed, and fluid within diagnostic
settings.

Ethos Generation in Networks
A networked conception of diagnostic ethoi raises important questions about how to
navigate diﬀerences of expertise and decide whom to trust in crucial moments. While Mol’s
analysis remains clinical and detached in considering ethos negotiation, real life scenarios can
be much more fraught. In a crisis scenario, with a patient’s life on the line and time in short
supply, should a mother’s hunch, a doctor’s training, or a test result be heeded? In Chapter 2,
I explored alternative frameworks for diagnostic rhetorics apart from approaches that hinge
on persuasion, interpretation, and identification. In analyzing Dr. Sanders’ “Diagnosis”
column, complex relationships between doctors and patients emerged that challenged
traditional conceptions of the doctor as the ultimate authority and the patient as the passive
text to be read. For example, in several cases, patients actually solved their own diagnostic
mysteries or lied to the doctor in order to be taken seriously. However, other relationships
also emerged between not only doctors and patients but family members, healthcare
providers, technologies, tests, and other community members. Furthermore, diagnostic
success in these narratives often resulted from collaborations between stakeholders. These
collaborations involved, for example, a brother checking his unconscious sister’s cell phone
for clues (“Unresponsive”). In other cases, doctors collaborated with colleagues with diﬀerent
specializations or even with residents and interns to determine the cause of the patient’s
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condition. Thus, drawing on Latour’s theory of Actor-Network Theory, I recast diagnoses as
assemblages of human and non-human actants that sometimes work together and, at other
times, work at cross-purposes. While such an approach allows for more dynamic doctorpatient relationships, it also extends the number of actants who must be considered when
making a diagnosis. The narratives Sanders shares also highlight the need for a suﬃciently
intricate approach to diagnostic ethos.
Sanders’ narratives vividly demonstrate the multiple types of ethoi that emerge in
diagnostic networks. For example, in “What Caused this 15-Year-Old’s Debilitating
Headaches?” Sanders tells the story of a mother who advocates for her son’s treatment by
lying to the doctors. Although they tell her repeatedly that her son simply has migraines, a
gut feeling tells her that something more serious is to blame. When she lies to the doctors
and tells them that her son has a fever, they immediately order the CT scan she wanted and
find the cause of her son’s sudden illness. The mother’s experience with her son’s normal
reactions to illness and her gut feeling enable her to push for a diagnosis that otherwise might
have been missed. While the mother’s attachment to her son informed her tenacity and
ingenuity within the diagnostic network, in other cases, actants do not even need to know
the patient to eﬀectively intervene. In “Losing Consciousness,” for instance, a
gastroenterologist encounters a patient who cannot stop bleeding rectally. Recognizing the
woman’s risk of bleeding to death due to her blood’s inability to clot, the doctor contacts a
hematologist friend to ask for his input. He determines the patient’s condition immediately,
attributing it to a reaction to combined histamine and anti-depression medications. This
narrative stresses the significance of cross-specialty collaboration, as no doctor can possibly
recall all diseases and pearls of wisdom for each area of medicine at all times. In fact, Sanders
reiterates the diagnostic vitality of “a phone and a friend” throughout her “Diagnosis”
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narratives (“Losing Consciousness”). In other cases, expertise from an entirely diﬀerent
discipline—such as botany—can prove more useful than any medical specialty. In “Rough
Patches,” when a little boy breaks out with a mysterious rash that his doctors are unable to
identify, a chance decision by his doctor to stop by the local greenhouse ends up revealing the
cause of his patient’s condition. When the doctor recites some of the plants growing in the
boy’s grandmother’s garden, a greenhouse employee is able to attribute the rash to a pumpkin
vine allergy. As all of these examples indicate, expertise within diagnostic settings can be as
diverse as the myriad illnesses patients experience. While doctors are primarily tasked with
treating disease, Sanders’ narratives suggest that actual diagnoses can often be performed by
other actants whose expertise resides in personal experience, a diﬀerent medical
specialization, or a diﬀerent field of study altogether.
Beyond the multiple kinds of ethoi that diagnostic networks reveal, it is important to
note that such ethoi also tend to emerge through collaboration rather than individual
actions. In a sense, McIntyre’s thesis in Relational Agency, Networked Technology, and the Social
Media Aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing that agency is relational and dispersed
applies to the view of ethoi that Sanders’ narratives present. In particular, McIntyre’s
argument that agency is a shared power to act co-created through networked relationships is
suggestive for an ANT approach to diagnostic ethoi. Such a definition fits especially well for
collaborative ethoi that emerge when doctors deliberate together on diagnostic mysteries;
when doctors collaborate to diagnose a patient—perhaps one doctor responding to a gut
feeling, another recalling a pearl of wisdom, and another noticing an odd test result—their
ethoi are communally actualized. In McIntyre’s assessment, the Boston Marathon bombing
mobilized a network of actants, including Twitter, hashtags, and Bostonians, to interact with
the media, police, and victims, in order to help those aﬀected by the bombing. She writes:
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[F]ollowing the bombings, as many runners and other tourists were barred by
law enforcement from retrieving their belongs and returning to their hotels,
numerous Twitter users began to tweet oﬀers for food and shelter using the
aforementioned hashtag [#BostonHelp]. These acts of kindness are
intentionally agentive acts enabled by a network of technologies (spaces like
Twitter as well as the internet itself and the hardware necessary to connect),
material goods (the food and shelter they oﬀer), and the human kindness that
underlies the oﬀers. (17)
Thus, McIntyre finds that agency is enabled by the network, and that it emerges through
interaction rather than in isolation. Similarly, I want to suggest that ethos can be seen as
emerging in contexts of diﬀerence, disagreement, and negotiation, since Sanders’ narratives
highlight the ineﬃcacy of a solitary expert solving problems in everyday diagnostic contexts.
For example, to return to her instructive set of narratives a final time, Sanders’
October entry, “Why Was this Woman Suﬀering from Terrible, Unrelenting Pain” illustrates
this interactional approach to ethos generation. In this narrative, a generally healthy 43-year
old woman suddenly begins to experience debilitating abdominal pain that makes it
impossible for her to eat or sleep. Although she works as a lawyer, she is rendered unable to
work due to the pain, which keeps her in bed most days. All tests for the usual suspects, such
as Crohn’s disease or another gastrointestinal blockage, came back negative. According to
Sanders, the one problem physicians did identify was gastroparesis, which occurs when food
moves too slowly through the GI tract. It’s a particularly challenging condition, Sanders
explains, because: “It’s a diﬃcult problem to treat. Eating smaller, more frequent meals and
taking medicine to stop the nausea caused by the backlog of undigested food can help. If it
doesn’t, patients are put on a liquid diet or given medicine to make the stomach work faster.
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Some patients must receive their nutrients through a tube into the small intestines” (n.p.).
Still, “The couple resigned themselves to the situation,” apparently figuring that this
unfortunate and painful situation would be their new normal (n.p.). Before the couple could
fully accept their fate, however, a sudden phone call from an unexpected source brought
some hope. Sanders recalls, “[O]ne afternoon, the patient got a call. It was Lois Abrams, a
friend of her mother’s whom she had known since childhood. Abrams explained that she had
a friend who had a niece who had something that sounded like what the patient was
experiencing” (n.p.). When the patient followed up with Abrams’ friend’s niece, she
discovered that their symptoms were identical, and that a surgery to remove the compressed
celiac artery and associated nerves had cured her entirely. The woman consults with the
niece’s surgeon, who proposes a simple test to see if she, too, suﬀers from MALS. “A specialist
would inject a numbing medicine into her celiac ganglion,” the doctor explained, “If it
relieved the pain for a few weeks, there was an excellent chance that surgery would solve the
problem. After the injection, she felt no pain for six weeks and regained most of her lost
weight” (n.p.). Surgery followed, and the woman experienced a full recovery of her pain-free
existence, thanks to the collaborative eﬀorts of the networked actants.
This example highlights the ways in which networked actants mobilize the expertise
of other actants. For example, the niece’s personal experience with MALS led her to be a
compelling source for the patient, who turned to an expert surgeon, who suggested a test to
determine her condition (n.p.). Each source’s ethos was only mobilized when another actant
called it to action. Furthermore, each actant’s ethos is actually constituted through its
interactions with other actants, since the surgeon’s expertise is reliant on the niece’s
recommendation, which leads the patient to seek him out. The test, too, only demonstrates
its ethos when the doctor suggests its usage as a way to determine the patient’s condition and
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predict the likelihood of surgical success. As this narrative indicates, it is not enough to
simply recognize ethos as a collaborative endeavor; instead, a framework for ethos generation
must take into account its constitution through interaction and communal decision-making.
Ethos, then, might be more productively conceived of as hinging on relational deliberation,
meaning that we need an alternative framework for understanding how to intervene within
such situations to better grasp the way diagnostic ethos gets created. In some ways, this
approach to ethos exceeds Mol’s conception of ethos by moving towards a more complex and
meta-level approach to ethos constitution. A better approach to ethos generation, about
which more later, will need to account for the extent to which ethos cannot always be
isolated within a single actant but must be traced within interactions amongst actants.

Ethos, Networks, and Negotiation
Beyond the relational qualities of generating networked diagnostic ethoi, I want to
also consider how such ethoi get negotiated in healthcare settings. Chapter 2’s emphasis on
expanding conceptions of diagnostic rhetorics beyond the doctor and patient and towards
contributions of other stakeholders (such as family members and non-humans) culminated
in Chapter 3’s consideration of how ANT might better explain what happens when
networked mistakes happen. In describing the public misdiagnosis of the so-called “Ebola
nurse,” Kaci Hickox, I drew attention to the roles played by unlikely actants whose actions
had been masked by the public panic over Ebola. In particular, I analyzed the role played by
deforestation in Africa, which placed animals capable of incubating and transmitting Ebola
in closer contact with at-risk human populations. I then emphasized the contributions of
African aid workers, who were the first responders to the crisis. Often working without the
same precautions and resources of Western aid workers, who arrived later, this population
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suﬀered both physically—many of them contracting Ebola themselves, emotionally—many
faced stigmatization and even accusations that they were working for the government to
infect Africans with the disease, and financially—since Ebola devastated African economies
in a way that Western outsiders failed to grasp. Furthermore, these African aid workers often
served as intermediaries between local populations and Western aid workers, who were
mistrusted by such groups. Finally, I explored the contributions of conservative politicians,
such as Governors Chris Christie and Paul LePage, who took unnecessary measures to
quarantine Ebola aid workers against their will. In so doing, they hoped to demonstrate their
eﬀectiveness in responding to public health crises—although their actions defied the expert
testimony of public health oﬃcials and healthcare providers.
Like Chapter 2, Chapter 3 opened up important questions about ethos, as the actants
who ultimately misdiagnosed Hickox were politicians—not medical experts. In many ways,
Chapter 3 tells a cautionary tale about what happens when networks ineﬀectively negotiate
ethoi, discarding one form of expert testimony in favor of another rather than adding them
up. For example, public health oﬃcials and politicians might have coordinated their eﬀorts
based on their diﬀering forms of expertise, one on matters of health, and the other on
matters of governing. They might have worked together to ensure that aid eﬀorts were
continually encouraged and supported while simultaneously protecting Western audiences
from contracting the deadly disease. However, in the Trump era, part of the emerging
conservative ethos involves a defiance of expert testimony in favor of fear mongering; this
strategy is eﬀective at generating citizen support, in some cases, but less eﬀective at
controlling contagious disease. In addition to violating Hickox’s rights, by enforcing her
quarantine and then requiring that she remain under house arrest (she refused), the
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networked mistake resulted in unfounded public terror about Ebola transmission in the
United States and a reduction of aid workers willing to serve in Africa.
Beyond the major problems of networked ethoi within the Hickox/Ebola narratives,
the emphasis on the relationship between African and Western aid workers reflects a
disconnect between local and global ethoi. Local aid workers, often from the villages aﬀected
by Ebola, possessed an ethos amongst their people based on their understanding of the
culture and their familiarity with local customs. Rather than dismissing beliefs that Ebola was
a government project designed to kill African people, they persuaded local citizens that the
Western disease management techniques were designed to protect them. They also worked
with villagers to reform cultural traditions of washing corpses of deceased victims,
encouraging them to stop engaging in this tradition until the outbreak ended to prevent the
continued spread of Ebola via contaminated water sources. Such eﬀorts were so successful
that Western aid workers set up training workshops for African aid workers where they
taught them how to teach their fellow villagers about Ebola prevention and treatment. While
this negotiation of ethoi worked well, African aid workers were subsequently abandoned by
Western aid workers when the immediate threat of Ebola dwindled. As the narratives by
Isaac Bayoh in The Guardian’s “Ebola: Life on the Frontlines” series highlight, African aid
workers and citizens have been left to pick up the pieces of the economic, interpersonal, and
infrastructural devastation left in the wake of the Ebola epidemic. As he describes the postEbola rebuilding process, Bayoh points to the lack of resources and healthcare infrastructure,
wondering “how ready is our health care system to fight another outbreak like this? Many
things that need to be done are yet to be implemented” (“Ebola in Sierra Leone” n.p.). Thus,
while aid workers from Africa and other countries, such as the United States, were able to
calibrate their ethoi in the moment to respond to a crisis, ongoing coordination between
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their groups failed. The insights of Bayoh and other aid workers he interviews reiterate the
need for continuing calibration amongst public health networks to contain disease outbreak
risks, research diseases and treatment methods, and educate the public about prevention
measures.
A final ethos problem invoked by Chapter 3 involved the coordination between not
just public health oﬃcials in varying countries, but environmental and animal experts.
Ebola’s status as a zoonotic disease (meaning it is transmitted to humans by animals)
indicates the importance of incorporating scientific experts from a range of disciplines into
conversations about outbreaks. Furthermore, the eﬀects of deforestation on animal disease—
and human risk—incorporates a range of ecological activists and researchers into the growing
network of disease. In fact, this issue is the focus of David Quammen’s New York Times
bestseller Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic. In his opening chapter,
he argues that “The subject of animal disease and the subject of human disease are . . . strands
of one braided cord” (13). Each chapter that follows traces these strands, in the Latourian
sense, and he unpacks the interrelationships of nature, animals, microbes, viruses, diseases,
and humans. In such contexts, the diagnosis of a disease involves both animal and human
diagnoses, and such a central part of human medical encounters becomes a mere starting
point. He writes of finally diagnosing the mysterious Hendra virus, which randomly killed
horses and then humans that had had contact with infected horses, “Identifying the new
virus was only one step in solving the immediate mystery of Hendra, let alone understanding
the disease in a wider context. Step two would involve tracking that virus to its hiding place.
Where did it exist when it wasn’t killing horses and people? Step three would entail asking a
further cluster of questions: How did the virus emerge from its secret refuge, and why here,
and why now?” (19). These questions—of identification, tracking, timing, and spreadability

188

—encompass a range of actants who must contribute their expertise. For example, the
Hendra case involved horses, bats, horse owners, veterinarians, botanists (who could study
the trees where bats had gathered—and under which the first infected horse had nestled), bat
carers, medical experts, microbiologists, journalists, and a host of other stakeholders. Each
actant possessed his or her own expertise that had to be collaboratively considered in order to
successfully answer any of the questions Quammen poses.
In many ways, the shift from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3 can be understood as a shift
from the interpersonal to the institutional level of network tracing. While Chapter 2
emphasized the interplay of local actants and their expertise—such as a doctor, patient,
family members, and specialists with relationships to primary doctors—Chapter 3 takes a
meta approach to such interactional ethoi. Rather than isolated doctor-patient networks,
Quammen’s analysis—and Chapter 3’s—takes a diﬀerent approach to understanding
problems within diagnostic networks, focusing instead on institutions such as ecology, the
Australian horse racing industry, veterinary precautions for treating sick animals, and the
environmental eﬀects of colonial eﬀorts to introduce horses into Australian habitats in the
late 1700s. While the meta-level networks are more complex and frightening—in the sense
that they indicate a future pandemic that will wipe out millions of people, just as influenza
and AIDS have done—they also oﬀer greater possibilities for actant intervention. A key tenet
of Quammen’s analysis, in fact, is that humans are actually bringing pandemics and
epidemics upon themselves by destroying habitats and the environment. He writes:
Make no mistake, they are connected, these disease outbreaks [AIDS,
influenza, Ebola, Nipah, West Nile, Sars, avian flu, Hendra, etc.] coming one
after another. And they are not simply happening to us; they represent the
unintended results of things we are doing. They reflect two forms of crisis on
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our planet. The first crisis is ecological, the second is medical. As the two
intersect, their joint consequences appear as a pattern of weird and terrible
new diseases, emerging from unexpected sources and raising deep concern,
deep foreboding, among the scientists who study them. How do diseases leap
from nonhuman animals into people, and why do they seem to be leaping
more frequently in recent years? To put the matter in its starkest form:
Human-caused ecological pressures and disruptions are bringing animal
pathogens ever more into contact with human populations, while human
technology and behavior are spreading those pathogens even more widely and
quickly. (39-40)
While reducing ecological destruction and the carbon footprint cannot entirely eradicate
infectious and zoonotic diseases, Quammen provides a possibility that reforming ecological
practices—at the individual and global level—might at least help lessen the severity of such
diseases or enhance containment eﬀorts. In this way, Quammen highlights the vitality of not
only coordinating diﬀerent forms of expertise but of calibrating our expertise to respond to
the challenges that face our world.
This approach to ethos exceeds the boundaries Mol inadvertently imposes on ethos
by limiting her study to ethos negotiation in hospital settings. While saving a patient’s life is
the ultimate measure of successful network negotiation for Mol, for Quammen and Bayoh,
successful negotiation hinges on higher stake projects: protecting entire countries from public
health outbreaks and ensuring that steps are taken to create healthcare infrastructure that can
adequately respond when outbreaks do occur. While saving an individual patient’s life is
obviously an important and worthy goal, the scope of Mol’s project fails to account for larger
scale projects that must be undertaken by more complex networks. Thus, in addition to

190

accounting for the ways in which ethos is generated via actant interaction, an alternative
approach to networked ethos must address how expertise gets negotiated within public
health networks.

When Ethos Goes Unrecognized
Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 emphasized networked relationships, Chapter 4 focused
on the role one often-neglected actant plays in diagnostic deliberations: uncertainty. I began
by arguing that diagnostic deliberations tend to overly value outcome-based, probabilistic
approaches over open-ended and ongoing ones. This habitus of Western deliberative rhetorics
has influenced healthcare providers to stress the significance of acting quickly in response to
imperfect or even conflicting information. However, this model’s appreciation for acting
decisively in the moment fails to adequately serve populations of potential patients, such as
bug chasers and those at risk for genetic disease, whose risk for disease requires a diﬀerent
rhetorical approach. Lyon’s approach to deliberative rhetorics presents an alternative picture
of deliberation as an ongoing conversation where actants seek to understand rather than
persuade one another. She furthermore emphasizes the moment when actants come together
to make decisions as a situation wherein diﬀerences can be calibrated, to borrow Mol’s term,
rather than erased. Rather than a model of persuasion or identification, Lyon’s approach to
deliberation mobilizes Arendt’s concept of inter-est to stress the significance of locating a
common struggle that can enable multiple actants to correlate their actions. I finally posited
that diagnosis can no longer be medicine’s sole telos, and that diagnostic deliberation
networks might start to locate their common ground in the uncertainty that all actants
within diagnostic settings face.
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Beyond Chapter 4’s focus, though, uncertainty raises additional questions about
negotiating ethoi in diagnostic contexts. In fact, a key challenge facing medical authority—or
ethos—is its susceptibility to change. In Exploring Medical Anthropology, Donald Joralemon
argues that “The social and cultural authority of a healer is supporter by anything that
appears to his/her clients to be a cure, but when the results are ambiguous or negative, the
healer’s authority can suﬀer” (70). Thus, a healer’s guesswork is not only significant for her
patient but also for the population which she serves, which may lose faith in both her and
the healing practice she represents if she fails. Joralemon continues, “[W]hen a new disease
appears, for which existing therapies are ineﬀective, the cultural authority of healers may be
challenged. If other healers, representing a diﬀerent medical system, have greater success,
there may also arise a contest over social authority” (70). As an example of such a contest—
and shift in healthcare paradigms—Joralemon points to the Amerindian shamans who
attempted to protect their communities from disease from Spanish invaders in the 1500s. He
explains, “European explorers and colonists brought with them an array of epidemic agents
to which indigenous populations had not previously been exposed, including smallpox,
measles, mumps, yellow fever, and bubonic plague . . . Shamans and other indigenous healers
were impotent in the face of these devastating new diseases and they quickly lost credibility
in their communities” (70). Far from simply eliminating community faith in the healer’s
abilities, such a shift away from indigenous healing “represented a significant loss of social
and cultural authority, one which undermined existing religious beliefs with a corresponding
decay in the entire social fabric” (70). Thus, one problem with expertise is its capacity to
evolve—one can be an expert of disease, for example, until suddenly a new disease comes
along about which the would-be expert knows nothing. Expertise is both circumstantial and
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evolving, then, as few things worthy of expert knowledge and understanding remain the
same for long.
Another problem with medical expertise, and perhaps a more troubling one, involves
uncertainty about whether an actual expert will be regarded as such by an audience due to his
or her race, gender, ethnicity, or appearance. In Black Man in a White Coat: A Doctor’s
Reflections on Race and Medicine, Dr. Damon Tweedy explores the ways in which his race has
aﬀected his medical school, training, and professional experiences. He first recalls his
excitement as a new student at Duke University’s Medical School, although he explains that a
professor’s confusion about why he was in the classroom—and his question about whether he
was there to fix the lights—deflated his spirits. Later, as a medical student and then M.D.,
patients often made assumptions about his athletic abilities, assuming that he was a
basketball player due to his race and height. “At least once a day during my rotations,”
Tweedy clarifies, “my race would come up in an interaction with patients. The racial
conversation was usually implied rather than explicit, as one person after another, usually
white, took one look at me and inquired about my basketball skills” (113). While some asked
where he played ball, others spoke of his career opportunities: “You’re wasting your time in
school. You should be playing in the NBA” and “A tall black like you with long arms and legs
should be on a basketball court and nowhere else” (113). Beyond making Tweedy feel
uncomfortable, this commentary on his assumed athletic prowess caused him to wonder
whether these assumptions actually caused patients to doubt his medical proficiency. He
reflects, “[A]long with some people’s certainty that I could dribble and shoot came, at least to
my thinking, an assumption that I was a dumb jock . . . Would they doubt my ability to be a
competent doctor? If so, would that hinder my career?” (114). Tweedy not only had to
endure racist remarks in addition to the already strenuous work of keeping his patients alive,

193

then, he was also made to doubt his own authority due to the assumptions underlying such
remarks. Added to the normal anxieties about whether one can master a new and challenging
craft, Tweedy was made to wonder whether his race would make patients doubt his ethos
altogether. While this unsolicited commentary and subsequent self-doubt are troubling
generally, I want to particularly focus on Tweedy’s encounters with Chester and Robert, two
patients Tweedy worked with as a medical intern.
Before Tweedy even entered Chester’s room, he had made racist assumptions about
the kind of care he could oﬀer. Chester had asked his nurse why so many black people were
in the hospital, and he had informed her: “I don’t want no [black] doctor” (106).8 Tweedy
recalls that the experience was a surprise—an unexpected and unwelcome interruption into
his daily tasks. “I was struggling with this adjustment [from medical student to first
responder] along with the rest of my colleagues, my mind focused on the objective analysis of
lab results, EKGs, and chest X-rays—medical tasks that had nothing to do with race. But
Chester’s words had unceremoniously shoved me out of 2003, and back into a world that felt
more like 1963” (106). Suddenly singled out, Tweedy is oﬀered the opportunity to not treat
the patient; however, he decides to do it anyway, coupling the pressure of saving the patient’s
life with the stress of knowing that the patient will hate him because of his race. As they
entered Chester’s room, the doctor in charge, Audrey, introduced herself, Tweedy, and
another doctor two years out of college. Chester replied, “Where’s my real doctor?”—
evidently unsatisfied that one of his doctors was a woman and one was black (109). Tweedy
remembers that the conversation progressed thusly: “‘We are your doctors,’ Audrey fired
back. ‘And I’m the one in charge.’ Chester looked past her, his eyes settling on me for an
instant, his face a nasty scowl, before they rested on Gabe. ‘I only wanna deal with
8

Chester uses a racial slur here, which I have omitted.
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you’” (109). Gabe, though the least qualified of the three doctors, was a white male, and
therefore infinitely more capable in Chester’s eyes. When Audrey reiterated that she was in
charge, and he could either work with her or wait hours for a new doctor, he finally complied
and allowed them to continue their examination. However, as Tweedy notes, it took one and
a half weeks before Chester even acknowledged his existence enough to respond to a
question, despite his dire physical condition (120).
Audrey and Tweedy also faced challenges with Chester’s family members, who were
no less hostile to the ones responsible for their father’s care. As the two doctors met his
daughter and grandson for the first time, the daughter was wearing a Confederate flag t-shirt
and the son had a “shirt pocket [that] flaunted a smaller Confederate flag” (119). “With
manners similar to her father,” Tweedy describes, “Molly derisively asked: ‘Who’s in charge
here?’” (119). Chester’s daughter Molly challenged Audrey’s authority when she described
what was wrong with her father, although she finally relented after Audrey confidently
replied to every question (119). Tweedy finds himself in a challenging position where he
must again decide whether he will continue to treat the patient (and deal with his and his
family’s racist attitudes) or assign him to a new team of doctors. Tweedy decides to continue
caring for Chester, but he later questions his own motives for doing so. When Chester
ultimately dies, he is confronted by conflicted emotions about the experience and his
response. “I was proud of the way I’d handled Chester’s case,” he writes, “but I was also left
with a twinge of guilt. Though I was certain I had worked as hard as I could, motivated in
part to show Chester and his family that I was a competent doctor, I knew that my clinical
diligence had as much to do with wanting to impress Audrey and my other
supervisors” (128). Even after Chester is dead, then, his prejudices and the hateful attitude
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with which he encountered his non-white, non-male doctors leaves Tweedy unnerved and
uncertain of his own eﬃcacy as a doctor.
Beyond the challenges Tweedy faces from Chester and his family members, he recalls
a similar experience where a patient initially refused his care—but this patient was black. As
Tweedy entered the room, Robert demanded of him, “Does anyone in your family have
sickle-cell?” (123). When Tweedy said no, Robert asked what he knew of the disease. With
his expertise so brazenly challenged, Tweedy froze and was initially unable to say anything
about the disease. “Man,” Robert responded with a sneer (123). When Tweedy asked the
man what he meant, he replied, “C’mon man, we both know what the deal is. I’m sure you
did good in school and everything, but they’re passin’ you oﬀ on me. And they think I won’t
care because I’m supposed to be some dumb [black man]9. Go tell your boss I don’t want no
black doctor” (123). Tweedy describes his painful emotional response, writing, “Dazed, I
retreated a half-step. I felt my heart thump and blood pulse through my ears. In the clearest
of terms, Robert was saying that black doctors were incompetent, and that I was the latest
example” (123). This experience was more painful for Tweedy than Chester’s dismissal of his
medical expertise, “given what it said about how we felt about ourselves as a race” (125).
Thus, internalized racism provokes the same distrust of a black doctor’s authority—and
disgust at being passed oﬀ on an ostensibly under-qualified doctor—causing Tweedy to
further doubt his own expertise.
Tweedy ultimately gains the trust and aﬀection of both Chester and Robert.
Although Chester dies, and Robert lives, he teaches both men an important lesson about
judging ethos based on physical appearance. However, the additional pressure and stress he
faces due to the racist beliefs of both black and white patients, and the responsibility he feels
9
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to prove himself as a capable medical professional in spite of his patient’s blatant racism,
speak to a huge political problem facing medical ethos. Just because one has been deemed an
expert by Duke University, a medical board, or a prominent hospital does not mean that a
doctor will be granted the same authority by patients, who bring their own fears, biases, and
prejudices to such interactions. Uncertainty about how best to respond to diagnostic
problems—and risks for developing diseases in the future—intersects with uncertainty about
how one’s authority will be perceived and/or challenged by others. Further, these experiences
cause Tweedy to initially doubt himself and feel an unfair pressure to prove himself, not just
as a doctor but as a black doctor.
Tweedy’s narratives speak to the importance of understanding ethoi as contextual and
culturally generated. In particular, patients may bring prejudices that label minorities or
women as inferior, and therefore less qualified to do their job. Even the institutions that
verify credentials and those responsible for preparing and vetting future experts may promote
such racist ideologies, whether intentionally or not. We may recall, for example, the professor
who initially made Tweedy feel like an outsider, like a lesser authority or an undeserving
member of the medical profession. As Tweedy notes, although his race may have granted him
access to the medical field (he claims that he would not have been accepted to Duke if he
were not black), it failed to also provide him with the attendant ethos usually reserved for
medical experts. A final requirement for an alternative framework for ethos generation and
negotiation, then, must account for sociocultural factors that determine who will naturally be
treated as experts, and who will have to work doubly hard to have their ethos recognized.
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Feminist Ecological Ethos
As the previous recaps and analyses have argued, ethos haunts this project in that it
haunts medicine and diagnosis. This is particularly true of a networked approach to
diagnosis, as enlisting more actants into consideration will bring with it attendant conflicts
regarding whose ethos matters most and why. Although previous chapters have emphasized
ANT via Latour, I want to shift now towards a feminist ecological approach to ANT to
consider how their conceptions of ethos might resolve, and productively complicate, the
problems with ethos that this project uncovers.
The field of rhetoric has a complex relationship with ethos that can be traced back to
at least the writings of Homer. According to Charles Chamberlain, “In most writers of the
fifth century B.C. and later, ēthos can usually be understood and translated as ‘character.’ In
earlier writers however ‘character’ is often an impossible or at best a misleading translation,
not surprisingly, since the word originally designates ‘the places where animals are usually
found’ [or ‘animals’ haunts’]” (97). Such a definition responds to the Aristotelian tradition of
defining ēthos as “moral character” or “the trustworthy character of a speaker as artistically
created in a speech” (Kennedy 148). Aristotle, for his part, frames ethos as a necessary
component of deliberation: “But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment . . . it
is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and persuasive
but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to
prepare the judge” (112). For Aristotle, ēthos is a useful rhetorical tool that seeks to ingratiate
the audience to the speaker in order to win their approval for a suggested course of action.
This can be achieved by demonstrating good will or generating common ground, as Aristotle
notes: “[I]t makes much diﬀerence in regard to persuasion . . . that the speaker seem to be a
certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed toward them in a
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certain way” (112). Thus, Kennedy argues that although ēthos has come to mean “the
projection of the speaker’s character,” Aristotle initially intended for the term to denote “the
speaker’s success in conveying to the audience a perception that he or she can be trusted” (x).
Aristotle’s approach to ēthos via generating trust and goodwill significantly places an emphasis
on the relationship between speaker and audience, thereby setting the stage for critiques of
the ways in which this relationship might be corrupted or exclusionary. In particular,
Aristotle’s account of ēthos fails to account for marginalized populations whose forms of
expertise have been dismissed and whose eﬀorts involve seeking to change conversations
rather than attain goodwill from audiences.
In contrast to the Aristotelian tradition, Chamberlain traces the ongoing
development of ēthos’ meaning through alternative historical texts, beginning with Homer’s
pluralistic use of ēthea (“the places where animals are found”) and location-based ētheios (“one
who is found in a certain place”) (97). For Homer, the various forms of ēthos encompass “an
arena or range in which the animal naturally belongs” (97). Such a belonging is innate or at
least ingrained within the animals, since they experience distress when humans try to
rehabituate them in a new environment. Writes Chamberlain, “the humans hope to change
the horse’s habits by using hunger to make it regard the manger at home. But the power of
habituation (eiōthōs) is too strong to be overcome. Homer emphasizes the horse’s joy . . . in
order to show the power of habituation. The horse longs to be in his ēthea, feels pain at being
locked away at the manger and joy upon breaking free” (98). This understanding of ethos
points to a logic that defies logic, something that Chamberlain will pick back up later on in
his piece (102). But before he does so, Chamberlain shifts to an analysis of Hesiod’s and
Theognis’s poetry, where “ēthos is applied more widely and is used regularly in the singular,”
attributed to humans rather than animals, and “used in a derogatory sense” (98). Ēthos
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becomes, in their poetry, a title that indicates deceitfulness or false friendship rather than
good character (99). Despite the suggestions that ēthos is innate or somehow deeply
embedded in human and animal consciousness, Chamberlain credits Pindar with the
question of whether ēthos “can be aﬀected at all . . . Can one ‘change’ one’s ēthos?” (100). His
tentative answer is yes, based on passages by Hesiod, Herodotus, and Sophocles, which
suggest that women, barbarians, slaves, and children can evolve to possess more desirable (to
Western white men) ēthea (100). He explains that their passages “suggest that the ēthos is
susceptible to change, but only through a process of long association best done in childhood”
(100). While Chamberlain fails to acknowledge it, the process might also be seen as a form of
coercion, whereby those in power seek to change or “reform” the ēthea of those deemed
inferior.
A final significant moment for ēthos can be located in the “political use of the word,”
or its’ associations with “the peculiar characteristics which citizens of a polis acquire as part of
their civic heritage” (101). Thus, ēthos can refer not only to an individual’s place of belonging
but of a polis’. As Chamberlain explains, this collective “ēthē forms a kind of moral ambience
which is peculiar to a certain polis and whose most important influence is upon the children
of that place,” an idea that Aristotle in particular mobilized (102). Chamberlain finally sums
up his review of ancient conceptions of ēthos, explaining:
Like the pasturage which the horse calls its own, there exists a part of our
being which is untouched by higher reasons of love or friendship or duty, and
may come to light in a crisis . . . It is an apparently irrational or
unaccountable entity which nevertheless follows a rational principle or
principles of its own. To put it more suggestively, the ēthos has its own logos
which is in a sense beyond the reach of logos. (102)

200

Chamberlain just stops short of identifying ēthos with phusis, thereby establishing it as a
contradictory or contrasting concept to nomos, or the laws and customs that would try to
habituate ēthos.
I begin by explaining this approach to ēthos at length because it powerfully introduces
major themes of feminist ecological conceptions of the storied and multi-faceted term(s). In
the “Introduction” to Rethinking Ethos: A Feminist Ecological Approach to Rhetoric, Kathleen J.
Ryan, Nancy Meyers, and Rebecca Jones are careful to distinguish ēthos from ethos, noting
that “The etymology of ethos, according to the Greek-English Lexicon compiled by Henry
George Liddell and Robert Scott, is simply ‘custom’ and ‘habit,’ while the denotations of
ēthos and its plural, ēthē, entail social, ethical, and located dimensions” (6). As such, ēthē
becomes a compelling starting point for a feminist approach to understanding the
development of authority or character that is social, respondent to power dynamics, and
situated within particular contexts. In the “Preface” to the same collection, the editors
conceive of their purpose for the book thusly: “We are compelled . . . to ask how else have,
do, and might women compose their ethos? By focusing on ethos, we highlight a complex
issue: the cultural, historical, and social positions that restrain and invigorate women’s
rhetorical prospects as agentive rhetors” (vii). The writers anticipate a shift away from “male
orators in positions of power” and toward multi-faceted, disruptive ethos generation, and
that women oﬀer particularly powerful examples of how best to enact these shifts due to their
long history of marginalization (4-5). They furthermore argue that “By naming women’s
ethos practices as feminist ecological ethoi, we shift away from an Aristotelian framework
toward a conceptualization of women’s ethos that accounts in new ways for interrelationality,
materiality, and agency” (viii). Feminist ecological ethoi, located “at the confluence of
ecological thinking and feminist rhetorical thinking” seeks to challenge and “shift the
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dominant discourse” rather than cultivate a socially acceptable ethos (2). Ryan et. al argue
that “Common, normalizing ethoi (i.e. Mormon woman, mother, angel of the house, whore,
bitch) ascribed to women do not lend themselves readily to public speaking. As such, new
ethoi must be created and defined to push against these socially determined ethoi” (2).
Indeed, feminist interventions against normalizing ethoi include work by radical feminists
such as Andrea Dworkin, who “cultivate[s] a productive, confrontational ethos by rejecting
social convention in her rhetoric, embodiment, and relationships” (Palmer-Mehta 66).
Rather than seeking to appease her audience and generate feelings of good-will, she instead
“commanded the floor with force, scarcely pausing to justify her presence. Rather than
adapting to the audience or making conciliatory gestures, she called on them to adapt to her
way of thinking" (66). In this way, Dworkin exemplifies the value of habit-disruption by
“engaging in a strategic reversal . . . mov[ing] the burden of cultivating an appropriate ethos
onto her audience,” rather than seeking to prove her own (67). Thus, feminist ecological
ethos can be disruptive and responsive to power structures that oppress and exclude some
from civic participation. Rather than seeking to generate goodwill between a rhetor and
audience, ethos might be mobilized to confront an audience and productively shift the
relationships among actants.
Another key tenet of a feminist ecological approach to ethos is its multiplicity,
fluidity, and emphasis on nonlinear relations. “Feminist ecological ethoi,” Ryan et. al write,
“open up new ways of envisioning ethos to acknowledge the multiple, nonlinear relations
operating among rhetorics, audiences, things, and contexts (i.e. ideological, metaphorical,
geographical). This theorizing recognizes all elements of any rhetorical situation as shifting
and morphing in response to others, generating a variety and plurality of ethos, or ethoi” (3).
This approach recognizes the ways in which context influences ethoi, which must shift in
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response to new audiences and purposes for speaking. Similarly, it acknowledges the extent to
which any individual or polis might possess multiple ethoi: as a doctor, scholar, researcher,
and writer, and mother, for example, a woman might have a variety of ethoi that inform her
identity and expertise. This awareness of the multiplicity of ethoi is a result of the
marginalization of women, for Ryan et. al, who note that “marginalized rhetors have a keen
sense of the burdens of ethos negotiation” and the tools through which they might “alter
ecosystems” (3). As an example, we might recall Tweedy’s reflections on the way race aﬀected
his medical practice; as a black male doctor, he was expected to be able to seamlessly switch
from his expertise as a doctor to expertise on sports, particularly basketball, to an
understanding of issues aﬀecting minorities—both social and health-related. Thus, taking a
multiple or fluid approach to ethos should not encompass an uncritical embrace of what can
oftentimes become a burden for marginalized populations to “prove themselves” as experts
due to their status as non-white, non-male, non-hetero, and non-Western rhetors.
Finally, a major shift that Ryan et. al instigate within conceptions of ethos involves a
move away from location and towards relationship. Crediting Craig R. Smith with the idea
that “ethos dwells not just at specific locations but also in the speaker and audience
relationship,” Ryan et. al are careful to note that their conception of relationships includes
both human and nonhuman actants (7; Smith 15-6). They begin to identify the necessity of
the “ecological” component of their definition by noting the responsibility we bear to not
only other humans—particularly marginalized populations—but to the earth, environment,
and nonhumans, such as animals. “Ecological thinking,” they clarify:
is about a way of living in the world oriented toward cohabitation; it
acknowledges the dynamic construction of relationships within and across
location and between people as constituting knowledge and values. Ethos is
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neither solitary nor fixed. Rather, ethos is negotiated and renegotiated,
embodied and communal, co-constructed and thoroughly implicated in
shifting power dynamics. (11)
Ethos, too, is not a self-serving endeavor that seeks to cultivate one’s own authority; instead,
in Ryan et al.’s hands, it becomes a way to “encourage the flourishing of all people” and take
responsibility for the work we do (11). In this sense, the authors draw on Lorraine Code’s
Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, where she conceives of habitat and
ethos within a feminist framework of responsibility. She posits that “the transformative
potential of ecological thinking can be realized by participants engaged in producing a viable
habit and ethos, prepared to take on the burdens and blessings of place, identity, materiality,
and history, and to work within the locational possibilities and limitations, found and made,
of human cognitive-corporeal lives” (5).10 The responsibility, for Code, resides with any
rhetor who seeks to aﬀect the ecology of which he or she is apart. “He/she,” she elaborates,
“is self-critically cognizant of being part of and specifically located with in a social-political
world that constrains and enables human practices, where knowing and acting always
generate consequences” (5). Because of the “worldly implications” of ethos cultivation and
renegotiation, then, feminist ecological ethoi emphasizes relationship to stress responsibility
between actants who must negotiate (Ryan et al. 11).

Feminist Ecological Ethos and Diagnostic Networks
In their “Introduction,” Ryan et al. stress the strength women have historically
demonstrated their expert cultivations of ecological ethoi, but they also argue that “any
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marginalized rhetor can employ ecological ethoi” (4). While not all actants within the
medical and diagnostic networks that have been covered in this chapter are marginalized, I
want to briefly explore the value of such a model for diagnostic ethoi construction and
negotiation before I conclude this chapter.
First, feminist ecological ethos oﬀers an alternative approach to ethos generation that
can be relational and fluid. As previously mentioned, we should be wary of eﬀorts to embrace
fluidity to the neglect of interrogating ways in which it can be used to disempower some who
will be expected to exceed expectations due to their race, gender, sexuality, ability, or
ethnicity. However, the strength of such an approach is its recognition of the constantly
shifting parameters of expertise and the challenges of ever attaining enough authority to
make declarations about human bodies, which are ever-changing and ultimately
unknowable. The value of fluid ethos within diagnostic contexts might be its insistence that
ethos must evolve just as networks do, and that actants can pool expertise to generate
solutions, rather than relying on individual knowledge. While we might all appreciate a
world where doctors became certified with perfect knowledge of all medical conditions, a
more realistic approach to ethos generation would recognize the limitations of expertise and
the vitality of relational approaches to diagnosis.
Furthermore, just as Mol fails to account for the meta-level of networked deliberation
beyond hospital contexts, she also fails to suggest a method for challenging the status quo.
Feminist ecological ethos, on the other hand, acknowledges the significance of and oﬀers
suggestions for generating ethoi that challenge and reshape networks. Rather than simply
accepting the network’s project and working within its confines, actants must be capable of
working to change the conversation altogether by cultivating ethoi that reframe relationships
amongst actants. This approach oﬀers possibilities for responding to diagnostic networks that
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fail to account for the sociocultural conditions that shape them, and it also shifts creative
power to the rhetors, who might cultivate forms of ethoi that will be most eﬀective rather
than limiting their ethos construction to the pursuit of goodwill.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, feminist ecological ethoi challenge me to
speak to the meta-level of my own project. While my primary focus for this project was
broadening the scope of diagnostic networks in hospital settings, feminist ecological ethoi
projects highlight the significance of paying attention to the broader scale problems facing
healthcare networks now and in the future. We must learn to recognize the contributions of
ecological and non-human actants—not only because to do so is ethical and humane, but
because it might help us actually preserve and enhance human life. Our ethical obligation to
protect the environment and care for animals intersects with our responsibility to create a
world that is inhabitable for all humans—particularly those who are rendered most
vulnerable by the eﬀects of climate change and other global atrocities, such as deforestation
and the over harvesting of seafood. These problems will have real eﬀects on human lives and
human health in the decades to come, and they require networked intervention to the same
degree—if not more—that a patient requires a diagnosis.

Conclusion
Part of the reason why I chose to focus on ethos in this, the final chapter of my
dissertation on diagnostic networks, is because of its significance to decision making.
Diagnosis hinges on decisions made not by medical experts alone, but by actants who are
thrust together by chance, disease, and constraints of time, location, and finances. Since
ethos is a mobilizing force that generates action on the part of actants, then, its alternative
framing seems a significant way to close this project, which has attempted to shift the ways in
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which diagnostic communication and deliberation gets framed rhetorically. More specifically,
reconsidering ethos is an important final step towards resituating diagnosis because it deals
with the realm of the possible, opening up pathways for intervention and responsibility.
According to Smith, “ethos informs decision making, thus moving a people to their
potentiality” (4). Additionally, “The teleological dimensions of ethos lead the speaker toward a
higher potential, one capable of advancing a cause, uplifting an audience, and guiding a
society aright, one that can improve the mutual dwelling place” (15-6). Thus, ethos
generation and negotiation oﬀers what perhaps few other concepts within this project can: a
chance to make a diﬀerence.
Diagnostic communication is bound up in specialized language and isolated in
settings far removed from the average American—unless, of course, they are being diagnosed
themselves or are witnessing the diagnosis of a friend or family member. However, there are
two major ways in which we might intervene to positively aﬀect diagnostic networks. First,
in “The Empathy Exams,” Leslie Jamison invites readers to enter the strange world of medical
acting. Jamison works hourly as a pretend patient, testing medical students on their
knowledge, diagnostic accuracy, and—most interestingly—their ability to empathize.
Although she primarily describes her job as getting paid to “play sick,” she also highlights the
rhetorical elements of the scripted interactions:
You get a script and a paper gown. You get $13.50 an hour. Our scripts are
ten to twelve pages long. They outline what’s wrong with us—not just what
hurts but how to express it. They tell us how much to give away, and when.
We are supposed to unfurl the answers according to specific protocol. The
scripts dig deep into our fictive lives: the ages of our children and the diseases
of our parents, the names of our husbands’ real estate and graphic design
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firms, the amount of weight we’ve lost in the past year, the amount of alcohol
we drink each week. (1)
Jamison and her fellow actors are supposed to evaluate medical students based on their
identification of “crucial pieces of information” within the patient’s narrative (2). For
example, the “STD Grandma” character is supposed to “hid[e] behind her shame like a veil”
for having “cheated on her husband of forty years [with] a case of gonorrhea to show for
it” (3). Jamison explains wryly, “If [the student] asks the right questions, [STD Grandma
will] have a simulated crying breakdown halfway through the encounter” (3). In less
emotionally intense interactions, the student might get points for uncovering previous drug
abuse, medication allergies, or past trauma—such as the death of a close friend or relative. By
piecing together the clues and deciphering the actor’s unspoken symptoms, students are to
determine the correct diagnosis. In this way, the first part of the exam ask students to do, in a
contrived setting, what they will do in the future as they work with patients: collaboratively
construct narratives about which the patient herself may not be totally conscious.
While the end goal of the first part of the exam is for students to correctly identify
and diagnose the presenting problem, Jamison labels the second half of the checklist “the
empathy exams.” Jamison reveals that “Checklist item 31 is generally acknowledged as the
most important category: ‘Voiced empathy for my situation/problem’” (3). Some students
fail this test by aggressively attempting to “wrestl[e] [Jamison] into eye contact” even though
her script tells her to avoid it (4). One student fails by forgetting the pretense of the situation
and asking in-depth follow-up questions about her fake hometown “beyond the purview of
the script” (4). Others technically fulfill the test’s requirements by adopting a mechanical
method for expressing empathy: “that must be really hard [to have a dying baby], that must be
really hard [to be afraid you’ll have another seizure in the middle of the grocery store], that
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must be really hard [to carry in your uterus the bacterial evidence of cheating on your
husband]” (4-5). Jamison finds, through her tests, that empathy cannot be reduced to an
item on a checklist; it involves attunement to the other person and her unique needs. But
perhaps more importantly, empathy is interactional—“we’re holding the fiction between us
like a jump rope,” Jamison writes—and intentional (23). Jamison explains, “Empathy isn’t
just something that happens to us—a meteor shower of synapses firing across the brain—it’s
also a choice we make: to pay attention, to extend ourselves” (23). Rather than viewing
empathy as a kind of innate impulse that medical students must learn to reveal to patients,
Jamison instead argues that empathy is a choice they must make, an intentional positioning
of themselves as open and responsive to the patient’s needs.
Ultimately, Jamison argues that empathy is not only interactional; it involves, too, an
acceptance of one’s limitations within the interaction. “[E]mpathy isn’t just measured by
checklist item 31,” she writes:
Empathy isn’t just remembering to say that must be really hard—it’s figuring
out how to bring diﬃculty into the light so it can be seen at all. Empathy isn’t
just listening, it’s asking the questions whose answers need to be listened to.
Empathy requires inquiry as much as imagination. Empathy requires
knowing you know nothing. Empathy means acknowledging a horizon of
context that extended perpetually beyond what you can see: an old woman’s
gonorrhea is connected to her guilt is connected to her marriage is connected
to her children is connected to the days when she was a child. All this is
connected to her domestically stifled mother, in turn, and to her parents’
unbroken marriage . . . Empathy means realizing trauma has no discrete
edges. Trauma bleeds. Out of wounds and across boundaries. (5)
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In some ways, Jamison’s ultimate conception of empathy transforms the two checklists into
contradictory tests: one measuring the medical students’ expertise and the other measuring
their willingness to be uncertain. Jamison speaks to the challenging role physicians play as
they must not only demonstrate their competence but also their humanity through their
willingness to accept what they do not know. Part of this process involves, as Jamison points
out, recognizing that patients are never singular just as illness itself is never singular.
Jamison’s presentation of the multiple, sometimes conflicting identities doctors must
cultivate speaks to the multiple ways in which we might intervene within networks:
cultivating empathy for the people who require care. While this might seem like an obscure
invitation to care for others, I want to suggest that caring for others is never a trite endeavor.
As Jamison reminds us, it is always intentional, always slightly uncomfortable, and it
demands of us a willingness to listen to what another person might need or want. Caring for
others in diagnostic network contexts could involve, for example, advocating for the
vulnerable populations who might be aﬀected by eﬀorts to cut access to aﬀordable
healthcare, such as those with preexisting conditions who might have been denied insurance
coverage if the American Healthcare Act had passed. This might involve listening to a friend
who has been diagnosed with a disease or who has just learned that she is at risk for a disease.
This might mean working compassionately with students who are aﬀected by disease, who
live with daily uncertainty, and reforming course policies to serve such students. It might
even mean educating oneself about how to respond empathetically when a person needs
support due to a recent diagnosis—beyond saying “that must be really hard.” Empathy is
hard, but it is nonetheless a responsibility that emerges through diagnostic networks; if we
are all connected via networks of health and disease, then we all bear a responsibility to care
for each other and participate within such networks as global citizens but also human beings.
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Furthermore, a second major way in which we might intervene within healthcare
networks involves larger scale change—one that moves beyond the realm of the
interpersonal. In order to illustrate the scope of our responsibility as global citizens, who each
have a small but important role in shaping public health networks, I want to quote
Quammen’s list of the ways in which humans bring pandemics upon themselves at length, as
it speaks to both the complexity and necessity of our intervention and response. He positions
citizens as the secondary respondents to disease crises—just after expert public health oﬃcial
and scientists—and therefore charges them with the responsibility to be informed and active.
He elaborates:
The experts have alerted us to these factors [that cause disease] and it’s easy
enough to make a list. We have increased our population to the level of 7
billion and beyond. We are well on our way toward 9 billion before our
growth trend is likely to flatten. We live at high densities in many cities. We
have penetrated, and we continue to penetrate, the last great forests and other
wild ecosystems on the planet, disrupting the physical structures and the
ecological communities of such places. We cut our way through the Congo.
We cut our way through the Amazon. We cut our way through Borneo. We
cut our way through Madagascar. We cut our way through New Guinea and
northeastern Australia. We shake the trees, figuratively and literally, and
things fall out. We kill and butcher and eat many of the wild animals found
there. We settle in those places, creating villages, work camps, towns,
extractive industries, new cities. We bring in our domesticated animals,
replacing the wild herbivores with livestock. We multiply our livestock as
we’ve multiplied ourselves, operating huge factory-scale operations involving
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thousands of cattle, pigs, chickens, ducks, sheep, and goats, not to mention
hundreds of bamboo rats and palm civets, all confined en masse within pens
and corrals, under conditions that allow these domestics and semidomestics
to acquire infectious pathogens from external sources (such as bats roosting
over the pig pens), to share those infections with one another, and to provide
abundant opportunities for the pathogens to evolve new forms, some of
which are capable of infecting a human as well as a cow or a duck. We treat
many of those stock animals with prophylactic doses of antibiotics and other
drugs, intended not to cure them but to foster their weight gain and maintain
their health just suﬃciently for profitable sale and slaughter, and in doing
that we encourage the evolution of resistant bacteria. We export and import
livestock across great distances and at high speeds. We export and import
other live animals, especially primates, for medical research. We export and
import wild animals as exotic pets. We export and import animal skins,
contraband bushmeat, and plants, some of which carry secret microbial
passengers. We travel, moving between cities and continents even more
quickly than our transported livestock. We stay in hotels where strangers
sneeze and vomit. We eat in restaurants where the cook may have butchered a
porcupine before working on our scallops. We visit monkey temples in Asia,
live markets in India, picturesque villages in South America, dusty
archeological sites in New Mexico, dairy towns in the Netherlands, bat caves
in East Africa, racetracks in Australia—breathing the air, feeding the animals,
touching things, shaking hands with friendly locals—and then we jump on
our planes and fly home. We get bitten by mosquitos and ticks. We alter the
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global climate with our carbon emissions, which may in turn alter the
latitudinal ranges within which those mosquitos and ticks live. We provide an
irresistible opportunity for enterprising microbes by the ubiquity and
abundance of our human bodies. (515-6).
As Quammen’s intersectional analysis of the problems caused by human actants within global
health networks illustrates, suggestions for responding within such networks will require
complex, collaborative, and multi-layered eﬀorts. In some ways, the problems Quammen
presents might seem insurmountable because of the sheer volume of actants involved.
However, Quammen’s analysis also demonstrates the significance of a networked approach,
since within both ANT and ecological models for understanding global health networks,
relations between actants always stand open to revision and intervention. Thus, in my closing
remarks, I want to make several suggestions for how concerned actants might begin to take
action and reshape public health networks while we still can.
The first steps for reshaping public health networks via public policy and
environmental ethics entails shifting towards a networked, relational view of such practices,
as problems facing the environment also aﬀect animal habitats, human health, and the
availability of crucial resources. In some ways, this first recommendation speaks to the
limitations of ANT-based approaches to networked problems, as the larger social
conversation about global health concerns tends to isolate each problem and cultivate
individual responses. Future research should seek methods for mobilizing ANT for public
audiences and facilitating collaborative problem-solving not just within higher education but
within the public at large. Sonia Shah reiterates the importance of a global, relational view of
health as she stresses the importance of ensuring that all countries and hotspots for disease
are adequately prepared to monitor and respond to outbreaks. In particular, she finds the idea
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that past prevention methods will work for future diseases dubious at best. “Fixing the
present surveillance system is no small task,” she writes, “it will require easy and aﬀordable
health care for people everywhere. A network of clinics, staﬀed with health-care workers
trained to recognize and report new pathogens, could do the trick” (212). Shah posits that
disease networks are global constructions, and that we ignore this to our own detriment.
Rather than simply concerning ourselves with aﬀordable healthcare, treatment, and
medication in the United States, Shah reminds us that we have to look beyond our own
borders to foster eﬀective healthcare and disease surveillance systems globally in order to
prevent disease outbreaks and respond eﬀectively to them. Howard Markel echoes Shah’s
observations, arguing that “the human race is simply too interconnected to rely on walls or
borders as public health safeguards” anymore (208). Diseases slip through barriers—from
person to person, animal to person, skin to cells, and country to country. They travel
unchecked through security checkpoints at airports all over the globe. And the diseases
spread, sometimes invisibly and always randomly. Thus, global health infrastructure must
reflect the complexity of these diseases, which slip into bodies and countries and leave
devastating statistics in their wake.
Furthermore, we must educate ourselves about the global and individual practices
that currently threaten to perpetuate violence against the environment and thereby
undermine the health of vulnerable populations worldwide. This aspect of intervening in
global health networks might involve enlisting more concerned actants who are unaware of
threats to global health or environmental destruction—thereby educating them about the
problems that exist. However, a more important approach seems to be educating everyone
about the ways in which they can combat such consequences within their own networks. For
example, making the personal choice to only consume antibiotic and hormone free meat can
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help undermine an industry that pumps medications into animals that humans consume,
often with very little thought (if any) about the consequences of this process. While I am not
advocating for this decision as a complete solution, I do want to commend the thought
behind it; only by seeking to understand the local and global impact of our actions can we
make ethical choices.
This emphasis on educating ourselves and others about global risks for disease, and
human causes of pandemics and disease outbreaks, means that we must continue to grapple
with a challenge that has faced public health oﬃcials since at least 1892: we tend to forget
about public health infrastructure so long as Western countries remain relatively untouched
by contagious disease. Howard Markel clarifies, “[W]e continue to grapple with the essential
paradox of public health . . . when the system is working eﬀectively [at least for those in the
West], it is a silent venture and there are relatively few outbreaks of disease. These very
successes lead most of us down a complacent path of false confidence, apathy, and
assumptions that the endless dance is over” (210). Markel insists that while “‘Public health is
purchasable,’” in that we can fund healthcare and vaccinations for the world’s vulnerable and
poor populations rather than paying for weapons to fight them and walls to isolate them, “it
is an investment that works best when purchased in advance rather than paid out as each
crisis arises” (213). Failing to adequately communicate the relational and networked nature
of diseases can mean that we only respond—and demand response on the part of our
government through the allocation of resources—once a crisis is already underway. Markel
also highlights the importance of individual contributions to collective problems when he
personalizes the response that everyday citizens might take: “Sachs and his colleagues have
estimated that if every person living in a high-income nation today denied him-or herself the
luxury of one movie ticket and a bag of popcorn each year, the control of infectious killers
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such as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis could be easily funded at the levels recommended by
the United Nations” (213). By recasting networked relations as a series of informed choices,
we might encourage the thoughtful consumption and allocation of resources at the local
level, which might ultimately inspire national and global policy reform. One of the key
arguments of this project, then, is that failing to see that disease networks always encompass
global actants will have deadly consequences.
Finally, we must interrogate actants within public health networks, hold them
accountable, and protest their eﬀorts when they fail to support vulnerable populations. We
must advocate for the reshaping of networks when they fail to adequately meet our
healthcare needs. In this sense, recent protests at town halls held by conservative politicians
over the attempted Obamacare repeal highlight the power of concerned actants holding those
in power accountable. Ultimately, the Obamacare repeal was unsuccessful at least in part due
to fears, on the part of conservative politicians, that they would not be re-elected if they
failed to heed the concerns of those they represent. However, the success of protestor eﬀorts
in relation to dangerous healthcare legislation has failed to translate into successful response
to Trump’s proposed EPA budget cuts. In “I Ran George W. Bush’s EPA—and Trump’s Cuts
to the Agency Would Endanger Lives,” Christine Todd Whitman claims that Trump’s
proposed 31 percent decrease in EPA funding—it “would stand to lose approximately onethird of its total budget”—will have serious and permanent eﬀects on public health (n.p.).
For example, Whitman cites Trump’s halving of the Clean Air Act’s budget as a particularly
dangerous decision, since “A 2013 Massachusetts Institute of Technology study reported that
roughly 19,000 more people die prematurely from automobile pollution each year than die
in car accidents” (n.p.). The budget will also “reduce funding for the Great Lakes Restoration
Initiative, or GLRI, by more than 90 percent” even though “The Great Lakes are the largest
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surface freshwater source in the word . . . provid[ing] drinking water to approximately 40
million people in the United States and Canada” (n.p.). Thus government regulations of both
air and water pollution will be significantly diminished, likely resulting in heightened health
complications and even death in the short term. Long term eﬀects, of course, will include
further depletion of the ozone layer and the contamination of precious freshwater resources.
However, these structural risks that will aﬀect human health (not to mention the
environment and animals) fail to generate the same kind of outrage and responsiveness as
proposals to nix Obamacare precautions that provide coverage for the poor and protect
Americans at risk for disease.
Within this landscape—of an inescapable future haunted by a pandemic that will kill
millions of people worldwide—the good news is that public health networks are already
mobilized. We must support and add to the ongoing eﬀorts of such organizations at the
national and local level. We need to contribute our own resources of time, money, and
energy to collective eﬀorts to ensure eﬀective worldwide healthcare, and we need to pressure
our elected oﬃcials to do the same. We must, ultimately, learn to do what doctors do: move
beyond the diagnosis of a problem and towards deliberation about what to do next.
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